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Abstract 
In this thesis I explore three key debates within postcolonial theory. I argue for the 
efficacy of deploying deconstructive readings in postcolonial contexts. I closely 
analyse the debates in order to identify a number of important questions for the 
theorisation of postcoloniality. My discussion of the first debate between Gayatri 
Spivak and Benita Parry focuses on the problematics of representation, through an 
analysis of the questions of subalternity, native agency/resistance/insurgency, and, 
crucially, the question of the political positionality of the postcolonial intellectual as 
investigating subject. Jacques Derrida's debate on apartheid with Anne McClintock 
and Robert Nixon, although not expressed in the terms of postcolonial theory, raises 
questions of context, the necessity of ethics in intellectual discussion and the politics 
and ethics of deconstructive engagements with material situations. In the debate 
between Homi K. Bhabha and Benita Parry, I examine the question of the most 
apposite way to read the contribution of Frantz Fanon's work. I argue the latter debate 
offers a politico-theoretical insight or strategy that would be important for the 
development of postcolonial theory. Finally, I demonstrate how the South African 
appropriation of postcolonial theory (and the subsequent critique) rehearses some of 
the preoccupations of the previous debates. I argue that the particular version that 
South African advocates of postcolonial theory sought to install into the literary-
cultural agenda in the early 1990s, highlights an inattentiveness to the theory which it 
is concerned to appropriate. My thesis is concerned to argue that the debates need to 
be reread given some of the (mis)taken arguments I identify. The urgent, difficult and 
complex questions in contemporary South Africa are what postcolonial critics need to 
think through. I argue the urgency and difficulty of the South African case can be 
fruitfully interrogated by a deconstructive postcolonial theory. 
I declare that this thesis, unless specifically indicated to the contrary in the text, is my 
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In this thesis I will argue for the particular efficacy of a postcolonial theory informed by 
deconstruction. My own reading of the texts of deconstruction is largely informed by an 
engagement with (and by commentaries on) Jacques Derrida's work. Consequently, I will 
analyse the work of theorists who acknowledge an inheritance to deconstructive practices 
(or whose work commentators identify as such), and the critics of that inheritance. 
Taking Benita Parry's (1997) assertion that no overview or survey of postcolonial theory 
should begin without a discussion of the debate on the connotations and denotations of 
the term 'postcolonial', I here signal at that debate1. This debate was animated by, among 
other things, the question of the spatiality and temporality of what is constructed and 
delineated by the term postcolonial. The debate was no less vociferous around the 
question of the politics cohering to the institutionalisation of postcolonial theory as an 
explanatory model for the history of (the discourse of) (neo)colonialism. As it will be 
clear from the key questions I examine, this latter debate on the politics of postcolonial 
theory is related to what will be one of the major concerns of this thesis. 
In order to delimit an expansive field of study, my investigation will proceed through the 
close textual analysis of selected areas of critical contention within postcolonial theory, 
particularly where the theorisation of postcoloniality intersects with deconstruction. I 
should also acknowledge that I am aware that the term 'deconstruction' has itself not 
been without debate2. However, this thesis is particularly preoccupied with the 
enunciations of postcolonial theory. As such, the debate on the term deconstruction lies 
outside the bounds of my study. As for the usage of the term postcolonial within this 
thesis, the term will be contextualised within a discussion of the selected debates in 
postcolonial theory. Before delineating exactly what these sites of critical contention are, 
I should first like to set out the key questions to be addressed. 
1 For a discussion of the temporal singularity of the term 'postcolonialism', see Anne McClintock (1992); 
see also Ella Shohat (1992), Masao Miyoshi (1993) and Arif Dirlik (1994) for the adverse political 
implications connoted by the term; for an analysis of the metropolitan provenance of the term see Laura 
Chrisman (1995) and Aijaz Ahmad (1992); for the continuing importance of the term, despite the problems 
associated with it, see Parry (1997). 
2 For discussions on the term deconstruction, see Derrida (1991) and Nicholas Royle (2000). 
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Firstly, what are the functions of postcolonial intellectual production given that 
(according to Arif Dirlik) the contemporary situation of 'Global Capitalism' is a 
(necessary) condition of its emergence? That is, in what ways are the strategies employed 
in postcolonial theory and criticism complicit - given that the bulk of postcolonial 
intellectual production is produced in the 'Western' academy - with the dynamics of, 
among other things, the contemporary international division of labour? Secondly, in what 
ways are the questions of subalternity, alterity, representation and 'native' agency, 
resistance or insurgency presented within postcolonial theory? Thirdly, how efficacious is 
the use or deployment of 'derivative discourses' - including deconstructive practices 
themselves - within both the counter-discourses of the anti-
colonialist/liberationist/nationalist tradition and contemporary postcolonial theory? 
Fourthly, what are the attendant politics, ethics and pragmatics of deconstructive 
practices? Fifthly, in what ways have the contributions of anti-colonialist liberation1 
theory - particularly, the work of Frantz Fanon - been appropriated within postcolonial 
intellectual production? And lastly, how have postcoloniality (and postcolonial theory) 
and deconstruction been appropriated or read within the discourses of the South African 
literary-cultural establishment. 
These questions, as I have stated, will be addressed through the close textual analysis of 
particular debates within postcolonial theory. In chapter two I will analyse the debate 
initiated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988), as 
well as Benita Parry's attack on Spivak, in "Problems in Current Theories of Colonial 
Discourse" (1987)3. After detailing Spivak's brief response to Parry's essay, 1 will open 
the discussion to an exploration of the exchange between Laura Chrisman and Robert 
Young in Textual Practice (1997). Also, I will illustrate how this exchange foregrounds a 
possible misreading or (mis)taking of Spivak's insistence that postcolonial intellectuals j 
mark their political positionality. My discussion will be principally concerned to explore 
how the questions of representation, subalternity and 'native' agency, insurgency or 
3 The dates of publication I give for the Spivak and Parry's essays seem to reverse the trajectory of the 
debate. My own discussion refers to the reprinted edition of "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988), whereas 
Parry's attack is animated by, among other things, Spivak's initial articulations in "Can the Subaltern 
Speak? Speculations on Widow-Sacrifice" (1985). 
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resistance emerge in the debate. Before briefly signalling one of the important questions 
raised in the debate - namely, the question of the ethico-political viability of 
deconstructive practices when they are brought to the analysis and theorisation of 
(post)colonial contexts - I will explore the value and limitations of both Parry and 
Spivak's arguments. As such, 1 will have recourse to further responses to the debate by 
other commentators and critics. One of the concerns briefly touched upon in the exchange 
between Chrisman and Young concerns the exemplary status South Africa has seemed to 
enjoy for postcolonial criticism. I will engage with this question more closely in my 
conclusion. 
In chapter three 1 will examine Derrida's intervention into the debate on apartheid, in his 
essay "Racism's Last Word" (1985), as an unequivocal instance of what Derrida has 
articulated as the relation between "deconstruction and the 'yes'". I will explore the 
charge that Derrida's work or deconstruction in general is too esoteric, interesting yet 
only theoretically or philosophically so - only concerned, as it were, with a 
deconstruction of the 'Western metaphysics of presence or logocentrism'. What I will 
investigate here is precisely how Derrida's appeal in his essay on apartheid risks an 
ethico-political intervention in 'the real-world' or 'the material', as a call for the demise 
of apartheid and an invocation of responsibility to the future remembrance of its text. 
Thus my argument will attempt to illustrate how McClintock and Nixon's response, "No 
Names Apart: The Separation of Word and History in Derrida's 'Le Dernier Mot du 
Rascime'" (1986), and some subsequent commentary, misreads the deconstructive 
reformulation of the concept of (con)text. 
Given the accusation that Derrida's gesture is an attempt to exteriorise the text of 
apartheid as a distinctively South African phenomenon - in order to occlude an 
understanding of the West's complicities and duplicities with (among other things, the 
political, economic, theological and military discourses of) the apartheid South African 
regime - 1 once again consider the question of the political positionality of the intellectual 
as investigating subject. Given the intensity of this debate, I will then explore the 
question of an 'ethics of discussion', to which Derrida elsewhere states his commitment. 
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Finally, 1 will discuss the charge that Derrida's work and deconstruction in general, far 
from being radical, is apolitical, if not anti-revolutionary and conservative, and consider 
how this is related to the 'political demand' made of Derrida's work - the demand that he 
express his politics in the conventional grammars of political philosophy. 
In chapter four 1 will critically analyse the debate around Homi K. Bhabha's 
(post)colonial intellectual production, but particularly his appropriation and reading of 
the work of Frantz Fanon. 1 will here proceed through the analysis of Bhabha's essay 
"Interrogating Identity: Frantz Fanon and the Postcolonial Prerogative". The latter essay 
offers a useful point of entry into the debate. This is because it encapsulates a number of 
the concepts Bhabha has already theorised elsewhere. Once again, Benita Parry's attack 
in "Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse" will be important not only for 
its critique of Bhabha's appropriation of Fanon, but also its brief delineation of her own 
reading of Fanon's work. However, given that I already explore some of the limitations 
of Parry's position on native agency and resistance in my discussion of her attack on 
Spivak, I here explore her (revised) position on Fanon and the anti-colonialist tradition in 
"Resistance Theory/Theorizing Resistance or Two Cheers for Nativism" (1994). 
Once again, my analysis of this debate aims to test the central question of my thesis. That 
is, what I will explore here is the extent to which Bhabha's deconstructive practices are 
flexible in addressing both the stereotypes of the politico-institutional discourse of 
colonialism, and also the articulations of anti-colonialist discourse. I will tender my own 
brief account of Fanon's thought on politics, native agency and resistance. It is my hope 
that this will highlight some of the possible misunderstandings in both Parry and 
Bhabha's readings of Fanon. In this chapter, I clarify the major politico-theoretical 
insight or strategy that a reading of Fanon's work opens for any conception of an 
intellectual counter-hegemonic practice. Also, I here briefly engage with Robert Young's 
"Subjectivity and History: Derrida in Algeria", in which Young argues for a rereading of 
Derrida's intellectual production (and some of the articulations of what came to be 
known as "poststructuralist theory") as a possible enunciation of postcolonial theory. 
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This thesis is concerned to argue that the presuppositions and questions raised in 
the debates under discussion are important for postcolonial theory. As it should be clear 
from the altogether tendentious title I have given to my study, I believe that the 
importance of re-reading the debates - with the care, rigour and patience that the strategy 
of close analysis perhaps opens - lies precisely in the residual or remainder expressed by 
and in the antagonism and agonism of the debates. I believe that the misreadings or what 
I denote as (mis)takings call for the debates to be reread. This remainder - what I call the 
"non-present perhaps" - is both interstitial and futural, as it attempts to leave open the 
movement of another knowledge or practice between (and yet always never quite 
arriving) the sometimes seemingly disparate standpoints of the participants to the debates. 
The title of my thesis already exhorts the need for the dynamics, experiences and 
temporalities of (post)coloniality to be understood as heterogeneous, so that its 
theorisation will not be narrowly explanatory. That is, there is a need for postcolonial 
critics to remain aware that, for instance, Fanon's theorisation of the Negro's alienation 
in Martinique or his interrogation of decolonisation in Algeria, and Spivak's articulation 
of 'satf as a particular instance of subalternity, should not be uncritically appropriated to 
other contexts. 
Thus in my conclusion I will read the South African literary-cultural appropriation of 
postcolonial theory within the purview of the previous metropolitan debates in order to 
investigate the relays traced by this particular appropriation as both a possible 
retrospective lesson for the previous debates and an introspective lesson for the South 
African case. That is, I will explore in a condensed way the significance of the 
metropolitan debates for the South African appropriation of postcolonial theory and the 
counter-significance of the South African debate for the former. Thus I will investigate 
the ways the debate on the South African appropriation of postcolonial theory possibly 
rehearses some of the concerns of the previous debates. Given that the exchange between 
Laura Chrisman and Robert Young takes place some five years after the South African 
debate, this signals that the debates do need to be reread. When we consider that the 
South African debate occurs within its own distinctive milieu, the consequences of that 
rehearsal emerge differently. I will here explore the particular takes on postcolonial 
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theory that David Attwell, Leon de Kock and Annamaria Carusi attempted to install onto 
the South African literary-cultural discursive agenda in the early 1990s. So too will I 
examine Nicholas Visser and Kelwyn Sole's critiques of this appropriation. The 
importance of this period for the South African calendar cannot be underestimated. It was 
during this space of transition that the conditions of possibility for South Africa's 
negotiated settlement were officially sketched out - the final programme for the 
dismantling of the apartheid state and the constitution of a new republic where the fruits 
of citizenship were opened to all South Africans. In short, a future where the colonial past 
will finally be transcended. 
We shall see that the four major concerns I identify in the South African debate reiterate 
some of those I discuss in the earlier debates. The first of these has to do with the 
applicability of the term postcolonial or a notion of postcoloniality for the South African 
experience. This preoccupation questions the appositeness of holding South Africa to be 
an exemplary instance of postcoloniality. I then discuss the concern that the 
demonstrations or readings of a deconstructive postcolonial theory lead to the critical 
disablement of the investigating intellectual. The latter concern is related to both the 
question of the political implications of postcolonial theory in South Africa, and the 
question of the focus on race and cultural difference within that appropriation. Finally, I 
speculate on some of the contradictions of the transition to democracy that have 
manifested themselves in contemporary South Africa. The latter will not be an attempt to 
dispute the necessity and the achievement of the constitutional settlement in South 
Africa, but rather an attempt to highlight some of the urgent questions that have yet to be 
answered in the country. Nor will I claim the originality of foregrounding the 
contradictions of the South African democratic project. Rather, I will be attempting to 
highlight some possible sites of intervention and intellectual practice for postcolonial 
theory in South Africa. An intellectual practice that I will argue can learn from the 
(mis)takes within the debates on postcolonial theory. Indeed, this is what I try to suggest 
in the title to my thesis. 
2 
Subaltern Hearings: Postcolonial Intellectual 
Positionality and the Problematics of Representation 
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The prolific and fragmentary intellectual production of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is 
perhaps one of the most significant contributions to postcolonial theory and analysis. Her 
dense and sometimes cryptic writing style, together with the complexity of its inflection 
with 'high' theory, has meant however that her work is some of the most challenging in 
the field. This complexity has resulted in the regrettable tendency to arrive at what are 
often uncritical summations of her work. My own investigation will largely proceed 
through the strategy of close textual analysis of the two major texts informing what came 
to be known as the Spivak/Parry debate. That is, Spivak's provocative essay "Can the 
Subaltern Speak?" and Benita Parry's attack on her position in "Problems in Current 
Theories of Colonial Discourse". This chapter will however not restrict itself to the 
moment of the debate's emergence. 
After undertaking a close reading of Spivak's essay, 1 will analyse Parry's own lengthy 
essay, inasmuch as her criticisms relate to Spivak. I will however have recourse to 
Parry's other arguments - on Frantz Fanon, Homi K. Bhabha and Abdul JanMohamed -
insofar as these inform her general complaints against Spivak's work. I will explore what 
seems to be a rehearsal of the debate almost a decade later, in the encounter between 
Laura Chrisman and Robert Young in an issue of Textual Practice (1997). I will 
investigate how the latter encounter is an exemplary repetition of some of the terms of the 
debate between Spivak and Parry. Then I will argue that the encounter highlights a 
particular misreading or (mis)taking of Spivak's insistence that it is imperative for the 
intellectual to mark his/her political positionality as investigating subject. Variously 
drawing from other contributions to the debate, I will then expose the value and 
limitations of both Parry and Spivak's arguments - largely focusing on questions of 
subalternity, 'native' agency/resistance and political positionality. In closing my 
discussion of the debate, I will signal at one of the major issues informing the debate: 
namely, the specific relations between deconstructive practices and the questions of 
politics, pragmatics and ethics - especially for the analysis or theorising of (post)colonial 
contexts. 
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After briefly setting out the broad concerns of her paper, it comes as no surprise that 
Spivak should invoke her own positionality. She rhetorically muses that whatever 
"power" her meditations command is perhaps "earned by a politically interested refusal 
to push to the limit the founding presuppositions of [her] desires, as far as they are within 
[her] grasp" (1988:271). This precarious invocation of her positionality - which she 
attempts to foreground throughout her paper - is levied to emphasise what she sees as the 
vacuity associated with much of the calling into question of the place of the researcher 
which surrounded critiques of subjective sovereignty at the time. As will become evident 
later, this is precisely one of the directions that the Chrisman/Young exchange erringly 
takes. Spivak then asserts that most radical criticism produced in the West effectively 
conserves "the subject of the West, or the West as Subject" (1988:271). In order to 
demonstrate how this "concealed" Subject is precisely inaugurated by the critique of the 
sovereign subject - as in the theorisation of pluralized "subject-effects" - she closely 
reads a text by two of its most influential practitioners: "Intellectuals and Power: A 
Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze". She notes that the 
conversation highlights the salient 
contributions of French poststructuralist theory: first, that the networks of 
power/desire/interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction to a coherent 
narrative is counterproductive - a persistent critique is needed; and second, that 
intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know the discourse of society's Other. 
(272) 
Despite these contributions, according to Spivak, Foucault and Deleuze are methodical in 
their elision of the question of ideology and their own roles as functionaries in 
"intellectual and economic history" (272) . Although primarily concerned with the 
critique of the sovereign subject, Spivak notes that their exchange coheres by signalling 
"two monolithic and anonymous subjects-in-revolution: 'A Maoist' and 'the workers'" 
1 It should be noted that Foucault does (once) signal at the complicities of intellectual production with 
contemporary power relations: "Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of power - the idea of 
their responsibility for 'consciousness' and discourse forms part of the system" (1977:207). However, it is 
this very idea of limited responsibility - I would say limited liability - that leads Foucault and Deleuze to 
pronounce the end of representation. My assertion of course already follows the track of Spivak's analysis. 
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(272). For Spivak, the respective appeals to these latter subjects effectively renders 
"Asia" transparent and ignores the international division of labour. She thus asserts that 
the connection to the workers' struggle is located in a totalised anarchistic valorisation of 
"any desire destructive of any power" (272). 
Given the assertion that the connection to the workers' struggle is merely located in 
desire, Spivak then illustrates the limitations of their alternative revision of the 
psychoanalytic definition of desire. Their revised definition in no way alters the 
particularity of "the desiring subject (or leftover subject-effect) that attaches to specific 
instances of desire or to production of the desiring machine" (273). For Spivak, Deleuze 
and Guattari are unable to articulate a "theory of interests" because of their inattention to 
the significance of ideology and failure to attend to "the relations between desire, power 
and subjectivity" (273). Drawing on Althusser's attempt to schematise the dynamics of 
an "immense institutional heterogeneity", she asserts that Foucault - and in a similar 
mariner, Deleuze and Guattari - comes close to this in his consideration of "the pervasive 
heterogeneity of power" (1988:274). 
However, Spivak argues that Foucault's commitment to "genealogical" analysis does not 
allow him to "admit that a developed theory of ideology recognizes its own material 
production in institutionality, as well as in the 'effective instruments for the formation 
and accumulation of knowledge'" (274). In ignoring the apprehension of the textuality of 
ideology, Spivak contends that Foucault and Deleuze can only theorise a mechanical 
relation between desire and interest. Their "orthodox" schema is thus for her a 
"parasubjective matrix, cross-hatched with heterogeneity" - the result of conceptualising 
an "undifferentiated desire as agent" (274), whose effects are created by the elusive 
intervention of power. For Spivak, this singular opposition of desire to "being deceived" 
is a rehearsal of the sort of thinking which defines ideology as mere "false 
consciousness" (274). Thus, "in the name of desire, [Foucault and Deleuze] reintroduce 
the undivided subject into the discourse of power ... [and reinscribe] the Subject of 
Europe" (1988:274). 
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Spivak reemphasises that the negation of the role of ideology in reproducing relations 
within "socialized capital" necessarily valorises the "oppressed as subject" - through 
essentialising the materiality of the experiential - and forecloses the necessary though 
"difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production" (1988:275). For Spivak, 
Deleuze's pronouncement about the end of signification - and thus the signifier 
"representation" - within theoretical production, is the mark of an intellectual anxiety 
that seeks to prove the equivalence of intellectual and manual labour. Deleuze's latter 
articulation arises from the problematic conflation of the "irreducibly discontinuous" 
(275) double inscription within the term and concept of representation. For Spivak, 
submerged within this move is an untenable "subject-privileging" of the intellectual as 
speaking-agent over subjects (or remnant subject-effects) whom Deleuze and Foucault 
define as those who "act and struggle". That is, Deleuze and Foucault effectively define 
the latter as unspeaking automatons. Moreover, she asserts that this highlights an attempt 
to elide the presence of the intellectual at the very site of inscribing a "list of self-
knowing, politically canny subalterns" (275) - a move that Spivak argues "leads to an 
essentialist, Utopian politics" (1988:276). 
Spivak then precisely delineates her understanding of the textuality of the double 
inscription of representation. "Vertretung [is] representation in the political context. 
Representation in the economic context is Darstellung, the philosophical concept of 
representation as staging or, indeed, signification" (1988:278). She garners this 
understanding of the two senses of representation - which she signals by hyphenating the 
second instance - from an extensive reading of a passage in Marx's The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. This is done in order to suggest that an even more radical 
decentring of the subject is implicit in Marx, than in the contemporary critiques of the 
sovereign subject articulated by Deleuze and Foucault: 
Not only does [Marx's] model of social indirection ... imply a critique of the 
subject as individual agent but a critique even of the subjectivity of a collective 
agency... [And], the event of representation as Vertretung (in the constellation of 
rhetoric-as-persuasion) behaves like a Darstellung (or rhetoric-as-trope), taking 
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its place in the gap between the formation of a (descriptive) class and the 
nonformation of a (transformative) class. (1988:277) 
For Spivak, the non-articulation of "a theory of exploitation as the extraction 
(production), appropriation, and realization of (surplus) value as representation of labor 
power, capitalist exploitation must [in Foucault and Deleuze] be seen as a variety of 
domination (the mechanics of power as such)" (1988:279). In a different register -
though reiterating an earlier call for the need of a developed theory of ideology - Spivak 
argues the "relationship between global capitalism (exploitation in economics) and 
nation-state alliances (domination in geopolitics) is so macrological that it cannot account 
for the micrological texture of power" (1988:279). A developed theory of ideology would 
precisely open up the space of interrogation by the intellectual concerned to intervene 
within that micrological dissimulation. 
As such, Spivak calls for a "radical practice" within intellectual production that would 
attend to the "double session" of representation. Given the discursive authority of the 
'intellectual as investigating subject', this would minimally suggest vigilance, at the very 
site of intellectual articulation, and attention to any reconstitution of the 'oppressed as 
subject'. Although Spivak is obliged to note the subterfuge in Marx's appeal to the binary 
opposition nature/culture, she argues that his suspending of the realm of "class practice 
on a second level of abstraction" effectively keeps open Kant and Hegel's various 
"critiquefs] of the individual subject as agent" (1988:279). As such, "in the context of 
poststructuralist claims to critical practice", she finds Marx's project seemingly "more 
recuperable than the clandestine restoration of subjective essentialism" (279). To Edward 
Said's critique of power in Foucault as a thoroughly hegemonic and "mystificatory 
category", Spivak adds the notion of the clandestine "subject of power and desire" 
evidenced by the assumed transparency of the intellectual, which she argues arises from 
the denegation of "the critic's institutional responsibility". Hence Spivak's suggestion 
that in light of 
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the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of the 
Other as the Self s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intellectual 
would be to put the economic "under erasure", to see the economic factor as 
irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however 
imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental 
signified. (1988:280) 
Spivak is not here asserting that the possibility of a counter-hegemonic intellectual 
practice emerges from the elision of the economic domain. If I interpret her correctly, she 
is here attempting to highlight the foreclosures entailed by an intellectual practice that 
essentialises the economic as the final horizon of interpretation. Such determinism 
resonates with assumptions about the self-evidence of 'the material', which would in the 
final analysis foreclose the apprehension of the heterogeneity of the Other through other 
relays of difference. 
In the next section Spivak explores this "persistent constitution of the Other as the 
Self s shadow", the clearest example being for her the "remotely orchestrated, far-flung, 
and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other ... [An] 
asymmetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subject-ivity" 
(1988:281). She questions the normativity of Foucault's monofocal location of epistemic 
violence in the redefinition of psychosis at the end of the European eighteenth century; it 
does not acknowledge the possibility that the project of "epistemic overhaul" included the 
colonies. Spivak leverages a "schematic summary of the epistemic violence of the 
codification of Hindu Law" (281), in order to give credence to her final analysis of 
widow-sacrifice. She briefly motivates her choice of Indian material, yet cautions that the 
"Indian case cannot be taken as representative of all countries, nations, cultures, and the 
like that may be invoked as the Other of Europe as Self (1988:281). This caution is 
precisely for intellectuals to avoid the easy, uncritical appropriation of her investigation 
of the violent function of the colonial and imperial episteme within the particularities of 
the Indian context; to remain aware, as it were, of the differential histories of colonial 
experience. 
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She exposes how, at the end of the eighteenth century, Hindu law, "operated in terms of 
four texts that 'staged' a four-part episteme defined by the subject's use of memory: sruti 
(the heard), smriti (the remembered), sastra (the learned-from-another), and vyavahara 
(the performed-in-exchange)" (1988:281). Spivak notes how the possible discontinuity of 
origin between the heard and the remembered presented a problem in the discourse and 
application of Hindu law. This was due to the uncertainty of legal theorists and 
practitioners at the time as to whether the structure described the corpus, or prescribed 
four ways of settling a dispute. She thus offers this narrative of (bifurcated) codification 
of "the polymorphous structure of legal performance" (1988:281) as an example of 
epistemic violence. Given the currency of the story of Indian education, Spivak explores 
the dynamics of epistemic violence manifested in its narrative: 
The education of colonial subjects compliments their production in law. One 
effect of establishing a version of the British system was the development of an 
uneasy separation between disciplinary formation in Sanskrit studies and the 
native, now alternative, tradition of Sanskrit "high culture". Within the former, 
cultural explanations generated by authoritative scholars matched the epistemic 
violence of the legal project. (1988:282) 
Spivak then traces the Orientalism that coheres to those scholars, and comments that the 
piecemeal effect of their authority succeeded in establishing a version of history in which 
the intentions (and consequent legitimation) of the codifying British were seen as 
identical to those of the Brahmans. These "authorities" are not the Other as Subject that 
she earlier affirmed are inaccessible to intellectuals like Foucault and Deleuze; but rather, 
Spivak is "thinking of the general nonspecialist, nonacademic population across the class 
spectrum, for whom the epistemic operates its silent programming function" (1988:282-
83). In response to Foucault and Deleuze's pronouncement that the oppressed, if given 
the chance, (by the beneficent - though transparent - intellectual) en route to "solidarity 
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through alliance politics ... can speak and know their conditions" , she poses the 
provocative question that is her paper's title: 
On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, 
inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and 
education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? 
(1988:283) 
The term and concept of subalternity has a history, and it is for this reason that Spivak 
proceeds to delineate its functioning within her own thinking. 
Spivak acknowledges - and notes the limitations of - Gramsci's work on 
"subaltern classes" as a contribution to the "class-position/class-consciousness 
argument". For her, Gramsci's account of the phased development of the subaltern is 
ruptured when "his cultural macrology is operated, however remotely, by the epistemic 
interference with legal and disciplinary definitions accompanying the imperialist project" 
(1988:283). Spivak then analyses the work of the "Subaltern Studies" group, whose 
project is to re-present (darstellen) "Indian historiography from the perspectives of the 
discontinuous chain of peasant insurgencies during the colonial occupation" (1988:283); 
thus the group's methodology insists that they ask whether or not the subaltern can speak. 
Spivak cannot entirely concur with Ranajit Guha's "insistence on [the] determinate vigor 
and full autonomy" (1988:284) of subaltern consciousness. She identifies in Guha's 
construction of a definition of "the people" as "identity-in-differential" - this is done in 
order to assuage charges of essentialism - a program that self-professedly investigates 
and measures the third of the four groups, who "ideally speaking, [belonged] to the 
category of people or subaltern classes" (1988:284). This slippage, within the text of the 
Subaltern Studies group, occurs "because of the violence of imperial epistemic, social, 
and disciplinary inscription" and, as such, the group's "text articulates the difficult task of 
rewriting its own conditions of impossibility as the conditions of possibility" (1988:285). 
2 Here is an instance of this in the Foucault/Deleuze conversation: "In engaging in a struggle that concerns 
their own interests, whose objectives they clearly understand and whose methods only they can determine, 
they enter into a revolutionary process" (1977:216, my emphasis). 
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Nonetheless, Spivak does concede that the group's recognition of the discontinuity 
between interest and action in the third group of their taxonomy, and Guha's articulation 
of "interest in terms of the social rather than the libidinal" is - in coming closer to Marx -
more salutary than Deleuze's pronouncement on the matter. She briefly explores Ajit K. 
Chaudhury's critique of Guha's historiography and concludes that Chaudhury's "variety 
of 'internationalist' Marxism", Foucault and Deleuze, and the Subaltern Studies group 
are "united in the assumption that there is a pure form of consciousness" (1988:286). For 
Spivak, what is missing in each of the latter is a "developed theory of ideology". Reading 
Pierre Macherey's formula for the interpretation of ideology in literary texts within a 
differential register, Spivak affirms "something like a collective ideological refusal can 
be diagnosed for the codifying practice of imperialism", which - unlike the analysis of 
literary texts - certainly requires the task of "measuring silences" (1988:286). 
Macherey's "notion of what the [literary] work cannot say becomes important" when the 
concomitant question of subaltern consciousness is considered. It is here that Spivak 
more extensively rearticulates her notion of a postcolonial intellectual radical practice: 
In the semioses of the social text, elaborations of insurgency stand in the place of 
"the utterance". The sender - "the peasant" - is marked only as a pointer to an 
irretrievable consciousness ... The historian, transforming "insurgency" into "text 
for knowledge," is only one "receiver" of any collectively intended social act. 
With no possibility for nostalgia for that lost origin, the historian must suspend (as 
far as possible) the clamor of his or her consciousness ... so that the elaboration 
of insurgency, packaged with an insurgent-consciousness, does not freeze into an 
"object of investigation", or, worse yet, a model for imitation. "The subject" 
implied by the texts of insurgency can only serve as a counterpossibility for the 
narrative sanctions granted to the colonial subject in the dominant groups. The 
postcolonial intellectuals learn that their privilege is their loss. In this they are a 
paradigm of the intellectuals. (1988:287) 
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For an entry into the discussion of the subaltern as female, Spivak comments on 
the similar engagements with the question of the feminine between both the 
deconstructive interrogation and (certain strands of) feminist critique, and Subaltern 
historiography. Unlike the deconstructive demonstration of this question, which already 
fits into a "phallocentric tradition" (1988:287) that minimally predicates the figure of 
"woman" as indeterminate - a figuration whose elisions, marginalisations and interests 
has been traced by feminist criticism - Subaltern historiography experiences the 
impossibility of its scene of writing. That is, the latter must realise that "both as object of 
colonial historiography and as subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of 
gender keeps the male dominant. If, in the context of colonial production, the subaltern 
has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow" 
(1988:287). Spivak motivates that the contemporary international division of labour is a 
spatial and temporal displacement of the text of nineteenth-century territorial 
imperialism. The maintenance of the international division of labour is achieved through 
the withholding of consumerism in comprador countries and, in the case of women, is 
exacerbated by patriarchal social relations: "On the other side of the international division 
of labor, the subject of exploitation cannot speak and know the text of female 
exploitation, even if the absurdity of the nonrepresenting intellectual making a space for 
her to speak is achieved" (1988:288). Thus if intellectuals exercise their institutional 
responsibility it becomes clear that to confront the heterogeneous Other "is not to 
represent (vertreten) them but [for intellectuals] to learn to represent (darstellen) 
[themselves]" (1988:288-89). 
In returning to the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze, Spivak comments on the 
limitations of their articulation of a resistance program based on alliance politics. For 
Spivak, such a program is "confined to the third-world groups that are directly accessible 
to the First World" (1988:289). As a consequence of Foucault's methodological 
presupposition of a "Subject-of-power", she asserts that he is unable to acknowledge the 
'First World-ist' geopolitical specificity of his invocation of "geographical 
discontinuity". However, his inability (or refusal?) to see contemporary "geographical 
discontinuity" as a displacement of an earlier territorial imperialism - a move that Spivak 
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suggests purchases a hermetic version of the West - discounts "its production in the 
imperialist project" (1988:291). Such foreclosures within Foucault's project would 
minimally necessitate the rethinking of the assumptions informing the appropriation of 
his work by all manner of academic and intellectual practitioners. 
Consequently, Spivak assesses the appropriation of French intellectual theory and 
criticism within the U.S. academy in general: "Foucault deals with real history, real 
politics, and real social problems; Derrida is inaccessible, esoteric, and textualist" 
(1988:291). Spivak argues the latter is the general pattern of the contrasting views about 
Foucault and Derrida held by a number of Anglo-American critics and intellectuals. To 
demonstrate the continuing usefulness of Derrida, Spivak considers a chapter in Of 
Grammatology, entitled "Of Grammatology as a Positive Science". Here Derrida offers a 
program for the "benevolent Western intellectual": "The question is how to keep the 
ethnocentric Subject from establishing itself by selectively defining an Other" 
(1988:292). The importance of this question for my thesis cannot be underestimated. 
Although Derrida specifically proffers a program for the "benevolent Western 
intellectual", his demonstration is particularly useful when taken with Spivak's call for 
the institutional responsibility of postcolonial intellectuals - who are, as she has asserted, 
a paradigmatic instance of the intellectual as such. To follow Derrida and Spivak here 
means to begin to fashion an intellectual practice that would be vigilant before any 
constructions of an "ethnocentric Subject". For postcolonial intellectuals, who are 
particularly concerned to rearticulate a differential figuration of the Third World - which 
would precisely no longer be figured as Third World - this would also mean to be critical 
of any constitution of the Other in a program of anti-ethnocentric ethnocentrism. It is a 
question, no doubt, of the 'political positionality' of the postcolonial intellectual as 
investigating subject - nothing less than a question of interrogating the postcolonial 
intellectual's own discursive authority. For Spivak, it is precisely Derrida's interrogation 
of "the European intellectual's ethnocentric impulse" (1988:292) that begins to suggest 
an intellectual practice that would not efface the place and interest of the intellectual as 
investigating subject. 
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Spivak then notes Derrida's comments on the convergent problems faced by empirical 
investigation and "grammatological" knowledge, and thus his assertion of an obligation 
to proceed through examples. As such, his examples "come from the appropriate 
ideological self-justification of an imperialist project": the three kinds of "prejudices" 
operating in seventeenth-century European histories of writing. That is, the "theological 
prejudice," the "Chinese prejudice," and the "hieroglyphist prejudice" (1988:292). After 
exposing the self-referential collusion of these three prejudices, as illustrated by Derrida, 
she argues that the efficacy of the grammatological project, is evidenced in Derrida's 
concession of 
the vulnerability of his own desire to conserve something that is, paradoxically, 
both ineffable and nontranscendental. In critiquing the production of the colonial 
subject, this ineffable, nontranscendental ("historical") place is cathected by the 
subaltern subject. Derrida ... [shows] again that the project of grammatology ... is 
not just a critique of presence but an awareness of the itinerary of the discourse of 
presence in one's own critique, a vigilance precisely against too great a claim for 
transparency. (1988:293) 
Although she complains that the program of the constitution of the Other can be more 
fruitfully traced in "the imperialist constitution of the colonial subject than in repeated 
incursions into psychoanalysis or the 'figure' of woman", for Spivak, Derrida's work is 
exceedingly useful for its articulation of "the mechanics of the constitution of the Other". 
Not completely abandoning Foucault, she adds that he remains useful in his analysis of 
"the mechanics of disciplinarization and institutionalization, the constitution, as it were, 
of the colonizer" (1988:294). Despite the usefulness of Foucault's project, Spivak once 
again reiterates the danger posed by his inattention to the function of intellectuals as 
investigating subjects. 
In the final section of her essay Spivak cautions intellectuals to watch out for the 
persistent "recognition of the Other by assimilation" (1988:294) - especially in the case 
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of the poor-black-female subaltern as subject. For Spivak, the transposition of a 
chromatic identity politics "from the first-world context into the postcolonial" loses its 
persuasive significance: "The necessary stratification of colonial subject-constitution in 
the first phase of capitalist imperialism makes 'color' useless as an emancipatory 
signifier" (1988:294). For Spivak, this does not foreclose "antisexist work among women 
of color or women in class oppression in the First World or the Third World" (1988:295). 
Rather, what needs to be interrogated are the dangers implicit in the long run 
consequence of such anti-sexist work. Effectively sustained by "the assumption and 
construction of a consciousness or subject... [it] will cohere with the work of imperialist 
subject-constitution, mingling epistemic violence with the advancement of learning and 
civilization" (1988:295). Despite the difficulty of the question of the subaltern woman's 
consciousness, the postcolonial intellectual, in seeking to learn to speak to 'her', needs to 
methodically "unlearn" female privilege - a process that involves "the persistent critique 
of postcolonial discourse ... and not simply substituting the lost figure of the colonized" 
(1988:295). For Spivak, this would be as important for feminist criticism(s) as it would 
be for postcolonial critics in general, although perhaps more so for the former, given the 
interest to interrogate the sites of marginalised and elided female subjectivity or subject 
effects. 
Spivak argues against Jonathan Culler's suggestion that the result of the insistence on the 
heterogeneity of subaltern woman consciousness and experience is to produce an empty 
difference based on essentialising and privileging the "concrete experience" of a 
particular sexual identity. For Spivak, the feminist project as envisaged by the likes of 
Culler - which she acknowledges was a "necessary stage" in the development of feminist 
criticism - often positions itself as a critique of "positivism", which it marks as 
equivalent to "essentialism"; all of which is done in the name of "theory" (1988:295). 
This construction of a binary opposition between positivism/essentialism and "theory", 
not only represses the "ambiguous complicity between essentialism and critiques of 
positivism ... [but] also errs in implying that positivism is not a theory. [It is a] move 
[that] allows the emergence of a proper name, a positive essence, Theory" (1988:296). 
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Such moves repeat the elision of the question of the investigator's position. In order to 
confront the question of the consciousness of the female as subaltern, Spivak reinscribes 
the problem in a sentence - "White men are saving brown women from brown men" -
and transforms the latter into the object of investigation. With this sentence she draws an 
analogy "between the ideological victimization of a Freud and the positionality of the 
postcolonial intellectual as investigating subject" (1988:296). That is, Spivak's sentence 
is not dissimilar to Freud's construction of the sentence, "A child is being beaten", from 
whose "general methodological aura" (1988:297) she is attempting to borrow an 
investigative strategy. She thus considers the feminist criticism of Freud's investigation 
of his own sentence to be invaluable for an understanding of challenges faced by her own 
investigation. 
Spivak acknowledges Sarah Kofman's contribution to the critical understanding of the 
double-entendre involved in Freud's use of women as scapegoat: it is a "reaction-
formation" to an originary and persistent "desire to give the hysteric a voice, to transform 
her into the subject of hysteria" (1988:296). Spivak thus argues: 
[T]he masculine-imperialist ideological formation that shaped that desire into "the 
daughter's seduction" is part of the same formation that constructs the monolithic 
"third-world woman". As a postcolonial intellectual, 1 am influenced by that 
formation as well ... Thus, when confronted with the questions, Can the subaltern 
speak? and Can the subaltern (as woman) speak?, our efforts to give the subaltern 
a voice in history will be doubly open to the dangers run by Freud's discourse. 
(1988:296) 
That is, if the politics of Freud's attempt to recover the voice of the hysteric into 
something other than its construction within phallocentric or 'patrilogical' rationality 
ends up precisely cohering to a construction of the "subject of hysteria" as woman, then 
Spivak's desirous attempt to recover the historical consciousness of the subaltern woman 
at the interstices of "masculine-imperialist ideology" is in danger of recognising the 
'subject of subalternity' as woman by assimilation to the doubly enunciated (or forked 
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tongue?) of "masculine-imperial ideology". For Spivak, recognising these dangers should 
not impose closure - something like the subject of the subaltern female as taboo - on 
intellectual practice. Spivak proceeds to apply something similar to Freud's strategy on 
"the Marxist narrative to explain the ideological dissimulation of imperialist political 
economy and outline a history of repression that produces a sentence like the one [she 
sketches]" (1988:297). Although, surprisingly, Spivak's essay is largely an examination 
of subalternity through a discussion of the question of "widow self-immolation", the 
main debate that the essay initiated has not turned on this question as such. The occlusion 
of this question from the debate would require analysis whose texture lies outside the 
bounds of my thesis. For this reason, what follows will be a summary of Spivak's 
interesting and complex discussion of the history of widow self-immolation. This is 
because it illustrates the kind of deconstructive reading Spivak advocates, and it is 
fastened upon in Parry's critique. 
Spivak explores the double origin of this history in the British abolition of widow 
sacrifice in 1829 and the classical and Vedic texts of Hindu India. The former is generally 
understood to be a case of "White men saving brown women from brown men", whilst 
the latter, in an "Indian nativist" counterargument, asserts that "The women actually 
wanted to die" (1988:297). These sentences, she argues, are conjoined and successfully 
slur over any evidence of the "women's voice-consciousness". On the one hand, the 
British abolition of widow sacrifice was in deference to the "civilising" mission or the 
project to found a "good society" within the colony. On the other hand, "sati" was 
cathected by the "native 'colonial subject'" (1988:298) seeking a strategy - as proof of 
conformity to a threatened native custom/law/way-of-life - against acculturating to the 
British. 
For Spivak, although the first historical origin of her sentence might be lost in the Marxist 
explanation of the "history of humankind as work" and "narrative of modes of 
production" within both the colony and the colonising country, she holds that "to ignore 
the subaltern today is, willy-nilly, to continue the imperialist project" (1988:298). To 
approach the question of an ideological shift from "Britain" to "Hinduism", she turns her 
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attention to what she calls the "archaic origin" of her sentence, "the Rg-Veda and the 
Dharmasastra" (297). Within the categories of sanctioned suicides in the latter text, 
widow self-immolation is acceptable only as the dissolving of "the proper name of 
suicide through the destruction of her proper self... on a dead spouse's pyre" (1988:300). 
Thus within this text, Spivak suggests that widow self-immolation is inscribed as 
(non)suicide. 
Exploring the early debate by learned Brahmans on "the doctrinal appropriateness of sati 
as of sanctioned suicides in sacred places in general", Spivak finds that "the woman as 
widow, by the general law of sacred doctrine ... effectively defines the woman as the 
object of one husband ... The self-immolation of the widow thereby becomes the extreme 
case of the general law rather than an exception to it" (1988:302-03). For Spivak, the 
irony in locating woman's freewill in the act of sati is that the latter act possesses agency 
in the weak sense. That is, the husband's pyre is the (only?) site where the female body 
can rescind its participation in samsara (the perpetual cycle of birth, suffering, death, and 
rebirth). Spivak then argues that foregrounding the obviously violent materiality of sati 
hides the "broader question of the constitution of the sexed subject" and thus occludes the 
"task of recovering a (sexually) subaltern subject [which] is lost in an institutional 
textuality at the archaic origin" (1988:303). 
Spivak briefly explores what she sees as a "perculiar and transparent misreading [of sati] 
at the very place of [its] sanction" in the Rg-Veda, by Raghunandana, a late 
fifteenth/sixteenth-century Indian legalist who is taken to be "the greatest authority" 
(1988:304) on the passages in the sacred texts that supposedly sanction sati. She then 
discloses that the other historical origin of "sati or suttee as the proper name of the rite of 
widow self-immolation commemorates a grammatical error on the part of the British ... 
The word in the various Indian languages is 'the burning of the satV or the good wife" 
(305). Thus the British abolition of widow self-immolation - in trying to save brown 
women - imposed upon them "a greater ideological constriction by absolutely 
identifying, within discursive practice, good-wifehood with self-immolation on the 
husband's pyre" (305). The violence of the episteme here operates to displace the figure 
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of the "third-world woman", who is "caught between tradition and modernization", 
"between patriarchy and imperialism" (1988:306). This however, as Spivak has 
continually reiterated, does not mean that the task of recovering the female subaltern 
subject is somehow obviated: 
The case of suttee as exemplum of the woman-in-imperialism would challenge 
and deconstruct this opposition between subject (law) and object-of-knowledge 
(repression) and mark the place of "disappearance" with something other than 
silence and nonexistence, a violent aporia between subject and object status. 
(1988:306) 
Finally, she offers that "there is no space from which the sexed subaltern subject can 
speak", and (following Derrida's insistence on the covalence between grammatological 
knowledge and empirical knowledge) proceeds to interrogate the exemplary suicide of 
Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri. This is done in order to show that "individual examples of this 
sort are tragic failures as models of interventionist practice" (1988:307). However, this 
does not forestall the task of the "non-self-abdicating" intellectual, who should apprehend 
these models as "objects of discourse analysis" and possibly "illuminate a section of the 
social text" (307). She retrieves a possible (mis)reading of Bhuvaneswari's suicide as "an 
unemphatic, ad hoc, subaltern rewriting of the social text of sari-suicide as much as the 
hegemonic account of the blazing, fighting, familial Durga" (308). Between these is 
marked the place of "disappearance" of Bhuvaneswari through epistemic violence. In the 
last, Spivak discloses the familial happenstance of her knowledge of Bhuvaneswari case 
and that initial investigation revealed that that her suicide might very well have been 
prompted by an "illicit love affair" (1988:308). 
At this point, I wish to note that I am here using the original version of Spivak's 
essay as it appeared in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (1988), and not the 
revised version, as it appears in Spivak's Critique of Postcolonial Reason (1999). 
However, as I will be using Parry's revised edition of "Problems in Current Theories of 
Colonial Discourse", as it appear in Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (2004), I 
25 
should note the updating of Spivak's argument in the later publication of her essay. Aside 
from minimal stylistic rewriting of some of her essay, Parry makes no substantial changes 
to the revised edition. She admits to this much in the introduction to her book, 
"Beginnings, Affiliations, Disavowals" (2004) - a point to which I will return to later. 
The first clear revision in Spivak's essay is the critical historicising and explanatory 
impulse evident in the typographical intrusion of footnotes that crowd out the discussion 
in the essay proper. There are two particularly interesting instances of this impulse that 
are related to my discussion. 
The first goes to my earlier assertion that the debate I analyse here does not take into 
account Spivak's interrogation of the text of sati. As can be seen from the page long 
footnote Spivak dedicates to a discussion of Lata Mani's "Contentious Traditions: The 
Debate on Sati in Colonial India", a somewhat different account of "how the 'reality' of 
widow-sacrificing was constituted or 'textualized' during the colonial period" (Spivak, 
1999:285). Clearly, for Spivak this particular debate on sati is important given that she is 
at pains to respond to Mani's reading and criticism. The second more interesting instance 
is Spivak's response - strangely referring to herself in the footnote in the third person - to 
how the notion of subalternity has been sometimes appropriated as a catch-all category 
for marginality, experiences of oppression, or even "inferiority" (1999:271)3. 
Nonetheless, the substance of Spivak's argument remains largely unchanged. What has 
changed in revised book version is Spivak's attempt to lighten the polemically charged 
texture of the initial essay. However, Spivak does seem to accept some of the criticism in 
the closing remarks to her essay - criticism that 1 now turn to in the form of Parry's 
attack on Spivak's work. 
I will draw on Parry's criticisms of Homi Bhabha, her (partial) approval of Abdul 
JanMohamed, and her advocacy of the work of Frantz Fanon only inasmuch as they 
highlight Parry's specific criticisms of Spivak. This is because 1 wish to (largely) suspend 
that discussion until my own consideration (in chapter four) of critical engagements with 
3 See also, the uncontrolled vehemence of Spivak's discussion of the response (discussed in my conclusion) 
to "Can the Subaltern Speak?" some six years after the initial debate, in her interview with Leon de Kock 
(1992:44-47). 
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liberation theory and Fanon. Parry is critical of what she saw at the time as a tendency in 
contemporary dissident criticism "to disown as necessarily less subversive of the 
established order, work done within radical traditions other than the most recently 
enunciated heterodoxies" (2004:13). Consequently, Parry begins with the reminder, that 
contrary to how some critics constitute the study and critique of colonialism, Edward 
Said's critique of Orientalism, though different in strategy, was in no way originary but 
rather "fed into and augmented colonial discourse analysis". For Parry, "the construction 
of a text disrupting imperialism's authorized version was begun long ago within the 
political and intellectual cultures of colonial liberation movements" (2004:13) and she 
considers the work of Frantz Fanon in the 1950s of singular importance to this project. 
Hence, she is concerned to reread and reassess the contributions of the anti-
colonialist/liberationist tradition. 
For Parry, invocations of Fanon by critics producing a critique of colonialism do not 
engage with his work on its own terms. That is, Parry contends these invocations do not 
necessarily validate Fanon's problematic, which serviced "an epistemology of dialectical 
process, replete with notion of alienation, existential freedom and authentic human 
experience; nor [do they] invariably read the texts as discourses of emancipation" 
(2004:13). For Parry, invocations of Fanon's work by critics "concerned with 
deconstructing the texts of colonialism" (14) view his intervention as unsatisfactory 
inasmuch as his strategy is seen to constitute a reverse discourse that replicates and 
therefore reinstalls the semantic oppositions "devised by the dominant centre to exclude 
and act against the categorized" (14). Parry finds highly questionable the politics of 
(deconstructive) projects - here naming the principals as Spivak and Bhabha - which, she 
argues, rescind the binary opposition coloniser/colonised. This is because they rewrite 
"the permanently embattled colonial situation constructed by anti-colonialist theory, 
[installing] either a silent place laid waste by imperialism's epistemic violence, or an 
agonistic space within which unequally placed contestants negotiate an imbalance of 
power" (2004:14): 
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What then is the politics, on the one hand, of a criticism that sets out to identify 
both the dominant and oppositional ideologies embedded in texts as expressions, 
transformations and functions of an extra-linguistic situation, and on the other, of 
textual paradigms where discourse is privileged as the primary form of social 
praxis and which seek to expose the making, operation and effects of ideology by 
stirring up and dispersing the sedimented meanings dormant in texts? (2004:17) 
Briefly acknowledging the signal contribution of colonial discourse analysis as the 
shifting of "the discussion away from the colonialist text as an authentic portrayal of 
reality, to the system of ideological representation which such writing produced" 
(2004:17), Parry notes too that this discourse has produced its own "theoretical 
difficulties". She argues that one such problem is that the model of colonial discourse 
turns on a prodigious concern with "processes of othering" which it detaches from "the 
more extensive and multivalent discursive practices of the imperial project" (2004:18). 
As such, Parry contends that the re-visioning of the history of colonialism should not be 
in deference to theory. Where theoretical re-visioning repudiates the authority of the 
official western archive and its methods, "rejects a Marxist version charged with 
'reducing out imperialism-as-history', and distances itself from liberationist histories 
accused of weaving a seamless narrative, but does not produce its own account of change, 
discontinuity, differential periods and particular social conflicts, there is a danger of 
distinctive moments being homogenized" (18). 
The consequence of this homogenization is that the specificity of colonialism as a "mode 
of the imperial project's many and mutable states ... is treated as identical with all its 
variable forms" (2004:18). For Parry, this is evident both in the elisions of Bhabha's 
"engagement with the civil discourse of England's liberal conservative imperialist 
culture", and, she argues, Spivak's position that the '"axiomatics of imperialism' are an 
unspecified 'territorial and subject constituting project'" (2004:18). She argues these 
positions are permutable promulgations of the cultural hegemony of Occidental norms 
and values being imbued with universality. She contends another deficiency of theorising 
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colonial discourse by using deconstructive practices is the myopic focus on the colonialist 
text, that 
either erase[s] the voice of the native or limit[s] native resistance to devices 
circumventing and interrogating colonial authority. Positions against the nostalgia 
for lost origins as a basis for counter-hegemonic ideological production (Spivak), 
or the self-righteous rhetoric of resistance (Bhabha), have been extended to a 
downgrading of anti-imperialist texts written by liberation movements; while the 
notion of epistemic violence and the occluding of reverse discourses have 
obliterated the role of the native as historical subject and combatant, possessor of 
other knowledges and producer of alternative traditions. (2004:18-19) 
It should be clear that Parry's major complaint is that Spivak's "learned 
disquisitions" constitute a lacunae issuing from a (poststructuralist) theory that assigns 
"absolute power to the hegemonic discourse in constituting and disarticulating the native" 
(2004:19). From a (rather brief) summary of the arguments in "Can the Subaltern 
Speak?" and "The Rani of Sirmur", Parry argues that the theoretical dictum that these 
essays reiterate derives from Spivak's meditations on the (narrow) discourse of Sati, from 
which she "derives large, general statements on woman's subject constitution/object 
formation in which the subaltern woman is conceived as a homogeneous and coherent 
category" (2004:19). Parry contends that Spivak is here confusing discourses of 
representation with the material realities of the colonial situation: 
Since the native woman is constructed within multiple social relationships and 
positioned as a product of different class, caste and cultural specificities, it should 
be possible to locate traces and testimony of women's voice on those sites where 
women inscribed themselves as healers, ascetics, singers of sacred songs, artisans 
and artists, and by this to modify Spivak's model of the silent subaltern. (2004:19) 
Parry asserts that this model of the silent subaltern breaches the confines of its discussion 
of the subaltern woman, through extending the theorem of imperialism's epistemic 
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violence to posit "the native, male and female, as a historically muted subject" (2004:20). 
Thus Parry complains that "Spivak in her project gives no speaking part to the colonized, 
effectively writing out the evidence of native agency recorded in India's two-hundred-
year struggle against British conquest and the Raj" (20). She argues that Spivak's strategy 
overemphasises the role of postcolonial woman intellectual as investigating subject, "for 
it is she who must plot a story, unravel a narrative and give the subaltern a voice in 
history" (2004:20), whilst it displaces and repudiates liberationist/nationalist discourses 
of resistance. This, for Parry, allows Spivak to not only write out the conflict immanent to 
the colonial encounter, but also means that Spivak's work "displays a process more 
insidious than naked repression, since here the native is prevailed upon to internalize as 
self-knowledge, the knowledge concocted by the master": 
Where military conquest, institutional compulsion and ideological interpellation 
was, epistemic violence and devious discursive negotiations requiring of the 
native that he rewrite his position as object of imperialism, is; and in place of 
recalcitrance and refusal articulated in oppositional discourses and enacted in 
movements of resistance, a tale is told of the self-consolidating other and the 
disarticulated subaltern. (2004:20) 
This is the crux of Parry's objection to deconstructive readings of colonialism undertaken 
in Spivak and Bhabha's work. 
I have already stated that I will not be exploring the intricacies of Parry's arguments as 
regards the work of Bhabha (discussed in chapter four) and JanMohamed. Although the 
following discussion will pre-empt my analysis of the exchange between Chrisman and 
Young, perhaps this is the place to reflect on Chrisman's assertion that "Parry's critique 
does not, in fact, charge 'the three' black writers (Spivak, Bhabha, JanMohamed) with 
silencing the 'natives'; it is only Spivak's work that is thus represented" (1997:40). 
Parry's critique, as 1 have illustrated, certainly argues that "Spivak's deliberated deafness 
to the native voice, where it is to be heard" (2004:23) amounts to a silencing of the 
'natives'. 
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However, I would argue that Parry does effectively accuse Spivak, Bhabha and 
JanMohamed of silencing the 'natives'. This would be inasmuch as Parry criticises 
Bhabha's work for theorising relations of power "in terms of psychoanalytic categories" 
(2004:26) that limit native resistance to mimicking colonial discourse. This, together with 
her argument that Bhabha's work displaces "the traditional anti-colonialist representation 
of antagonistic forces locked in struggle with a configuration of discursive transactions" 
(2004:26), means that Parry does indeed accuse Bhabha of silencing or severely limiting 
native resistance. Although Parry approves of JanMohamed's retention of Manichean 
colonial relations, in his Manichean Aesthetics: The Politics of Literature in Colonial 
Africa, his work is also criticised. For Parry, JanMohamed's work forecloses a place for 
"emergent discourses initiating new modes of address to construct not-yet-existing 
conditions, while the notion of counter-discourse is [in his work] bound by its role as a 
defensive, reactive reply to the hegemonic construction" (2004:31). Consequently, 
Chrisman's complaint is shown to be incorrect as Parry does argue - although for 
different reasons - that the three theorists silence the natives. Thus "Spivak's 
generalization of a racial 'we'" would not seem to rest so much on a misreading of 
Parry's analysis, as Chrisman complains, but most certainly "does not respect the nuances 
of Parry's argument" (1997:40). 
Chrisman's complaint is motivated by Spivak's brusque response, in Outside in the 
Teaching Machine (1993), to Parry's attack. Here, Spivak argues that postcolonial 
intellectuals should beware of "becoming complicitous in the preparation of a 'new 
orientalism'" (1993:56). For Spivak, Parry's argument is in danger of such complicity 
because Parry has recourse to "identitarian ethnicist claims" (1993:60) of native 
originality. Here Spivak is precisely recalling her assertions in "Can the Subaltern 
Speak?" that a chromatic identity politics loses its persuasive function within the 
postcolonial context. Accordingly, for Spivak, "the political claims that are most urgent 
in decolonized space are tacitly recognized as coded within the legacy of imperialism" 
(1993:60). It is precisely Parry's desire "to hear the voice of the native" (1993:60) that 
Spivak finds troubling. Here then is Spivak's summation of Parry's work: 
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I have no objection to conscientious ethnography, although I am a bit frightened 
by its relationship to the history of the discipline of anthropology. My especial 
word to Parry, however, is that her efforts as well as mine are judged by the 
exclusions practiced through the intricate workings of the techniques of 
knowledge and the strategies of power, which have a history rather longer and 
broader than our individual benevolence and avowals. (1993:61) 
This is precisely the point of departure that is taken in the exchange between 
Chrisman and Young in an issue Textual Practice (1997). The exchange is initiated by 
Young's 1996 review of Spivak's Outside in the Teaching Machine in same journal. 
Besides reflecting on the contribution her book makes to postcolonial theory, Young 
picks up on Spivak's response to Parry. For Young, "Spivak's rejoinder points to the 
political irony of three Black writers being attacked by an emigre South African critic 
during the era of apartheid" (1996:230). The ensuing exchange is important for the ways 
in which it rehearses (or perhaps more aptly, 're-presents') a possible (mis)take in reading 
Spivak's insistence that the intellectual mark her 'political positionality' as investigating 
subject. As I have shown, and as Young appositely notes in White Mythologies, for 
Spivak, the marking of one's positionality as investigating subject, results from her 
unerring concern "to introduce the question of the desire of the analyst, of the historian as 
well as her own, countering the tendency to neglect the investigator's own involvement 
by giving detailed descriptions of her own place, history and special interests during the 
course of her analysis" (1990:170-71). "Can the Subaltern Speak?" already predicts, as it 
were, the identitarian politics that inform both some of Parry's criticisms and those that 
provoke Chrisman's defence of Parry. 
Chrisman complains, in "Questioning Robert Young's Post-colonial Criticism", that it is 
"interesting that Spivak's defensiveness [in her response to Parry] should have recourse 
to the very 'ethnic identitarianism' to which she elsewhere is frequently opposed" 
(1997:39). 1 would argue that Chrisman not only misreads Spivak's insistence on the 
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inscription of positionality - or what Chrisman calls "Spivak's self-representation as a 
'postcolonial native', in response to Parry" - but also (provisionally though) 
problematically collapses the latter into "an example of the 'strategic essentialism' that is 
part of [Spivak's] theoretical arsenal" (1997:40)4. As 1 interpret Spivak's notion of 
'strategic essentialism', it is - in the second part of the phrase - to posit an assumption of 
essence with regard to a particular subject, with a particular ethico-political objective in 
mind, whilst not forgetting that such assumptions are philosophically unsound. As Spivak 
notes, "For Marx, the curious persistence of essentialism within the dialectic was a 
profound and productive problem" (1988:295-96). 
The 'strategic' part of this move would be the intellectual vigilance entailed in the 
persistent critique of one's own constructions, so as to recognise, as 1 have shown, that 
the postulation and production of a consciousness that sustains such objectives, will in the 
long run necessarily lose sight of the heterogeneity of the investigated subject and as such 
"cohere with the work of imperialist subject-constitution" (Spivak, 1988:295). Young's 
definition of strategic essentialism is more economical: "Spivak speaks of the 'strategic' 
use of essentialism and universals in certain situations, which describes, perhaps, the way 
in which class and the economic operate [within her work] as implicit, undisturbed 
collectives against which the anti-individualism and heterogeneity are driven" 
(1990:173). Although I am not sure that the critique of the sovereign subject is merely 
'anti-individualist', as 1 understand him, Young correctly explains that Spivak sometimes 
places the categories of class and the economic under erasure in order to disturb their 
essentiality. In this vein, Chrisman's complaint about Spivak's supposed 'ethnic 
identitarianism' emerges as entirely misdirected5. 
4 Here is Laura Chrisman's questionable comment: "Quite possibly both Parry and Spivak have misread 
one another" (1997:40). Chrisman pleads this case by asserting that Spivak gives "retrospective and 
clarificatory account of her subaltern argument" in an interview with Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean, 
and leverages Neil Lazarus's "contribution to the Spivak/Parry debate in his 'Nationalist Consciousness 
and the Specificity of (Post)colonial Intellectualism"'. However, Chrisman's assertion about a mutual 
misreading is not supported by either of the two references she uses to bolster her claim. 
5 Here is Spivak's complaint about how 'strategic essentialism' has been taken up in the Anglo-American 
academy: "I have ... reconsidered my cry for a strategic use of essentialism. In the personalist culture, even 
among people within the humanities, who are generally wordsmiths, it's the idea of a strategy that has been 
forgotten. The strategic has been taken as a point of self-differentiation from the poor essentialists. So long 
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The misreading of the insistence on marking one's positionality is particularly evident, as 
Young points out, in Chrisman's (repeated) confusion of "the personal with the 
positional" (1997:49). Thus Chrisman finds it necessary to report - in her postscript6 -
her "own experience as the daughter of a black Marxist academic ... [is] crucial in 
making sense of [her] own responses to post-colonial debates" (1997:44). Chrisman is 
not incorrect then, insofar as she argues that when an identitarian politics informs 
postcolonial intellectual production, it can be seen to be "a kind of anti-democratic 
practice [that allots] the post-colonial franchise to a selected few, removing it from others 
on the grounds of their natality" (1997:43). However, as 1 have shown, inasmuch as 
Young follows Spivak in posing "a question about the political priorities, agenda and 
genealogy of [Parry's] work" (1997:48), his comments do not foreclose the 'post-colonial 
franchise' on the basis of ethnic identity. 1 am however generally sympathetic with 
Chrisman's anxiety that "precisely because 'South Africa' has acquired, in the West, the 
fetishistic status of racial allegory, the danger is that Western-located academics assume 
... a relation of 'sanctioned ignorance' of that country" (1997:41-42). I also agree with 
Chrisman's related apprehension that "granting colonial epistemological primacy to 
India" obscures investigations into the dynamics of colonial subject-formation and the 
differing politics informing the imperial project outside of the Indian case. 
1 would argue that Parry's position is admirable for its concern to reinscribe 
'native' resistance into discussions of the colonial encounter. I also agree with her 
attempt to install a closer engagement with the work of the anti-colonialist tradition. The 
latter will be one of the preoccupations of my analysis (in chapter four) of Bhabha and 
Parry's different readings of Fanon's work. Parry quite rightly reminds us that it was the 
texts of these theorists that inaugurated the contemporary critique of colonialism and 
imperialism. As Ania Loomba points out in her contribution to the debate in 
as the critique of essentialism is understood not as an exposure of error ... but as an acknowledgement of 
the dangerousness of something one cannot not use" (Spivak, 1993:5). 
6 There is credence in Young's assertion that Chrisman's 'defence' of Parry is - as evidenced by the "Post-
script/Supplement" to her complaint - perhaps little more than an attempt to allay the "'political' 
postcolonial censure" (1997:43) she complains to have been subjected to for her essay "The Imperial 
Unconscious? Representations of Imperial Discourse" (1990). That is not to say however that the specific 
points of discussion that Chrisman invokes are not themselves of critical interest. 
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"Overworlding the Third World", Parry (and JanMohamed) seek to retain a "Manichean 
dichotomy between colonizer/colonized ... as the means to recover (a) the socio 
economic and historical referents of the colonial encounter and (b) the agency and 
oppositional impulses of the individual colonized subject and nationalist discourses and 
movements in general" (1994:308). As such, 1 am sympathetic to Parry's argument that, 
perhaps, Spivak's position on nationalist movements as (always?) being a "'nativist' 
attempt driven by 'nostalgia for lost origins'" (2004:28) elides the significant differences 
between a bourgeois nationalism and, as what Neil Lazarus calls, "a liberationist, anti-
imperialist, nationalist internationalism" (1994:198) or "nationalitarianism". However, 
Parry's arguments are not without their own problems. 
Parry's argument that Spivak has an absolute position on 'nativist' re-memberings of the 
past, undoes the complexity of Spivak's position - perhaps due, in no small part, to her 
self-admittedly "raw and selective summary of what are complex and subtle arguments" 
(Parry, 2004:20). Spivak's critique of nativism as a 'nostalgia for lost origins' does not 
mean that all recuperations of a native past are completely unwarranted; as she says in 
"Can the Subaltern Speak?", her "chief project is to point out the positivist-idealist 
variety of such nostalgia" (1988:281), with the proviso that such recuperations avoid the 
persistent 'recognition of the Other by assimilation'. Spivak's caution would require that 
postcolonial critics read the texts of anti-colonialist nationalism more carefully. 
Loomba warns that critics engaged in countering current theory's "effect of neglecting 
the radical potential of nationalism ... cannot construct an alternative which will be in 
danger of romanticizing it" (1994:314), and should thus acknowledge its determination 
within the social forces and processes shaping its articulation7. Parry too falls into such 
an uncritical endorsement of nationalism when her analysis does not attend to the 
heterogeneity of colonised subject positions and thus privileges, as Lazarus observes 
7 Loomba makes an interesting argument: "Parry's critique draws upon her reading of the African 
experience of colonialism ... and its theoretician, Frantz Fanon. But she goes on to offer this as the only 
politically correct model for a theory of colonialism. It is difficult to accept that any notion of hybridity will 
dilute the violence of the colonial encounter ... The paralysing dichotomy black skin/white masks can be 
questioned without downgrading indigenous cultures and subjects" (1994:308). This would be related to 
Spivak's assertion that the negation of the role of ideology forecloses the necessary though "difficult task 
of counterhegemonic ideological production" (1988:275). 
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following Spivak's own argument, "a certain kind of native agency - a certain kind of 
subjectivity and of 'speaking': that of the colonised subject who 'speaks' as an Indian 
nationalist"" (1994:208). This is evident in, in among other things, Parry's valorisation of 
"the evidence of native agency recorded in India's two-hundred-year struggle against 
British conquest and the Raj". Lazarus remarks on the saliency of Spivak's critique of 
nationalism, in light of Parry's invocation of native agency, and the abundance of 
scholarship illustrating that "local struggles and everyday forms of peasant resistance 
were often entirely divorced from and unassimilable to the 'vertical' political concerns of 
elite anticolonial nationalists" (1994:207): 
Peasant insurgents in India during the colonial era ... did not necessarily think of 
themselves as Indians, and they did not necessarily believe themselves to be 
fighting for the liberation of India. Parry does not provide us with an explanation 
as to why, under these circumstances, the acts of native agency to which she 
refers should automatically be thought of as moments in India's struggle against 
the Raj. (1994:208) 
These issues are highlighted in Parry's criticism of Spivak's deconstructive 
reading of Jean Rhys's novel, Wide Sargasso Sea. Parry argues that "Spivak's strategy of 
reading necessarily blots out ... Christophine's inscription as the native, female, 
individual self who defies the demands of the discriminatory discourses impinging on her 
person" (2004:22) and thus "demonstrates the pitfalls of a theory postulating that the 
master discourse preempts the (self) constitution of the historical native subject" 
(2004:21). The full discussion of their variously opposed interpretations of the novel lies 
outside the boundaries of this study8. As Anne Maxwell points out in "The Debate on 
Though I should also not like to discuss it in any great detail, this also seems to be place to recall 
Chrisman's complaint - which itself recalls her earlier argument in "The Imperial Unconscious: 
Representations of Imperial Discourse" - that "Spivak's reading of Jane Eyre, particularly her contention 
that the Caribbean Bertha Mason's death-by-fire required to be read in the context of colonial contests over 
Indian practices of sati, [reflects] an Indiacentrism found elsewhere in her work" (1997:43). However, 
Spivak herself warns that 'Indiacentrism' should not inform postcolonial theory or analysis: "Yet the Indian 
case cannot be taken as representative of all countries, nations, cultures, and the like that may be invoked as 
the Other of Europe as Self (Spivak, 1988:281). Spivak's reading of Bertha Mason is not an a reflection of 
Indiacentrism as such, but rather, as Bart Moore-Gilbert observes, an instance of the use of 'catachresis': a 
"tactical manoeuvre, which involves wrenching particular images, ideas or rhetorical strategies out of their 
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Current Theories of Colonial Discourse", Parry's "reference to an individual self admits 
to an undisclosed positionality within First World feminist discourse, "which attempts to 
articulate a separate women's identity for western and non-western women alike through 
the recovery of a separate female tradition, while ignoring its own privileged positioning 
on the other side of the other side of the international division of labour" (1991:80). That 
is, Parry's position - though she accuses Spivak of this - amounts to what Young, in his 
exposition of Spivak's work, calls an unconscious reproduction of imperialist 
assumptions, that includes "the unquestioned promotion of feminist individualism as the 
greatest good" (1990:162). As 1 have illustrated, this is precisely the import of Spivak's 
summary response to Parry. 
Parry's position on subalternity and native resistance undoubtedly arises from her 
endorsement of nationalism - as well as her distaste for deconstructive practices or 
poststructuralist theory. Also, Parry's positionality and wish to reincribe conflict and 
native resistance into the theorisation of'alternative narratives of colonialism' displays a 
marked similarity to Foucault and Deleuze's invocation of 'the workers' struggle'. Here 
is an instance of this in Parry's argument: "Those who have been or are still engaged in 
colonial struggles against contemporary forms of neo-colonialism could well read the 
theorizing of discourse analysts with considerable disbelief at the construction this puts 
on the situation they are fighting against and the contest in which they are engaged" 
(2004:26). To be sure, the 'totem' of native agency (or more specifically, resistance) 
seems an insufficient critique of Spivak's notion of subalternity. This is because, as 
Spivak argues, it does not attend to the heterogeneity of native publics as subjects in 
difference. As is evident from her criticisms, Parry seems (without analysis) to extend 
Spivak's notion of subalternity to the colonised population in general. Thus for Parry, 
Spivak's "theorem of imperialism's epistemic violence extends to positing the native, 
male and female, as a historically muted subject" (2004:20). Lazarus provides an 
invaluable discussion of the reductive tendencies of Parry's reading of Spivak's "theory 
of subalternity", which for him does not seem 
place within a particular narrative and using them to open up new arenas of meaning (often in direct 
contrast to their conventionally understood meanings and functions)" (Moore-Gilbert, 1997:84). 
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to be a theory of 'native agency' at all, but a theory of the way in which 
disenfranchised elements of the 'native' population are represented in the 
discourse of colonialism ... [l]n assuming that the discursive category of the 
subaltern models for the disenfranchised subject of colonialism in Spivak's 
thought, Parry seems to misread Spivak. (1994:205-06) 
Interesting also, is the manner in which Lazarus seeks to qualify Parry's complaint that 
Spivak 'effectively writes out evidence of native agency'. He argues that in Spivak's 
work "the deconstructive interrogation of subalternity is typically given precedence over 
the radical historiographical account of native agency" (1994:206). The emphasis of 
Spivak's intellectual production on subalternity, and its saturation of claims for colonial 
discourse could make it seem "as though she did*' (1994:206) write out evidence of 
native agency, though Parry's claim of a 'deliberated deafness' is unsustainable9. So too 
is Parry's polemic that Spivak's work exhibits an the "exorbitation of the role of the 
postcolonial woman intellectual" (2004:20), which as Lazarus convincingly argues, runs 
contrary to Spivak's argument: "almost invariably when she comes to talk about 
intellectualism, the weight of Spivak's emphasis tends to fall on the question of 
circumscription, on the checks and constraints governing intellectual practice and on the 
severe limitations of what intellectuals - especially radical intellectuals in the context of 
imperialism - can hope to achieve as intellectuals" (Lazarus, 1994:209). 
Nonetheless, there have been some valid criticisms of "Can the Subaltern 
Speak?", and Spivak's notion of subalternity in general. One of the most striking 
contradictions of Spivak's work is that it too falls prey to her critique of the tendency in 
western intellectual production about the Third World to conserve the 'West as Subject'. 
This is evident not only in the fact that Spivak's work largely addresses the western 
intellectual, but also the language of the address. This assertion is perhaps modified by 
the recognition that critique, as such, always already intimately inhabits its subject. 
9 Though she for the most argues that Spivak silences the natives, Parry does once admit an uncertainty of 
this position. Her use of 'restricts' and the tentatively parenthesised 'eliminates?' signals such uncertainty: 
"Spivak in her own work severely restricts (eliminates!) the space in which the colonized can be written 
back into history" (2004:23, my emphasis). 
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However, 1 am here not claiming that 'high' theory should not be used for subaltern 
material, which as Young notes, "involves a category mistake and an epistemological 
confusion ... The argument assumes that all political categories can only be sustained 
ontologically and epistemologically through experience" (1990:169). Rather, I seek to 
argue that her deconstructive mode as the (privileged) language of address does not sit 
well with her concern to 'learn to speak to the subaltern'. As 1 have already illustrated in 
my discussion of Parry's attack, even Spivak's notion of subaltemity has been open to 
criticism. 
Bart Moore-Gilbert argues subaltemity, as it is constituted in Spivak's work, "contradicts 
a crucial corollary of the articulation of subaltemity with hegemony in Gramsci's 
thinking ... This is that the oppressed can ... organize to overthrow the hegemonic order" 
(2005:464). This does not yet in itself amount to a critique, for, as Spivak argues in her 
interview with Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" settles 
itself on a very specific (though reworked) definition of subaltemity: "the space as 
defined by Ranajit Guha, the space that is cut off from the lines of mobility in a colonized 
country ... [E]very moment that is noticed as a case of subaltemity is undermined. We 
are never looking at the pure subaltern. There is, then, something of a not-speakingness in 
the very notion of subaltemity" (1996:288-89). Loomba thus complains, "to say that if 
the subaltern could speak she/he would not be a subaltern is a neat enough formulation, 
but somewhat inadequate if the 'Third World' is not to be, yet again, theorized into 
silence" (1994:320). That said, Spivak's focus on the 'itinerary of silencing' endured by 
the 'historical' subaltern, can at times be detrimental, as Moore-Gilbert argues, to a 
discussion of "how the contemporary subaltern might 'come to voice'" (2005:464, my 
emphasis). This is despite her stated concern that "to ignore the subaltern today is, willy-
nilly, to continue the imperialist project" (1988:298, my emphasis). It does not, however, 
fit into Parry's diagnosis of a 'deliberated deafness' within Spivak's work. Moore-Gilbert 
asserts that there is an evident "political pessimism" in Spivak's work: 
An insistence on the irreducible alterity and muteness of the subaltern, one might 
argue, paralyzes not just the subaltern, but the would-be ally of the subaltern -
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who is left in the double-bind of being required to show solidarity with the 
subaltern without in any way 'selfing' that Other or 'assimilating' her to the 
degree that solidarity perhaps inevitably demands. (2005:464)'° 
As 1 have already demonstrated, this is a major concern of the "Can the Subaltern 
Speak?", where Spivak argues that a closer analysis of the international division of labour 
be brought to postcolonial intellectual production. One of ways she confronts this is 
through her retention of Marx. 
Spivak leverages both the Marxist critique of the individual as oppressed subject and 
Marx's theories of value, whose utility, she argues, extend beyond his specific 
deployment of them in the realm of the economic. This renders untenable the contention 
- when applied to Spivak's work - that "the Marxist analysis of colonialism has been 
eschewed"(2004:8). This question of the eschewal of Marxist critique will be especially 
important for my later discussion (in chapter five) of the South African debate about 
postcolonial theory. For Parry, what is "at stake is whether the imperial project is 
historicized within the determining instance of capitalism's global trajectory, or uprooted 
from its material ground and resituated as a cultural phenomenon whose intelligibility 
and functioning can be recuperated from tendentious readings of texts" (2004:8). I would 
argue that it seems as if Parry is attempting to occlude the Marxist thrust of Spivak's 
arguments. However, Parry does signal the possible discrepancies involved in Spivak's 
"syncretic" use of poststructuralism and Marxism, when she refers to Young's discussion 
in White Mythologies: 
Young is sanguine about bringing the distinctive theoretical projects [Marxism 
and poststructuralism] into alignment within postcolonial studies; yet the rejection 
by poststructuralism of the Marxist notion underpinning left anti-colonial thinking 
- the capitalist system, structural divisions, nationalism, an emancipatory 
Lazarus makes a similar argument in "National Consciousness and the Specificity of (Post)colonial 
Intellectualism" (1994:209-10). 
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narrative, universalism - suggests that the discrepancy between the informing 
premises is not readily negotiated. (2004:7) 
Finally, 1 would like to discuss Parry's apparent aversion to 'theory', 'textualism' or 
what, in "Directions and Dead Ends in Postcolonial Studies", she calls "the linguistic turn 
in its strong form" (2002:74). We shall see how this preoccupation with 'strong' and 
'weak' or 'hard' and 'soft' theory unfolds in my discussion (in the conclusion) of the 
South African appropriation of postcolonial theory. Insofar as Spivak addresses "the 
processes of subject-constitution and material exploitation as complementary 
components" (Moore-Gilbert, 1997:100), Parry's unsustainably argues that "the 
significant differences in the critical practices of Spivak and Bhabha are submerged in a 
shared programme marked by the exorbitation of discourse and a related incuriosity about 
the enabling socio-economic and political institutions and other forms of social praxis" 
(2004:26). Ato Quayson makes a point similar to Parry's - not so much an argument, as it 
is a statement, for he makes it after referring to Spivak's work only in passing: "the 
interpretative modality interposes theory firmly between the indigenous or local sphere 
and the present. The subaltern, of whom Spivak famously concludes that he or she 
'cannot speak', is twice removed from speech in colonial discourse analysis because the 
psychoanalytic categories that are deployed to adduce the mentalities of the colonized do 
not partake of the native's own discursive modalities" (2000:74). As Loomba succinctly 
notes, "at one level, such a distinction, and indeed any demand to attend to 'the social' 
can be and is dismissed as subscribing to the traditional, and by now variously and 
thoroughly critiqued, model of the political as lying outside discourse, language and 
culture" (1994:306)". I will return to this issue in my analysis of McClintock and 
Nixon's attack on Derrida's politics (in chapter three) and in my reading of Parry's attack 
on Bhabha's work (in chapter four). For Spivak, to insist on an irreducible distinction 
between 'the social' and 'the discursive' "entails a notion of the social as essence. If one 
carries the notion of the social as an essence, that can very quickly lead to an unexamined 
assumption of capitalist sociality as a kind of essence, as the social" (1996:294). That is, 
11 See for instance Anne Maxwell's (1991:71-73) argument, although Maxwell more specifically relates it 
to Parry's criticisms of Bhabha's use of theory. 
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the danger of positing the social as essence is that such a position feeds into assumptions 
about the given-ness and thus unchangeability of the most dominant mode of social 
relations in the contemporary world: capitalism. However, as I have illustrated, Spivak 
herself strategically deploys the social as essence and her strategy of persistent critique is 
leveraged precisely in order to confront the danger I mention above. 
I would suggest that the debate turned on a number of key questions for the development 
of postcolonial theory. The first question is about the necessity that the postcolonial 
intellectual - and indeed, intellectuals in general - mark her political positionality as 
investigating subject. The difficulty of this question was illustrated by the misreadings or 
(mis)takes I have argued have informed the debate. The difficulty here is that Spivak's 
insistence on marking political positionality is something other than mere self-reflexivity. 
It is precisely what Spivak calls for when she asserts that the intellectual needs to 
'unlearn privilege'. The difficulty is also because there is no schema for the unlearning of 
privilege. Were there one, a register of calculable set of procedures or method to unlearn 
privilege, it would achieve the opposite of what it intended. The realm of the calculable 
cannot confront heterogeneous difference. This goes directly to the questions of 
subalternity and native agency and resistance, and of course, the question of how 
postcolonial critique should position itself in relation to previous theorisations of native 
resistance and the critiques of colonialism in the anti-colonialist tradition. These latter 
critiques necessarily entailed a particular intellectual practice, given their conditions of 
possibility within movements for decolonisation dictated the need to mobilise native 
resistance and uncover sites of disarticulated agency. One of the problems immanent with 
the latter practice - a problem already articulated from within anti-colonialist discourse -
and indeed a problem for (postcolonial) intellectuals as such, is the apprehension of 
native subjectivity or resistance as a search for 'lost origins'. As such, the debate also 
turned on the question of an appropriate counter-hegemonic or radical practice for the 
postcolonial intellectual. 
Doubtless, there are problems attending to Spivak's deconstructive preference or failures 
that she, as Moore-Gilbert argues, might elsewhere call "repetitions-in-rupture" 
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(1997:100). Nevertheless, her criticisms of the (unacknowledged) complicity of 
contemporary western intellectual production - whether 'benevolent' or 'disinterested' -
within the international division of labour, and consequent insistence that postcolonial 
intellectuals should mark their political positionality, as well as her persistent critique of 
the simple assimilation of the Other as the Self s shadow, remain critically enabling as a 
call for the ethical engagement with the Other. As Spivak herself acknowledges, the debt 
of this practice of 'persistent critique' or 'affirmative deconstruction' appeals to Derrida's 
project. 1 will move to consider Derrida's intervention into the debate on apartheid. This 
will be done precisely to assess the question of the relation between deconstructive 
practices and, politics and ethics. 
3 
"Deconstruction and the 'yes'": Incursions into the 
Debate on Apartheid 
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I should state from the outset that I do not, in this chapter, wish to reclaim or refashion 
Jacques Derrida as a postcolonial theorist. The tension of this latter assertion will become 
clear in my analysis of the debate between Homi Bhabha and Benita Parry (in chapter 
four). Rather, what will be examined here is an instance of what Derrida has called an 
attempt to articulate the relation between "deconstruction and the 'yes'" or 'affirmative 
deconstruction'1. That is, 'practical' interventions in 'real-world' examples or the 
'material'. Derrida's "Racism's Last Word" (1985) irrupts into the purview of 
'(post)coloniality' not merely as a reading of the text of apartheid, but in large measure 
as an ethico-political call for the demise of apartheid, a summoning of a future 
responsibility to the memory of its anteriority. As such, Derrida's text on apartheid is an 
important moment for testing the principal question of my thesis: how efficacious is 
deconstruction when brought to the analysis of 'postcolonial' contexts? My use of scare-
quotes around the last two references to postcoloniality and postcolonial contextual 
determination is an attempt to keep open the space for my later discussion (in the 
conclusion to this study) of the applicability of the term 'postcolonial' to the South 
African case. The contention around the question of (con)text is central to the Critical 
Inquiry (1985-86) debate on apartheid, initiated by "Racism's Last Word". 
My own discussion of the debate will, once again, proceed through the close textual 
analysis of the three major texts informing the debate. That is, Derrida's aforementioned 
text, Anne McClintock and Robert Nixon's response, "No Names Apart: The Separation 
of Word and History in Derrida's 'Le Dernier Mot du Rascime'", and Derrida's scathing 
rejoinder, "But, Beyond ... (Open Letter to Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon)". As the 
text of the debate on apartheid neither begins nor ends in Critical Inquiry I will variously 
draw from other contributions. What 1 seek to argue here is that the debate illustrates the 
various misreadings of how decohstructive practices engage with the questions of 
politics, ethics and pragmatics. At issue, I believe, are four major questions. 
1 "In the different texts I have written on (against) apartheid, I have on several occasions spoken of 
'unconditional' affirmation or of'unconditional' 'appeal'. This has also happened to me in other 'contexts' 
and each time that I speak of the link between deconstruction and the 'yes'" (Derrida, 1988:152). 
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Firstly, I examine how the misunderstanding of the deconstructive reevaluation of the 
question of '(con)texf informs the debate. Secondly, 1 argue that Derrida's gesture in 
"Racism's Last Word" is not an attempt to (dis)place the text of apartheid as a 
distinctively South African. His gesture is not, as it were, a characteristic reticence or 
denial of the question of complicity by the metropolitan intellectual. Thirdly, prompted 
by the interpretive violence of the interlocutors - which should not be separated from the 
emotive subject of the debate - I cojisider the question of an "ethics of discussion" to 
which Derrida elsewhere states his commitment. Finally, I discuss the denigration of 
deconstructive practices as unethical, apolitical, conservative or anti-revolutionary, and 
the related question of the demand made by some commentators that Derrida explicitly 
declare /his ̂ politics in the conventional terms of political philosophy, or even political 
activism. 
In her translator's note to "Racism's Last Word", Peggy Kamuf gives a brief 
genealogy of the paper and reminds the reader that it was a translation of 'Le Dernier Mot 
du Rascime', which was written for the catalogue of an international art exhibition 
against apartheid. The particular purpose of "Le Dernier Mot du Rascime" was, then, to 
introduce the project of the travelling exhibition, described by the organisers as awaiting 
(in transit) and seeking to hasten the day when it could be "presented as a gift to the first 
free and democratic government of South Africa to be elected by universal suffrage" 
(1985:290). Derrida's own reckoning of the exhibition is that it is not a presentation, as 
nothing 'is delivered here in the present, nothing that would be presentable". His opening 
(textual) analysis of apartheid begins with the appeal that it remain, 
from now on, the unique appellation for the ultimate racism in the world, the last 
of many. May it thus remain, but may a day come when it will only be for the 
memory of man ... Confined and abandoned then to this silence of memory, the 
name will resonate all by itself, reduced to the state of a term in disuse. The thing 
it names today will no longer be. (1985:291) 
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For him, apartheid is "the last" both in the French sense of "le dernier" - qualitatively 
though not necessarily quantitatively - signifying "the worst", "the lowest degree, the last 
of a series", and temporally as that which arrives (though never quite) "at the end of a 
history, or in the final analysis, to carry out the law of some process and reveal the 
thing's truth, here finishing off the essence of evil, the worst, the essence at its very worst 
- as if there were something like a racism par excellence, the most racist of racisms" 
(1985:291). This coterminous thinking of apartheid as the last, as "the most recent", as 
both "the oldest and the youngest" means that we must keep in memory that "although 
racial segregation didn't wait for the name apartheid to come along, that name became 
order's watchword and won its title in the political code of South Africa only at the end 
of the Second World War" (1985:291). 
Briefly commenting on the "material" consequences of the legislated acts of apartheid, 
Derrida argues that the name has never been translated in other languages possibly 
signals a lexical defence "against a sinister incorporation of the thing by means of the 
word", a refusal to be "contaminated through the contagious hospitality of the word-for-
word" (1985:292). He extends the discussion of the untranslatibility of the word 
apartheid in a direction already set out - to name but one instance - as early as "The 
Violence of the Letter: From Levi-Strauss to Rousseau" in Of Grammatology (1976). 
Derrida submits that "within the limits of this untranslatable idiom, a violent arrest of the 
mark, the glaring harshness of abstract essence (heid) seems to speculate in another 
regime of abstraction, that of confined separation. The word concentrates separation, 
raises it to another power and sets separation itself apart: 'apartitionality', something like 
that" (1985:292). The consequent corruption by the word of this separated separation into 
what he calls "a quasi-ontological segregation" is due precisely to hypostasisation or 
essentialisation of being apart. For him, the outrage of this political idiom, extreme 
though not dissimilar to other racisms, lies in its naturalisation of segregation. Following 
this, he makes the apparently implausible claim that "there's no racism without a 
language": 
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The point is not that acts of racial violence are only words but rather that they 
have to have a word. Even though it offers the excuse of blood, color, birth - or 
rather, because it uses this naturalist and sometimes creationist discourse - racism 
always betrays the perversion of a man, the 'talking animal'. It institutes, declares, 
writes, inscribes, prescribes. A system of marks, it outlines space in order to 
assign forced residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it 
discriminates. (1985:292) 
It is here that Derrida notes that apartheid is also "the last" for the pageantry of its 
political constitution; its status as the only racism "on the scene that dares say its name 
and to present itself for what it is: a legal defiance taken on by homo politicus, a juridical 
racism and a state racism" (292). As such, he reiterates that the uniqueness, the "sinister 
renown", the infamy of "this name apart" is due to its manifestation of "the lowest 
extreme of racism, its end and the narrow-minded self-sufficiency of its intention, its 
eschatology, the death rattle of what is already an interminable agony" (292-93). For 
Derrida, this would mean, "something like the setting in the West of racism - but also, 
and this will have to be specified below, racism as a Western thing." (293) 
The next section of "Racism's Last Word" deals specifically with the event of the 
exhibition as a particular ethico-political response to apartheid. That is, in "order to 
respond to this singularity or, better yet, to fling back an answer, the singularity right here 
of another event takes its measure ... Actually, it measures itself against apartheid only 
so as to remain in no measure comparable with that system, its power, its fantastic riches, 
its excessive armament, the worldwide network of its openly declared shamefaced 
accomplices" (1985:293). Derrida figures this itinerant exhibition as an exemplary 
"satellite of humanity" whose trajectory rushes impulsively, commemorating "in 
anticipation - not its own event but one that it calls forth: ... South Africa beyond 
apartheid, South Africa in memory of apartheid'' (293). He is in no way reticent before 
the "material" effects of apartheid, noting precisely that it is "an evil that cannot be 
summed up in the principial and abstract iniquity of a system. It is also daily suffering,' 
oppression, poverty, violence, torture inflicted by an arrogant white minority (16 percent 
48 
of the population, controlling 60 to 65 percent of the national revenue) on the mass of the 
black population" (1985:293). Derrida here reminds us that the question of what 
safeguards can be taken to ensure that the truth the exhibition exposes, "is not taken over 
and controlled, thus becoming another technical device, the antenna of some new 
politico-military strategy, a useful machinery for the exploitation of new resources, or the 
calculation in view of more comprehensive interests" (1985:294) is not one that can be 
answered in advance. He argues that to better conceive of this question of ethics, and of 
politics, we should return to the circumstances: 
In this collective and international exhibition ... pictural, sculptural idioms will be 
crossing, but they will be attempting to speak the other's language without 
renouncing their own. And in order to effect this translation, their common 
reference henceforth makes an appeal to a language that cannot be found, a 
language at once very old, older than Europe, but for that very reason to be 
invented once more. (1985:294) 
This reminder, of an "old language of the West" in relation to the exhibition is then not 
trivial. The "exhibition exposes and commemorates, indicts and contradicts the whole of 
a Western history"; that is, it shows up "a contradiction internal to the West and to the 
assertion of its rights" (1985:294). It is for this reason Derrida proceeds to consider how 
the text of apartheid is inscribed onto or by the West and Western history. 
Derrida argues the primary reason for apartheid being a "European 'creation'" is its 
status as a legislated state racism: "The judicial simulacrum and the political theater of 
this state racism have no meaning and would have no chance outside a European 
'discourse' on the concept of race. That discourse belongs to a whole system of 
'phantasms', to a certain representation of nature, life, history, religion, and law, to the 
very culture which succeeded in giving rise to this state takeover" (1985:294). For the 
remainder of the third section of "Racism's Last Word", Derrida seeks to expose the 
complicity of a large part of Europe with apartheid: 
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Since the Second World War, at least if one accepts the givens of a certain kind of 
calculation, the stability of the Pretoria regime has been a prerequisite to the 
political, economic, and strategic equilibrium of Europe. The survival of Western 
Europe depends on it ... Direct or even indirect Soviet control of South Africa 
would provoke, or so think certain Western heads of state, a catastrophe beyond 
all comparison with the malediction (or the 'bad image') of apartheid. (1985:295) 
He offers that this co-dependence for stability between the Pretoria regime and Europe 
constitutes apartheid as "the first 'delivery of arms', the first product of European 
exportation". This is despite the "symbolic condemnations" of apartheid issuing from 
Europe, a contradiction he sees as sharpest in France, "which provided more support for 
[the aforementioned] exhibition than anywhere else" (1985:295), and adds the 
supplementary contradiction of certain Eastern European countries themselves continuing 
economic relations with Pretoria. He urges the reader to bear in mind that the pressures 
applied to the South African regime to relax certain forms of what was then called 'petty 
apartheid' were "not always inspired by a respect for human rights" (295). For Derrida, 
sometimes submerged beneath such pressure, was "a liberal current according to which 
'apartheid is notoriously inefficient from the point of view of economic rationality'" 
(296). That is, the sometimes vociferous outcry against the policies and practices that 
came to be called 'petty apartheid', was at times nothing more than a call for business as 
usual - the business of profiting from the continued economic exploitation of the 
majority of the South African population: 
This too will have to remain in memory: if one day apartheid is abolished, its 
demise will not be credited only to the account of moral standards - because 
moral standards should not count or keep accounts, to be sure, but also because, 
on the scale which is that of a worldwide computer, the law of the marketplace 
will have imposed another standard of calculation. (1985:295-96) 
The penultimate section of the essay focuses on the "theologico-political discourse of 
apartheid', whose logic, Derrida argues, illustrates the "same intra-European 
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contradiction". He gives a brief chronicle of some of the inventions and prohibitions of 
apartheid, the "most repressive legal apparatus in the world", and argues "this law is also 
founded in a theology and these Acts in Scripture" (1985:296), all in a Calvinist reading 
that reviles democracy. He observes an example of this in the "charter of the Institute for 
National Christian Education (1948) [which] sets out the only regulations possible for a 
South African government". Among other things, the charter offers the Will of God as 
imposing on "the Afrikaner the duty of assuring that the colored peoples are educated in 
accordance with Christian-National principles", and that the "well-being and happiness of 
the colored man resides in his recognition of the fact that he belongs to a separate racial 
group" (1985:297). For Derrida, the 'quasi-ecumenical' fact that "apartheid is upheld ... 
but also condemned in the name of Christ" (1985:297) is an exemplary instance of the 
contradictions of European discourses, practices and policies regarding apartheid. 
Finally, Derrida catechises the essentiality of "South Africa", an enigma - in its 
"concentration of world history" - whose complexity he hopes to have isolated. This 
complexity, its alterity as such, which resists most conventional forms of analysis, is 
precisely what "calls for another mode of thinking"2. Knowing full well that it is not 
entirely possible he proffers that if "we could forget about the suffering, the humiliation, 
the torture and the deaths, we might be tempted to look at this region of the world as a 
giant tableau or painting, the screen for some geographical computer. Europe, in the 
enigmatic process of its globalization and of its paradoxical disappearance, seems to 
project onto this screen" the schedule of contradictions and complicities already 
mentioned, "the double-bind of its national and multinational interests" (1985:297-98). 
For him, dialectical reasoning seems to provide "only a provisional stasis in a precarious 
equilibrium, whose price today is apartheid', that is secured at an-other's expense. Even 
the "customary discourse on man, humanism and human rights" continued to have no 
effect - despite the 1973 United Nations verdict of apartheid as a 'crime against 
humanity' - because it encountered, in apartheid, "its effective and as yet unthought 
limit, the limit of the whole system in which it acquires meaning" (1985:298). This is 
2 For an attempt to read apartheid in deconstructive mode, see Aletta J. Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid 
Discourse (1996). 
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why, throughout "Racism's Last Word", Derrida has appealed for (and perhaps 
demonstrated) 'another mode of thinking', a differential thought of the questions of ethics 
and politics: 
[I]t was, it will have to be, it is necessary to appeal unconditionally to the future 
of another law and another force lying beyond the totality of this present. This, it 
seems to me, is what the exhibition affirms or summons forth, what it signs with a 
single stroke ... Even the future perfect can no longer translate the tense, the time 
of what is being written in this way - and what is doubtless no longer part of the 
everyday current, of the cursory sense of history. Isn't this true of any 'work'? Of 
that truth which is so difficult to put into words? Perhaps. (1985:298) 
in their response, "No Names Apart", it is clear that McClintock and Nixon locate their 
complaint against "Racism's Last Word" in the second part of their title: "The Separation 
of Word and History in Derrida's 'Le Dernier Mot du Racisme'". It is not so much that 
they doubt Derrida's "signal opposition to the South African regime", for they recognise 
in their introduction that his paper "is tendered as a call to action" (1986:140). (Neither is 
it insignificant that they choose to refer to his paper by the antecedent French title that 
appears in the catalogue of the exhibition - which I will return to later.) However, they 
find, in what one (in error) could call the 'philosophical' tenor of his arguments, the 
preponderance for merely examining "certain metaphysical assumptions" without 
pointing "to something beyond the. text, in this case the abolitipn of a regime" (1986:140). 
They argue "Derrida's protest is deficient in any sense of how the discourses on South 
African racism have been at once historically constituted and politically constitutive" 
(1986:140). This deficiency requires a serious consideration of what they call his 
"method". Their prognosis of the latter is that it "entails, in particular, pondering the 
political implications of both his extended reflection on the word apartheid and his 
diffuse historical comments" (1986:140)3. In their understanding at least, the remedy is 
probably that of the enterprising 'historical materialist': 
3 One could of course play on the essential 'pervertibility' of the word "diffuse" in their comment: That is, 
Derrida's historical comments are precisely sparse, "spread out, diffused, not concentrated" (OED). 
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For to begin to investigate how the representation of racial difference has 
functioned in South Africa's political and economic life, it is necessary to 
recognize and track the shifting character of these discourses. Derrida, however, 
blurs historical differences by conferring on the single term apartheid a spurious 
autonomy and agency. (1986:140) 
McClintock and Nixon's task is then to release the word apartheid "from its quarantine 
from historical process" in Derrida's analysis, the consequence of his being 
simultaneously "repelled by the word, yet seduced by its divisiveness, the division in the 
inner structure of the term itself which he elevates to a state of being" (1986:141). This is 
precisely why they find it necessary "to part ways with him" (my emphasis) in order "to 
face the challenge of investigating the strategic role of representation" by examining 
apartheid "in the context of developing discourses of racial difference" (1986:141). A 
differential reading of their phrase, "to part ways with", could of course highlight that this 
phrase is symptomatic of their strategy of reading as a whole. That is, as Derrida argues, 
what McClintock and Nixon part ways with here (but also from the beginning of their 
paper) is nothing short of reading "Racism's Last Word". As such, "No Names Apart" is 
not a "response"; the texture of a response is one of responsibility, of duty, to reading. 
Derrida suggests as much in his rejoinder when he states that they "quite simply did not 
read [his] text, in the most elementary and quasi-grammatical sense of what is called 
reading''' (1986:157). However, this already pre-empts an analysis I wish to defer, of 
what Derrida elsewhere calls the 'ethics of discussion'. 
As such, 1 will not be parting ways with "Racism's Last Word", choosing rather, to read 
it partially with their response. This strategy is then not only rhetorical, but also has the 
pragmatic effect of saving space by introducing some of Derrida arguments in his 
rejoinder, where he himself already closely reads "No Names Apart". Partially then, in 
both senses of this term: it both already prejudices and i(nte)rrupts McClintock and 
However, by isolating what is concentrated in apartheid, his comments are also not diffuse. Derrida argues 
this much in his response, for instance, as we shall see when he draws McClintock and Nixon's attention to 
the context and necessary brevity of his text. 
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Nixon's arguments, and disjointedly, thus incompletely, reads Derrida's response. Their 
'politically' interested refusal to read is, once again, motivated by, for them, the necessity 
of chronicling and periodising the changes to the rhetoric, ideology and lexicon of racism 
in the official discourse of the South African regime: "If an examination of South 
Africa's representation of racial difference is to be at all politically enabling, the 
changing hegemonic functions of the word apartheid and its kindred terms must be 
investigated in the context of an active, social language" (1986:145, my emphasis). As 1 
will show, and as Derrida himself argues, the 'enabling politics' McClintock and Nixon 
refer to are other than the politics that motivate their response. 
The first section of their essay is entirely dedicated to this 'historicising' 
tendency, for as they state, it was "as far back as the mid-fifties the South Africans 
themselves began to recognize that the term apartheid had become sufficiently 
stigmatized to be ostentatiously retired" (1986:141): "The word apartheid was coined by 
General Jan Smuts ... in 1917"; it only gained prominence and currency under D. F. 
Malan as the "rallying cry of the Nationalist party's victorious electoral campaign of 
1948" (141); "in 1958, with the election of Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd as prime minister ... 
'separate development' came to replace apartheid ... in the rhetoric and ideology of 
South African racism" (143); Prime Minister B. J. Vorster, Verwoerd's successor, 
sustained the "conciliatory rhetoric of multinationahsm" (1986:144); this "discourse of 
multinationahsm graduated ... into the even more desperately appeasing rhetoric of 
'plural democracy'" under P. W. Botha's "new proud language of [a Reaganite or 
Thatcherite] democratic federalism" (145). Given this, McClintock and Nixon contend 
the accuracy of "Derrida's claim that South African racism is 'the only one on the scene 
that dares to say its name and present itself for what it is'" (1986:141-42) and therefore 
find misleading his reference to apartheid as the "order's watchword". 
Surprisingly, this is in spite of their reference to apartheid as the name of South African 
racism: "South African racism has long since ceased to pronounce its own name" 
(1986:142, my emphasis). That is, McClintock and Nixon acknowledge that 'apartheid'' 
is precisely the name (for itself) that South African racism seeks to disavow. Though they 
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seek to deny it by delineating the disappearance of the name from the official discourse, 
McClintock and Nixon's acknowledgement that apartheid is the name of South African 
racism is precisely contained within their phrase "its own name". Indeed one could also 
argue that by italicising the word 'apartheid' within the terms of their own response, 
McClintock and Nixon concur with Derrida's argument on its 'apartitionality' and 
'untranslatibility'. The particular function of italicisation would here be the 
foregrounding of a certain typographic metonymy. 
The next section of McClintock and Nixon's paper proceeds in much the same fashion as 
the first, although this time they turn their attention to the "history" of the South African 
economy under apartheid, "the Nationalist's Bantustan policy" in particular, which they 
chronicle. They praise Derrida for his "indictment of Western complicity with South 
Africa" and see this as "possibly the most valuable contribution of 'Le Dernier Mot'", but 
are once more troubled by "his blindness to the unfolding of the racial discourses in their 
historical context" (1986:147). For them, Derrida's comments about the complicities and 
alliances between capital and apartheid elide a whole "political and economic debate on 
South Africa since the 1930's" whose two rival interpretations - "the liberal-reformist 
school" and "the 'revisionist' school" - are at odds "on whether the rational forces of 
capital are in contradiction with the irrational, archaic policies of white racism, or 
whether apartheid can profitably coexist with modern capitalism" (1986:148): 
The liberal-reformist school has argued that apartheid's cumbersome racial laws 
serve only to hamper the forward-thrusting momentum of the country's capitalist 
economy ... [Whereas] the 'revisionist' school has argued that apartheid and 
modern capitalism are bound in a flourishing blood brotherhood, a pragmatic and 
flexible alliance which is collaborative and of spectacular mutual benefit. 
(1986:148) 
Sketching the "historical context" of "South Africa's 'economic miracle' ... in terms of 
[the] shifting alliance between capital and racial ideology" (1986:148), McClintock and 
Nixon assert that this alliance "was refined, not undermined, and the overall goals of 
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apartheid remained the same" (1986:152). As such, they propose that "the 'revisionists' 
argue against Derrida" and the liberals' "optimistic vision of apartheid brought to its 
knees by a liberalizing capitalism": "Indeed, if Derrida takes to its logical conclusion his 
argument that apartheid may be abolished by the imposition of the 'law of the market', 
he will find himself in the position of advocating accelerated international investment in 
order to hasten the collapse of the regime" (1986:153). 
In his response, Derrida complains that McClintock and Nixon read him in 'bad faith' -
an accusation variously asserted in his rejoinder - when they characterise him in this 
way: "it is quite simply indecent to make me out tpjbejleading for capitalism or 
suggesting that laws of the marketplace ought to be allowed free rein because all by 
themselves they would take care of apartheid" (1986:166). He argues that he has of 
course always considered this "revisionist" view to contain some truth. However, he 
challenges them to find even but the slightest suggestion of what they call his "optimistic 
vision of apartheid' in his text: 
Had I such a 'vision' I would not have written anything 'against apartheid'. 1 
would have thought: laissons faire le capital! That said, there again things are 
complex, heterogeneous, and contradictory ... Apartheid can at the same time 
serve the interests of capitalist accumulation and get in the way of capitalist 
development. One has to distinguish here among different phases and various 
capitalisms or different, even contradictory sectors of capitalism ... Have you 
ever heard of the contradictions of capitalism? ... You see, I fear you have a| 
simple, homogeneistic, and mechanistic vision of history and politics. (1986:166-
67) 
Finally, McClintock and Nixon are satisfied that their own response and analysis does not 
separate 'word and history', given that they have regarded "with a historical eye the 
uneven traffic between political interests and an array of cultural discourses" (1986:154). 
For them, it is precisely due to his inattentiveness to "racial and class difference" and a 
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largely singular attention to the "solitary word apartheid''' that his "method" carries no 
"strategic force". On this they deserve to be quoted at some length: 
For an analysis of racial representation, at least, this would mean abandoning such 
favored monoliths of post-structuralism as 'logocentrism' and 'Western 
metaphysics', not to mention bulky homogeneities such as 'the occidental essence 
of the historical process' and a 'European "discourse" on the concept of race' ... 
Derrida's call to fling back an answer to apartheid is inspiring, but until one 
recognizes, with Dan O'Meara, that 'racial policy is open to a sequence of 
somersaults, deviations, and permutations which endlessly confuse those who 
regard it as the product of a monolithic racial ideology', and until one embeds the 
analysis of racial policy in the dense everyday life of South Africa, such calls to 
action will remain of limited strategic worth. (1986:154) 
Derrida defies and finds perfidious this comment that his text illustrates a penchant for 
"monoliths of post-structuralism" and "bulky homogeneities", and reminds them he 
rather "constantly emphasized heterogeneity, contradictions, tensions and uneven 
development" (1986:165). In fact, what Derrida argues in "Racism's Last Word" (and 
reiterates in his response) is that "the history of apartheid would have been impossible, 
unthinkable without the European concept and the European history of the state, without 
the European discourse on race - its scientific pseudoconcept and its religious roots, its 
modernity and its archaisms - without Judeo-Christian ideology, and so forth" 
(1986:165). 
Whence issues McClintock and Nixon's claim that Derrida's singular attention to the 
"solitary word apartheid" blinds him to the nuances of its historicity? Derrida is precisely 
aware of the complexity of the text of apartheid, as he illustrates in his discussion above, 
with which they seem to have no substantial quarrel. In part, what seems to authorise 
McClintock and Nixon's complaint against Derrida's gesture in "Racism's Last Word, is 
a pre-theoretical apprehension of the 'historical' and what constitutes the 'political'. That 
is, they appeal to the historical as mere datum or archive and the political as self-evident 
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quotidian episteme. It thus seems - and Derrida argues this much in his response - that 
McClintock and Nixon's complaint is directed at their conception of "post-structuralism" 
rather than to Derrida's text in particular. 
In "But, Beyond ..." Derrida admits that he is exceedingly grateful to McClintock and 
Nixon for having brought some "useful details to the attention of [those] ill-informed 
readers" who desire "to fight apartheid in South Africa [but still as yet] know little of the 
history of this state racism" (1986:155). However, Derrida hastens to add that on reading 
their response he could not find any "serious objections" to his own arguments, despite 
the ostensibly "serious tone" of their paper: "In your impatient desire to dispense a 
history lesson, you sometimes say just anything. The effect you want to produce is quite 
determined, but in order to arrive at it, you are willing to put forward any kind of 
countertruth, especially when, in your haste to object, you project into my text whatever 
will make your job easier" (1986:156). He thus contends McClintock and Nixon's 
reading of "Racism's Last Word" entirely disregards the question of its original "context" 
as "an eight-page text accompanying an art exhibit" which he knew quite well "couldn't 
be a historical or anthropological treatise". For Derrida, the contextual overdetermination 
and dimensional constraints of the original context of his intervention meant that his 
gesture "could only be an appeal, an appeal to others and to other kinds of action" 
(1986:157). As such, I agree with Derrida's charge that McClintock and Nixon did not 
read his text. This is the result of their not taking into account the rules of grammar, of 
rhetoric, and of pragmatics, to which "the text of an appear necessarily conforms. 
Derrida freely agrees with their assessment that the text of an appeal has "limited 
strategic worth" but urges them to remember that such assessments are always in large 
measure complicated, difficult to evaluate and overdetermined by the criterion of 
"context". He asserts that the "complex ensemble", that is the exhibition, of which his 
text was a part, cannot simply be reconstituted, as "its limits are by definition not fixed 
and are in the process of shifting at the very moment [he is] writing to [them]". He argues 
that although "such calls to action" will indeed remain of "limited strategic worth", they 
are far from being of no consequence. 
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As for its limits, they are no more restricted than those of a 'response', yours, 
which not only supposes the appeal to which it responds in its own fashion but 
also, without appealing to any action, is content to chronicle the word 'apartheid', 
while advising that, rather than making history, we ought to become more like 
historians ... In this domain, as in all domains, no one strategy is sufficient; there 
is, by definition, no ideal and absolute strategy. We have to multiply the 
approaches and conjugate efforts. (1986:157-58) 
Once again, McClintock and Nixon's failure to attend "to the context and the mode" of 
his text is quite determinate, as they are led by this failure into taking "a prescriptive 
utterance for a descriptive (theoretical and constative) one" (1986:158). He argues that an 
example of this occurs when they state that it is because "he views apartheid as a 'unique 
appellation', [that he] has little to say about the politically persuasive function that 
successive racist lexicons have served in South Africa" (1986:141). However, he asserts 
"he never considered (or 'viewed') apartheid as a 'unique appellation'", and reminds us 
that the first sentence of his text "is an appeal, a call to condemn, to stigmatize, to keep in 
memory; it is not a reasoned dictionary definition of the use of the word apartheid or its 
pseudonyms in the discourse of the South African leaders" (1986:158). Derrida argues, 
"although it is not limited by the form of descriptive observation, [his] "appeal" in no 
way contradicts the historians truth". However, "to treat it as one would an historian's 
observation" is for him proof either of an inability to read or a readiness "to shortchange 
the ethics, to say nothing of the politics, of reading and discussion" (158). Besides being 
"a call to action", as McClintock and Nixon put it, the appeal is for Derrida, first and 
foremost, "an ethical appeal, as indicated by that which, in both ethics and politics, passes 
by way of memory and promising, and thus by way of language and denomination" 
(1986:159): 
Thus, my appeal is indeed an appeal because it calls for something which is not 
yet, but it is still strategically realistic because it refers to a massively present 
reality, one which no historian could seriously put in question. It is a call to 
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struggle but also to memory. I never separate promising from memory. 
(1986:160) 
It should be clear then that his (undeniable) wish is for apartheid to "remain" a "unique 
appellation". As he himself argues, the tense in his assertion implies that apartheid 
already is the "unique appellation" for the "ultimate racism", despite the singular 
denegations in the officially sanctioned or sanitised lexicon. Derrida is not here arguing 
for the demerits of reading the contortions and tensions of the official discourse on 
apartheid. He acknowledges "one should also pay attention to the rhetorical contortions 
of the ideologues and official politicians of apartheid?'' (1986:159), although it does not 
suffice to merely reproduce that official discourse. 
The next section of Derrida's rejoinder proceeds much like the first and analyses yet 
another error in McClintock and Nixon's response, another "question of reading, still just 
as elementary and directly linked to the preceding one" (1986:160). However, the debate 
now turns on their assertion that Derrida considers apartheid to have "'always' been the 
literal 'watchword' within the Nationalist regime". He thus reminds McClintock and 
Nixon that his reference to apartheid as the watchword of South African racism is 
"precisely in order to say that this 'watchword' has a complex history, with its dates and 
places of emergence and disappearance" (160). Peggy Kamuf, in a translator's note, 
interestingly highlights that "Derrida's term mot d'ordre, translated as 'watchword', 
could also have been rendered by McClintock's and Nixon's term: 'rallying cry'" 
(1986:161). This is an instance of what Derrida identifies as McClintock and Nixon's 
arguing "against themselves", and further supports his contention that they have no 
'serious objections' to make to him. 
Their argument that Derrida's analysis in "Racism's Last Word" seeks to put apartheid in 
a "quarantine from the historical process" is thus turned against them: "It's you, and not 
me, who also seem to be frightened by this word because you propose that we take 
seriously all the substitutes and pseudonyms, the periphrases and metonymies that the 
official discourse in Pretoria keeps coming up with: the tireless ruse of propaganda, the 
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indefatigable but vain rhetoric of dissimulation" (1986:159). As such, Derrida finds it 
necessary to dispense his own lesson on historical reality, belittlingly referring to them as 
his "dear comrades". "A watchword is not just a name. This too history teaches us, as you 
should know since you're concerned with history. A watchword is also a concept and a 
reality ... One must be attentive to what links words to concepts and to realities but also 
to what can dissociate them" (1986:163). The lesson continues as Derrida answers their 
charge that he is inaccurate in stating South African racism is the only one that "dares say 
its name". Once again, McClintock and Nixon's appeal to the disappearance of apartheid 
in official discourse misses "the fact... that the system of apartheid is not only practiced 
but inscribed in the constitution and in and impressive judicial apparatus": 
To speak one's name in politics ... is not simply to make use of a substantive but 
to present oneself as such, for what one is, in complex discourses, the texts of the 
law and of socioeconomic, even police and 'physical' practices. In politics, as 
history should have taught you, a 'watchword' is not limited to a lexicon. You 
confuse words and history. Or rather, you make poor distinctions between them. 
(1986:163). 
In the closing analysis of his paper Derrida returns his attention to McClintock and 
Nixon's reproach of what they call his "method". 1 wish to recall their assertion fully, for 
1 left it unchallenged in my reading of their analysis: "If, then, Derrida seeks not merely 
to prize open certain covert metaphysical assumptions but also to point to something 
beyond the text, in this case the abolition of a regime, then the strategic value of his 
method has to be considered seriously" (1986:140). Derrida notes the wily allusion they 
make in their reference to the word "text" (which in their phrase, "beyond the text", 
undoubtedly gestures to Of Grammatology's (in)famous statement: "there is no outside 
the text") and use of words like "post-structuralism", "Western metaphysics". As such, 
Derrida correctly assesses that McClintock and Nixon "mean to contest, beyond the 
precise context of apartheid, the 'strategic value' of [his] 'method' in general 
(1986:167). The "method" to which they are signalling here is of course what they 
apprehend to be deconstruction. 
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Derrida charges that contrary to McClintock and Nixon's view, "text", "no more than 
writing or trace" (1986:167), is not limited to the book. To be sure, Derrida's articulation 
of the concept of trace - as evidenced in his theoretical production since the late 1960s -
generalises "it almost without limit, in any case without present or perceptible limit, 
without any limit that is. That's why there is nothing 'beyond the text'" (1986:167)4. This 
calculated reconsideration of textuality allows him, he claims, "to bring together in a 
more consistent fashion, in the most consistent fashion possible, theoretico-philosophical 
necessities with the 'practical', political, and other necessities of what is called 
deconstruction" (1986:168): 
That's why deconstructive readings and writings are concerned not only with 
library books, with discourses, with conceptual and semantic contents ... They are 
also effective or active (as one says) interventions, in particular political and 
institutional interventions that transform contexts without limiting themselves to 
theoretical or constative utterances even though they must also produce such 
utterances. That's why [he does not] go 'beyond the texf, in this new sense of the 
word text, by fighting and calling for a fight against apartheid, for example. 
(1986:168) 
For Derrida then, McClintock and Nixon's "response" is exemplary for it reflects the 
willed interest of both the 'Left' and the 'Right' "to represent deconstruction as a turning 
inward and an enclosure by the limits of language, whereas in fact deconstruction begins 
by deconstructing logocentrism, the linguistics of the word, and this very enclosure itself 
(1986:168). On both sides of this self-proclaimed "political" divide the impatience with 
deconstructive practices arises from the (denegated) recognition that the latter "are also 
and first of all political and institutional practices ... [that create the space for and even 
necessitate] the most open kinds of political (but not just political) practice and 
4 Elsewhere, for it bears repeating: "What I call "text" implies all the structures called the 'real', 
'economic', 'historical', 'socio-institutionaP, in short: all possible referents. Another way of recalling once 
again that 'there is nothing outside the text' ... [This means] that every referent, all reality has the structure 
of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this 'real' except in an interpretive experience. The latter 
neither yields meaning nor assumes it except in a movement of differential referring" (Derrida, 1988:148). 
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pragmatics" (1986:168-69). Here, Derrida reiterates that McClintock and Nixon do not 
respond to his paper as such, but rather, in their own fashion, to a politico-institutional 
"imperative" that admonishes interdisciplinarity: 
Each must stick to his role and stay within the field of his competence, none may 
transgress the limits of his territory. Oh, you wouldn't go so far as to wish that 
some sort of apartheid remain or become the law of the land in the academy. 
Besides, you obviously don't like this word. You are among those who don't like 
this word and do not want it to remain the 'unique appellation'. No, in the 
homelands of academic culture or of 'political action', you would favor instead 
reserved domains, the separate development of each community in the zone 
assigned to it. (1986:169-70) 
It should be clear that Derrida's remarks in the above - and this is consistent with the 
whole texture of his rejoinder - highlight the bitterness that characterises the debate. His 
damning suggestion here is that the disciplinary and institutional politics to which 
McClintock and Nixon's response adhere, (uncritically) follows the logic of apartheid. 
Derrida's rather severe assertion underscores the question of an 'ethics of discussion', a 
discussion to which I will later return. 
To be sure, the scant criticism and commentary there is on the present debate, is 
to varying degrees united in the assessment of McClintock and Nixon's response as (not) 
completely missing the point - although I am not asserting that this consensus somehow 
renders their response wrong in advance. The chronologising of the lexical denegations 
of apartheid in the discourse of South African regime does not constitute in any way a 
critique of Derrida's gesture in "Racism's Last Word", as he himself undoubtedly (and 
quite forcefully) illustrates in his response. There are four major questions that the debate 
raises which I would like to expose more closely here. 
The first of these is none other than the question of (con)text. It should already be clear 
that for Derrida the context and mode of his appeal are quite determined, thus his 
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assertion that that McClintock and Nixon's misapprehension of this leads them to "take a 
prescriptive utterance for a descriptive (theoretical and constative) one". This does not 
mean, as Paul Cilliers seems to think in "On Derrida and Apartheid", arguing with 
himself in the most confused fashion, that Derrida's justification of the appeal constituted 
in the first line of "Racism's Last Word" is an attempt to extricate prescription from 
description. Derrida is precisely aware, as Cilliers himself acknowledges, that the 
distinction between prescription and description is irreducible: "It is prescriptive 
concerning the name of the ultimate racism, but the statement is descriptive of what the 
ultimate racism is, namely Apartheid" (Cilliers, 1998:81). Cilliers' objection is thus 
unclear, for as Derrida states, "although it is not limited by the form of descriptive 
observation, [his] 'appeal' in no way contradicts the historian's truth" (1986:158)5. Thus, 
the mistake or "enormous blunder" that McClintock and Nixon make is the degree to 
which they take his "appeal" to be only a descriptive utterance. 
Cilliers usefully notes that the "context in which McClintock and Nixon, as well as the 
rest of us, encounter 'Racism's Last Word' is not in the catalogue, but in the pages of 
Critical Inquiry, an academic journal" (1998:80). He adds, "there is nothing wrong with 
an academic article, especially one with an ethical focus, in the form of an appeal. The 
point here is that Derrida was, by his own lights, a little more than unfair to chastise 
McClintock and Nixon for not realizing what the correct context of his text was - a 
context that should apparently have fixed their reading of the text" (1998:80, first 
emphasis mine). "By his own lights" then, for Cilliers seeks to argue that Derrida is in 
contradiction with his own assertion in "Afterword: Toward an Ethics of Discussion" (the 
Afterword to Limited Inc) which reflects on, among other things, an earlier debate with 
5 So too is Rosemary Jolly's objection in "Rehearsals of Liberation: Contemporary Postcolonial Discourse 
and the New South Africa". She argues, "the academy needs to accept as its crucial project the task of 
promoting a language that ruptures the division between the prescriptive and the descriptive on which 
Derrida's defense of 'Racism's Last Word' rests. The acceptance of such a language would mean that the 
theoretical would no longer be confined to the descriptive and opposed to the prescriptive, as it is in 
Derrida's formulation" (1995:24). Jolly even goes so far as to add that Derrida's "error" reflects Stanley 
Fish's claim "that, theoretically, his own arguments have 'no consequences' - despite his extraordinarily 
public persona" (1995:28). However, as I have shown, Derrida nowhere commits such an 'error', nor does 
he claim that his arguments have 'no consequences'. Derrida acknowledges McClintock and Nixon's 
assertion that his text is of 'limited strategic worth', but asserts that the strategic worth of his text "would 
be far from nil" (1986:157). 
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John R. Searle. Here, Derrida asserts that "the simple recalling of a context is never a 
gesture that is neutral, innocent, transparent, disinterested" (1988:131). However, to 
remain faithful to reading Derrida or to remedy what he sees as a contradiction, Cilliers 
would have to contextualise Derrida's above statement: 
The reconstitution of a context can never be perfect and irreproachable even 
though it is a regulative ideal in the ethics of reading, of interpretation, or of 
discussion. But since this ideal is unattainable, for reasons which are essential and 
to which I will doubtless return, the determination, or even the redetermination, 
the simple recalling of a context is never a gesture that is neutral, innocent, 
transparent, disinterested ... The putative or pretended ... reconstitution of a 
context always remains a performative operation and is never purely theoretical 
... [It] may not be something 'politically suspect' to be sure, but it also cannot be 
apolitical or politically neutral. And the analysis of the political dimension of all 
contextual determination is never a purely theoretical gesture. It always involves a 
political evaluation, even if the code of this evaluation is overdetermined, resists 
classifications (such as right/left), and is yet to come - promised - rather than 
given. (Derrida, 1988:131-132) 
Perhaps I did not need to reconstitute the context of Derrida's statement to the extent that 
I have in the above quote. For Derrida already states, in the fragment supplied by Cilliers, 
that what is at issue is "the simple recalling", or as the rest of the quote affirms, the 
"putative or pretended reconstitution of a context"6. Derrida's own comments to 
McClintock and Nixon about the criterion of context are far from simple and putative. 
They are not merely a supposedly apolitical theoretical gesture but a political evaluation, 
however overdetermined. As he notes in his rejoinder, contextual determination has 
limits that are "by definition not fixed and are in the process of shifting at the very 
moment [he] is writing". As such, Derrida does not affirm, as Cilliers offers, anything 
Of course then, my own recalling of the context of Derrida's statement is not arbitrary. It serves to pre-
empt and modify the discussion of Cilliers and Jolly's respective (though coterminous) assertions that 
Derrida's meditations in "Racism's Last Word" and his rejoinder effectively place apartheid"over there, in 
South Africa", and that it sought to construct South Africa as the "atavistic other". 
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like "the correct context of his text - a context that should apparently have fixed 
[McClintock and Nixon's] reading of the text". No, not fix their reading of the text, but to 
some extent inform their reading, especially since, as Derrida reminds, they "are 
concerned not to dissociate words and history" (1986:157). In a not merely superficial 
sense then, Niall Lucy correctly assesses that McClintock and Nixon's reference to 
Derrida's paper "by its (original) French title in the catalogue and not by its (translated) 
English title in Critical Inquiry" problematises the chronology of "the object of their 
critique in relation to the critique itself (1995:2). Their reference to the French title of 
"Racism's Last Word" is significant, for it bears directly on the question of (con)text 
which I have already discussed: 
It is important to understand that their complaint against Derrida depends on their 
separation of (the) text from (the) real, which becomes their warrant for accusing 
Derrida of separating 'Word' from 'History' ... Their separation of the text from 
the real (or refusal of the statement, 'there is no outside the text') supplies 
McClintock and Nixon with a warrant to accuse Derrida of separating word from 
history. (Lucy, 1995:4-5) 
The second critical issue raised in the debate, related to the first, is question of whether 
Derrida's appeal has the effect of (dis)placing apartheid as "an untranslatable name for 
the evil perpetrated by them, 'over there in South Africa'" (1998:82), as Cilliers argues -
or as Jolly asserts, seeks to construct South Africa as the "atavistic other" (1995:19-20). 
Cilliers however, who positions himself as "sympathetic to the strategies of 
deconstruction", admits that some "aspects of this reading may seem too deliberate ... 
and are perhaps at times unfair" (1998:83) and as such offers that Derrida could with 
some justification defend against them. Once again, it is not difficult to ascertain 
precisely why Cilliers should pen his text of complaint against Derrida's gesture in 
"Racism's Last Word". For Cilliers hastens to add that his "target is not the person 
Jacques Derrida, but those who preferred to see apartheid as something perpetrated only 
by a specific group of (white, South African) people" (1998:83). 
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Given that Cilliers himself argues that Derrida is not one of "those [metropolitans] who 
preferred" (my emphasis) to extricate themselves from apartheid his precise objection is 
against no one in particular. But then again "those" who sought to displace apartheid as 
specifically South African are never named. Consequently, the rhetoric of Cilliers' 
objection could be seen as effectively arguing the opposite of what he contends he is 
asserting - for the only name he gives is Derrida's. It soon becomes clear that Cilliers' 
interest is to motivate for a species of geopolitically disseminated apartheid: "there is a 
serious danger involved in reserving the notion of apartheid for that specifically South 
African thing", and, "Apartheid, as a modernist strategy to structure and control, was 
never confined to South Africa" (1998:85). Of course, but only to a point. A point to 
which 1 will soon return, as it goes directly to Derrida's articulation of apartheid as a 
"unique appellation". As 1 have alluded, Jolly is also concerned that apartheid not be 
seen as phenomenally South African. 
Jolly considers the rhetorical effects of Derrida's gesture in "Racism's Last 
Word" as "analyzed in the context of [its] performance, [to be] radically at odds with its 
stated goal, the condemnation of racism ... This plea certainly invites readers to be 
complicit in the text's condemnation of apartheid, but it does so by appealing to South 
Africa as spectacularly other" (1995:19). Jolly's problem is thus located in the exhibition: 
The artworks represent the atrocity of apartheid, thus presenting apartheid as a 
spectacle to be condemned. The notion of exhibition as just condemnation ... 
depends on the viewer or reader's assumption of an authority, an objectivity, that 
enables condemnation ... The authority of the art exhibition, once used to 
construct the other, must now deconstruct it". (Jolly, 1995:20, my emphasis) 
Rather than an ethico-political intervention, she argues that Derrida's text is 
"neocolonial", as it simultaneously invites the reader to "condemn" and "dissociate" 
herself from apartheid. For Jolly, Derrida's assertion "that the aforementioned exhibition 
exposes and commemorates, indicts and contradicts the whole of a Western history" is 
indicative of his anxiety not to afford the audience "the comforts of such dissociation" 
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(1995:20). However, it should be clear that Jolly elides Derrida's own arguments about 
the exhibition. To recall: for him, the exhibition, "beyond the present of the institutions 
supporting it or of the foundation that ... it will itself become ... neither commemorates 
nor represents an event" but rather, it calls forth or "commemorates in anticipation" 
(1985:298-99). Christopher Fynsk's discussion is instructive on this point: 
Thus the exhibition, exposition in French, presents nothing that is, Derrida says, 
describes or illustrates nothing present - since truth is no thing that is; if the 
exhibition exposes a present, it does so in projecting upon a future of which it 
presents no images. The exhibition does not work in the manner of a 
representation of any kind, or points beyond, for example, its various 
representations of atrocious suffering in South Africa. (1989:4) 
Derrida's formulation of apartheid, as "the unique appellation for the ultimate racism in 
the world, the last of many" should be clear, although Cilliers continues to be baffled: 
"We are still trying to figure out why anyone would refer to apartheid in South Africa as 
the 'ultimate racism' without condemning, referring, or comparing it to any other specific 
form of racism ... why, for what reason, would someone transpose the worst evils of 
racism onto a single term, and then situate that term in one specific context outside of 
himself, even if he is correct on a purely descriptive level?"7 (1998:85-86). To be sure, 
already in "Racism's Last Word", Derrida offers apartheid as "the essence at its very 
worst - as if there were something like a racism par excellence, the most racist of 
racisms" (my emphasis); or a page later, "Apartheid is famous, in sum, for manifesting 
the lowest extreme of racism" (my emphasis). That "as i f and "renown" - or as he offers 
in "But Beyond ...", "the history of apartheid (its 'discourse' and its 'reality', the totality 
of its text)" (1986:165) - is precisely what Derrida asserts no serious historian can call 
into question. As this is insufficient for Cilliers, Lucy puts it quite succinctly: 
7 Cilliers also argues that the terms of Derrida's rejoinder make it possible to read "Racism's Last Word" as 
"an example of an attempt by the West to deny their complicity in perpetrating apartheid themselves". 
However, it is strange that his assertion is not modified in the least by a reading of the "post-script" to 
Derrida's response. Here Derrida forwards two cursory reasons why apartheid is also an "American 
problem". Of course Cilliers has read the "post-script", for it is indeed here that he finds the quote he 
decontextualises, "over there, in South Africa", and on which his deliberate reading rests. 
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What if the word 'apartheid' is so saturated with history, like the word 
'Auschwitz', that it seems to stand apart from history and to stand in for the 
ultimate form of its type? Apartheid is the ultimate form of racism; Auschwitz, 
the ultimate form of genocide. Each word is the extreme form of a (different) 
same - racism is not confined to 'apartheid'; genocide is not confined to 
'Auschwitz' - only on the basis of the history that each records and which 
separates it from other words. For although there are other forms of racism, there 
is no single word for the injustice of all racisms that bares the history of the word 
'apartheid'. (1995:16-17) 
However, I should state my own reservation regarding two points Derrida makes in his 
appeal. The first of these is his reminder that apartheid "is also daily suffering, 
oppression, poverty, violence, torture inflicted by an arrogant white minority (16 percent 
of the population, controlling 60 to 65 percent of the national revenue) on the mass of the 
black population" (1985:293). This does perhaps highlight an oversimplification of the 
political allegiances or otherwise, of the white minority in South Africa, and seems to 
somewhat paint all white South Africans as identifying with apartheid. Also, in a certain 
sense, everyone (some more than others) suffers under apartheid; something like Fanon's 
exposition of the alienation and, obsessional neuroses and psychoses suffered sometimes 
suffered by both the coloniser and colonised in colonial social relations, or the tortured 
and the torturer during the armed struggle for liberation8. Nevertheless, one could also 
see Derrida's assertion as an appeal to the empirical fact of the effects of the renowned 
and obsessive juridico-legislative apparatus that was apartheid. As such, this (unpleasant) 
assertion could be rescued by reference to the fact that Derrida also states, "that a certain 
white community of European descent imposes apartheid on four-fifths of South Africa's 
population" (1985:294, my emphasis). Of course one could still complain about the 
unclear specificity (or homogenising tendency) within that "certain white community", 
no less also about the reference to four-fifths. 
See Fanon's comments on the effects of the violence of decolonisation in his psychiatric case studies at 
the end of The Wretched of the Earth, in the chapter entitled "Colonial War and Mental Disorders". 
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Derrida's statement that "the white resistance movement in South Africa deserves our 
praise" is however, more problematic. 1 agree with Cilliers to the extent that he notes that 
the above statement implies "a divide between those worthy of praise and those who feel 
that they are in a position to hand out praise" (1998:85). Certainly, the meting out of 
praise "is not the same as declaring one's solidarity", but it does not necessarily imply, as 
Cilliers goes on to offer, "that some have the ability to escape the messiness of interaction 
with the other, to reach some higher ground where they are morally safe" (1998:85). For 
to claim this Cilliers has to temporarily forget the ethico-political imperative of the text of 
an appeal, which he himself earlier acknowledges in both that Derrida's approach is 
"ethical through and through" (79) and that Derrida takes a "firm ethical position on an 
abomination" (83). No "escape from the messiness of interaction with other" then, if one 
already acknowledges an ethical relation - which, of course, is already a declaration of 
solidarity. In this view, to commend the merits of white resistance can be seen as 
supplementing the ethical relation - as recognition (or appeal) that white resistance, 
whose "members" constitute part of the juridico-legislated "beneficiaries" of apartheid, 
might hasten its end. 
It should be clear that I have not discussed the question of the texture of Derrida's 
response - its 'style', its 'rhetorics'. For some critics, Derrida's response is not 
responsible, as it does not remain faithful to the "ethics of discussion" that he proposes in 
the "Afterword" to Limited Inc9. Right from the beginning of his rejoinder, Derrida 
states: "Whenever 1 take part in a debate or, which is not often, in a polemic, I make it a 
point to quote extensively from the text I am discussing, even though this is not standard 
practice. Since I am going to be doing that here, by addressing you directly I will save 
space (and I'm thinking also of Critical Inquiry's hospitality)" (1986:155, my emphasis). 
It could be argued that the ambiguous objective specificity of "Since I am going to be 
doing that here" rhetorically signals that the logic of the text of the present discussion 
does not follow an either/or, but rather, a both/and in the relation between debate and 
9 "I think it is possible, if not for McClintock and Nixon, then at least for some other readers [of Derrida's 
rejoinder], to be a little more than unhappy with how Derrida did what he did in this case. In sum, his 
reaction was not responsible" (Cilliers, 1998:83). 
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polemic. This can be seen in among other things, the texture of his response (its 
infantilising and unkind terms), and his reiterated contention that McClintock and Nixon 
"have no serious objections" to make to him. 
There is perhaps the need to recall, as Lucy does, that "not all debates are necessarily 
productive or transforming; not all debates are conducted with good will" (1995:19). For 
Cilliers then, there is a contradiction between Derrida's reiterated charge that McClintock 
and Nixon consistently read him in "bad faith" given his "bad faith" reading of them, and 
his commitment to an "ethics of discussion". Reed Way Dasenbrock's paper, "Taking it 
Personally: Reading Derrida's Responses", does not specifically examine "the exchange 
with McClintock and Nixon over apartheid in detail since the substance of this exchange 
is at some remove from the more technical debates over meaning and interpretation on 
which the others focus" (1994:264)10. However, Dasenbrock is given to argue that 
Derrida is either in contradiction, or that he is a "recanting revolutionary" (273). For 
Dasenbrock, any assertion or complaint of 'bad faith' reading issuing from Derrida is 
counter to his earlier insights about authorial intention and textuality; most notably, the 
manner in which Derrida reads Searle in Limited Inc. That is, Dasenbrock's complaint is 
directed at Derrida's insistence on an 'ethics of discussion' and his assertion of the 
necessity to read in 'good faith'. However, in order to declare a contradiction here, it is 
necessary to ignore Derrida's thinking on ethics. Geoffrey Bennington is relevant here: 
Ethics, then, is ethical only to the extent that it is originarily compromised or 
contaminated by the non-ethical. According to a logic laid out more that thirty 
years earlier in 'Violence and Metaphysics', the chance of avoiding the worst 
violence is given by a compromise involving an acceptance of, and calculation of, 
the lesser violence ... In this case, Derrida will say that ethics is essentially 
pervertible, and that this pervertibility is the positive condition (to be affirmed, 
10 This assertion is untenable, for I have already illustrated that the exchange with McClintock and Nixon is 
itself quite technical and is at its core a debate about meaning and interpretation. Niall Lucy asserts this 
much regarding the debate: "There is something critical at stake, then - something critically political, 
fundamentally ethical at stake - between competing theories of language that contest an understanding of 
the world" (1995:7). Fynsk's rather "philosophical" account of Derrida's gesture and reading of the 
itinerant exhibition as signalling his indebtedness to Heidegger (1989:4), although at times apparently and 
self-admittedly reductive, also renders Dasenbrock's assertion questionable. 
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then) of all 'positive' values (the Good, the Just, and so on) ethics enjoins us to 
seek. (Bennington, 2000:42) 
In this view then, his commitment to an "ethics of discussion" does not preclude their 
"pervertibility". Nor does it entail a contradiction of the kind asserted by Dasenbrock1 . It 
is not so much that Derrida's rejoinder responds to McClintock and Nixon, but rather that 
theirs is not a "response" as such. That is, as Lucy asserts, their "response" is "irrespons-
ible". Lucy is correct in noting that the belligerence of Derrida's response illustrates him 
losing "patience with those who (in 1986, still) read him so perversely ... that they have 
clearly not registered at all the significance of the word 'text'" (1995:20). Derrida might 
argue his response involves "an acceptance of, and calculation of, the lesser violence" 
compared to McClintock and Nixon's own. He does indeed argue this when he charges 
that "the effect [McClintock and Nixon] want to produce is quite determined, but in order 
to arrive at it, [they] are willing to put forward any kind of countertruth". In this view, his 
rejoinder is an extreme form of the manner in which they presume to give him a lesson 
on history and politics. 
Finally, the opposition to deconstruction (in general) or, as McClintock and Nixon 
figure it (and in this they are not alone), something called Derrida's "method" (in 
particular) - on the supposed basis that it is 'apolitical' or that its implications are 
'politically suspect' and thus supposedly 'textualist' - forms part of a desire (by both 
those opposed and sympathetic commentators) for Derrida to explicitly declare his 
politics. 1 agree with Bennington's suggestion that what these commentaries fail to grasp 
is precisely the trajectory of Derrida's thought. The demand is for Derrida not to largely 
deal with questions of politics, ethics or justice obliquely, as he admits12. This would 
Despite assertions of contradiction by detractors and (some) commentators alike, for Derrida on why "it 
should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith, 
lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy", see "Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion" (1988:146). 
12 For Derrida's own discussion of why deconstruction seems to deal with the questions of justice (and thus 
of politics, ethics, responsibility and duty) obliquely, see "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of 
Authority'" (1992:9-10;15-16). For commentary on how 'the political' is figured in Derrida's thought, see 
Richard Beardsworth, Derrida & the Political (1996). For a lengthier discussion of "the political demand" 
(made of Derrida) or the "political imperative" within humanities scholarship see Geoffrey Bennington, 
Interrupting Derrida (2000:18-33), and Niall Lucy, Debating Derrida (1995:72-98). 
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require that he enunciate the political of his thought through the inherited terms and 
modalities of a tradition of (political) philosophy whose hierarchal oppositions and very 
"oppositionality" - Bennington's term (2000:9) - he has spent his intellectual career 
questioning; concepts whose nonessentiality and deconstructibility he has already 
attempted to demonstrate. Catherine Zuckert's discussion in "The Politics of Derridean 
Deconstruction" is an example of this "political demand", here articulated in accusatory 
mode. She argues that far from being "radical", Derrida's work "has an anti-activist, if 
not strictly speaking conservative thrust". Zuckert then turns tack and argues that if 
Derrida's work "is not conservative ... [then it is at least] profoundly anti-revolutionary" 
(1991:354-55). Although I hope to have sufficiently demonstrated it in my analysis of the 
debate, perhaps 1 need only recall Derrida's reminder: 
There is no one, single deconstruction. Were there Konly one, were it 
homogeneous, it would not be inherently either conservative or revolutionary, or 
determinable within the code of such oppositions. That is precisely what gets on 
everyone's nerves ... As deconstruction is inherently neither 'conservative' nor 
the contrary, the political evaluation of each of the gestures called deconstructive 
will have to depend, if it is to be rigorous and in proportion to what it is 
addressing, upon analyses that are very difficult, very minute, very flexible with 
regard to the stereotypes of political-institutional discourse. (1988:141) 
In her own manner, Zuckert follows McClintock and Nixon in what Lucy offers is "the 
one (mis)taken-for-granted assumption about Derrida's work ... is that it bears no 
relation to pragmatic politics" (1995:1). Why the oblique, indirect address of the 
questions of politics and ethics? Because for Derrida, in a logic he already sets out as 
early as Of Grammatology, ethics, like justice, is an experience of the impossible. This 
aporetic moment of undecidability is necessary if an ethics is to be true to its name; that 
is, if it is to exceed mere calculation or subsumption to some prior rule, norm or case. 
Can it still be said that Derrida's work or deconstructive practices in general are lacking 
in "political implications" (or otherwise apolitical), and say nothing on "ethics"? (And I 
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am in no way trying to limit this question to the comparatively noticeable interventions in 
"concrete" or "worldly" politics, or in contexts where Derrida attempts to enunciate what 
he calls a relation between "deconstruction and the 'yes'".) Certainly. Only if the 
deontological responsibility to read with rigour and patience is ignored in favour of 
partisan politico-institutional imperatives. Only if the ostentatious reference to "politics" 
is enough, by itself, to insure some sort of self-congratulatory radicality. That is, only if 
the inherited concepts of politics and of ethics are to remain unquestionable, occupying, 
as Bennington's exposition on Derrida thought testifies, a position of "transcendental 
contraband" (2000:19). To ask the question of politics and of ethics is not in itself already 
political or ethical - that is, cannot propose or institute a politics or ethics. It precisely 
exceeds proposition and institution, in striving, as Bennington notes, "to keep open the 
event of alterity which alone makes politics possible and inevitable, but which political 
philosophy of all colours has always tried to close" (2000:33). But how useful is this in a 
postcolonial context? 
Of course Derrida's intervention into the debate on apartheid is not articulated in the 
familiar terms of postcolonial theory. However, it is possible to argue - and I have shown 
that Derrida suggests this - that apartheid is the manifestation and crystallisation of a 
particular instance of the European imperial and colonial mission in South Africa. As an 
intervention into the text of South Africa, Derrida's text and the debate that it initiates, 
seems to highlight the kinds of issues with which postcolonial theory engages. Also, as a 
particular gesture to the text of apartheid, "Racism's Last Word" illustrates how 
deconstructive reading practices might be useful for postcolonial analysis. I have 
attempted to show this through foregrounding the major questions that I believe emerge 
from the debate. Derrida's reminder that "there is no one, single deconstruction" and his 
assertion of the rigour, difficulty and flexibility of deconstructive gestures - in addressing 
the question of the political - would seem to find answer in Homi Bhabha's work. Thus, 
by turning to an analysis of Bhabha's work, 1 will not only be returning to the more 
familiar terms of postcolonial theory, but I will once again test the central question of my 
thesis through an analysis of Bhabha's reading of the work of Frantz Fanon. 
4 
Posting Frantz Fanon's Call: A Political/Theoretical 
Insight for Postcolonial Intellectuals? 
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In this chapter 1 will critically analyse the debate around Homi K. Bhabha's 
deconstructive/(post)colonial intellectual production. I will pay particular attention to his 
reading of the work of Frantz Fanon, and the subsequent attack against this reading by 
Benita Parry. The discussion will disclose not only Parry's own reading of Fanon, which 
she offers as a rescue of his work from the exorbitances and exhortations of an overly 
esoteric postcolonial textualism, but also other contributions to the debate. The 
theoretical eclecticism of Bhabha's work, no less than the density (and metaphoricity) of 
his prose, poses a difficulty much like that which comes from engaging with Spivak's 
work. It has also led to similar charges of theoretical elitism and obscurantism1. Earlier, 
in the discussion of the debate inaugurated by Spivak's "Can the Subaltern Speak?", 1 
referenced Parry's attack as it relates to Bhabha's reading of Fanon's work. 1 will in this 
chapter not be attempting to engage with Bhabha's theoretical production as a whole, but 
rather with his particular appropriation of the work of Fanon - an appropriation inflected 
by a deconstructive practice indebted to amongst other things, Derridean deconstruction, 
Foucauldian discourse analysis, Bakhtinian dialogism, and Lacanian (partially Freudian) 
psychoanalysis. 
Bhabha's most sustained (single) engagement with the heritage of Fanon's thought is 
represented by his Foreword to the 1986 edition of Black Skin, White Masks, 
"Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition". Bhabha reworked this 
Foreword (without any particular change to his reading of Fanon) as "Interrogating 
Identity: Frantz Fanon and the Postcolonial Prerogative" for David Goldberg's The 
Anatomy of Racism (1990), and reprints the latter version in his own collection The 
Location of Culture (1994). This is not to say however, that Bhabha's intellectual 
production is, prior to his penning the Foreword, devoid of any engagement with Fanon's 
texts2. Parry's attack in "Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse" testifies to 
I have already noted (in chapter two) Parry's objection to the dense texture of Bhabha style and his 
deployment of a specialised terminology: Bhabha's "enchantment with troping, punning and riddling all 
too often sends the signifier into free-fall, rendering arbitrary the link between word and signified" which 
for his reader "presents the hazard of inadvertent misconstruction" (Parry, 1994:7); Moore-Gilbert concurs 
with this assessment, see (1997:115); see also Arif Dirlik's less generous reading of the implications of 
Bhabha's style as "political mystification and theoretical obfuscation" (1998:333). 
2 Bhabha's earliest notable engagement with Fanon's work is "Difference, Discrimination and the 
Discourse of Colonialism", the latter reworked and reprinted in The Location of Culture as "The Other 
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(at least) this much. Bhabha's work in the early 1980s is variously acknowledged to have 
reinvigorated the serious engagement with Fanon's work. Bhabha sought to critically 
reappraise the incisiveness of the anti-colonialist critique of colonial discourse and 
relations, given his particular reservations on what he saw as a marked quietism in 
Edward Said's Orientalism . 
Bhabha's reading of Fanon in "Interrogating Identity" relies on his theoretical 
articulations in his earlier essays. It is thus not merely for the ease of organisation that my 
own discussion of the debate surrounding Bhabha's appropriation of Fanon proceeds 
through the close textual analysis of his essay "Interrogating Identity". For not only does 
the latter essay assume and lay out the concepts and arguments of the earlier essays that 
animate Parry's attack, but it also inscribes some of Bhabha's responses to his detractors 
- more fully, although generally, laid out in "The Commitment to Theory" (1989). What 
I seek to investigate through my analysis of this debate is then, precisely whether 
Bhabha's deconstructive practices - in his theoretisation of (post)coloniality - are 
flexible in addressing both the stereotypes of the politico-institutional discourse of 
colonialism, and, crucially, the articulations of anti-colonialist discourse. In order to 
arrive at a discussion of what is critically at stake in the debate, I will highlight some 
misunderstandings in the debate through a brief reading of Fanon's enunciation of 
politics, native agency and resistance. This discussion will be punctuated by a brief 
reading of Robert Young's insistence on Derrida's Algerian connection in "Subjectivity 
and History: Derrida in Algeria" (2001). 
In the first section of "Interrogating Identity" Bhabha sets out the central 
argument, proposing that the radicality of Fanon's thought rests not so much on his 
articulation of the project of decolonisation - the transformation not only of colonial 
relations, but of humanity as a whole. Rather, Bhabha argues what remains enabling in 
Fanon's work is his enunciation of/from the tentative Hminality of the space of 
Question: Stereotype, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism". The former essay is collected in 
proceedings of the 1982 Essex Conference on the Sociology of Literature, The Politics of Theory. 
For Bhabha's affirmation and assessment of the contributions and limitations of Said's Orientalism, see 
particularly "Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism" (1983:199-201). 
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ambivalent racial and sexual identification. This was done in an attempt to think through 
the as yet "unresolved contradiction between culture and class" (1994:40) and rearticulate 
the political as the space of introjection and interaction between the psychic and the 
social4. That is, anti-colonial/liberationist struggles refract not only the direction of 
Western history, but also challenge its progressivist assumptions and linear conception of 
temporality: "If the order of Western historicism is disturbed in the colonial state of 
emergency, even more deeply disturbed is the social and psychic representation of the 
human subject" (1994:41-42). Bhabha thus argues that in Fanon's summary dismissal of 
an essential Negro and White identity, "The Negro is not. Any more than the white man", 
emerges a disturbance and dispersal of racial identity grounded in "the narcissistic myths 
of negritude or white cultural supremacy" (1994:40). 
The intransigent alienation of the colonial Algerian that Fanon encountered during his 
time as Chief psychiatrist at Blida-Joinville psychiatric hospital enlightened him to the 
complicities of institutional psychiatry in the discourse and reality of colonialism5. This 
realisation also resulted in what Bhabha has noted as Fanon's impatience in his "search 
for a conceptual form appropriate to the social antagonism of the colonial relation" 
(1994:41). Bhabha argues this incessant movement at the margins of the conceptual 
forms organising Fanon's thought marks his "doomed search for a dialectic of 
deliverance" (41) which Bhabha offers is illustrated by Fanon's reformulation of the 
Hegelian master/slave dialectic, his evocation of an existentialist black subjectivity and 
his articulation of psychoanalysis within the dynamics of colonial relations. For Bhabha, 
the triple logic informing Fanon's work serves both to restore the promise of freedom's 
attainability and to reinscribe the presence of the colonised, as well as to illuminate "the 
madness of racism, the pleasure of pain, the agonistic fantasy of political power" (41). 
Note that Bhabha's reading of Fanon's articulation of the racial drama or scene of colonial discourse and 
relations - as a scene of racial difference - relies on sighting/citing the latter scene as analogous to Freud's 
articulation, in On Sexuality, of the scene of sexual difference as functioning through fetishism. For 
Bhabha's justifications of this theoretical orientation, see (1983:201-202). 
See Fanon's letter of resignation from Blida-Joinville, "Letter to the Resident Minister (1956)", in 
Towards the African Revolution (1988:52-54). 
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The theoretical eclecticism that Bhabha identifies in the work of Fanon could also be seen 
to apply to his own work6. 
In his confrontation with colonial alienation Fanon poses the question of the colonised 
black man's desire in the language of psychoanalysis. Bhabha reads this as Fanon's 
privileging of the psychic domain, which Bhabha argues changes not only our conception 
of what constitutes "a political demand but transforms the very means by which we 
recognize and identify its human agency" (1994:42). Not surprisingly, Bhabha chastises -
not for the last time - what he sees as Fanon's erstwhile lapses into an 'existentialism' 
that poses the question of political oppression as a violation of human essence; the 
consequence of the subsumption of the question of colonial man in the universalist terms 
of a discredited 'liberal-humanism': 
Fanon's question is addressed not to such a unified notion of history nor to such a 
unitary concept of man. It is one of the original and disturbing qualities of Black 
Skin, White Masks that it rarely historicizes the colonial experience. There is no 
master narrative or realist perspective that provides a background of social and 
historical facts against which emerge the problems of the individual or collective 
psyche. (1994:42) 
Bhabha claims for Fanon's articulation of "the problem of colonial cultural alienation in 
the psychoanalytic language of demand and desire" a radical questioning of "both 
individual and social authority as they come to be developed in the discourse of social 
sovereignty" (43). Thus, the colonial situation - given the manifest splitting or 
segregation that characterises the colonial space, what Fanon calls "Manichean delirium" 
- entails a fundamental contradiction in the assumptions of social authority. This is 
because the latter assumptions of social authority rest on the "myth of Man and Society" 
(43). For Bhabha, these split representations of colonial relations reveal the "in-between" 
6 Here is Bhabha's meditation on Fanon: "As Fanon's texts unfold, the scientific fact comes to be aggressed 
by the experience of the street; sociological observations are intercut with literary artifacts" (1994:41); 
compare this to Young's comment that we see Bhabha in his essays, "move from the model of fetishism to 
those of'mimicry', 'hybridisation', and 'paranoia'" (2004:186). 
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space of "a deep psychic uncertainty" (1994:44) that enacts the ruse of (an unfettered and 
stable) conception of identity7. Such "ambivalent identification in the racist world" of 
colonial relations, in the perverse insertion of the colonised as absence, not in terms of 
the mutual recognition of Self and Other, but rather as "the otherness of the Self, "turns 
on the idea of man as his alienated image". For Bhabha, what emerges is a "figure of 
desire", of the Other as Self s "tethered" shadow, which threatens to its core the very 
image of the coloniser's identity. 
In the second section of his essay Bhabha turns his attention to the problem of identity in 
the postcolonial through a reading of two poems: the first by Bombay poet Adil 
Jussuwalla, elaborating the spectre of a denegated native subjectivity, "that haunts the 
identity of the postcolonial bourgeoisie", which is echoed in the second, "the verse of a 
black woman, descendant of slaves, writing of the diaspora" (1994:45). Through his 
reading Bhabha seeks to argue that the problem of identity returns in postcoloniality as "a 
persistent questioning of the frame, the space of representation, where the image -
"missing person", "invisible eye", Oriental stereotype - is confronted with its difference, 
its Other" (1994:46). The unfolding drama in these foreclosures of the identities of the 
marginalised native by the postcolonial bourgeoisie, and that of diasporas in the 
metropolitan centre, is one that elides any recognition or contemplation "of what is 
missing or invisible". As such, Bhabha asserts these negations illustrate the impossibility 
of originary claims "of Self (or Other) within a tradition of representation that conceives 
of identity as the satisfaction of a totalising, plenitudinous object of vision" (1994:46). 
That is, what is exposed here is the unfeasibility of claims in the language of the Self to 
fully know the Other, to behold the Other as object, given that "the secret art of 
invisibleness of which the migrant poet speaks changes the very terms of our recognition 
of the person": 
This change is precipitated by the peculiar termporality whereby the subject 
cannot be apprehended without the absence or invisibility that constitutes it . . . so 
Bhabha here deploys his articulation of ambivalence as disturbing colonial authority and identity; see 
"Signs Taken for Wonders" (1985b: 150-153). 
80 
that the subject speaks, and is seen from where it is not; and the migrant woman 
can subvert the perverse satisfaction of the racist, masculinist gaze that disavowed 
her presence, by presenting it with an anxious absence, a counter-gaze that turns 
the discriminatory look, which denies her cultural and sexual difference, back 
onto itself. (1994:47) 
To be sure, Bhabha has thus far sought to affirm the important role that the counter-
discourses and practices of anti-colonialist/liberationist struggles have had in challenging 
the inherent contradictions - when one examines colonial contexts - of, among other 
things, the Enlightenment ideals civilisation, freedom, individuality and legality. In the 
writings of this anti-colonialist tradition, Bhabha singles out Fanon's work as the most 
incisive and original, given the latter's interrogation of colonial authority and identity in 
the psychoanalytic language of demand and desire. For Bhabha, this interrogation opens 
up the space for rearticulating the question of the political beyond the conventional terms 
of political philosophy. Through privileging the significance of the psychic domain, it 
also opens for him the site of reinscription of the colonised as an agent of history and, 
reveals the contradictions and fissures in colonial authority and identity. Consequently, 
he argues that such ambivalent identification in the relations of the Manichean colonial 
world occludes recognition of the otherness of Other; a denegation of native subjectivity 
in the appropriation of the colonised as the absent presence of the coloniser's alienated 
Self-image. This is precisely the problematic of the representation of identity that returns 
in postcoloniality as the confrontation with the alterity of cultural and sexual difference. 
In the latter, Bhabha's discussion would seem covalent with my earlier analysis (in 
chapter two) of Spivak's assertion that postcolonial theorists and critics need to be aware 
- in their attempts to reinscribe subaltern subjectivities - of the persistent appropriation 
of 'the Other as Self s shadow'. 
Through a reading of Roland Barthes' meditations on the symbolic sign and the 
function of the sign of "resemblance" in the "act of signification", Bhabha next seeks to 
reinscribe the "perspective of depth" as offering a certain authenticity to the sign of 
identity. His definition of the space of the enunciation of identity at those moments where 
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it exceeds the boundary of the image, leaving a "resistant trace, a stain of the subject, a 
sign of resistance", is an attempt to articulate a "discursive strategy of the moment of 
interrogation, a moment in which the demand for identification becomes, primarily, a 
response to other questions of signification and desire, culture and politics" (1994:49-50). 
Through this response to other questions, Bhabha argues, "we are faced with the 
dimension of doubling"8. He emphasises the importance of the space of doubling, as the 
enunciatory space through which the "problems of meaning and being enter the 
discourses of poststructuralism, as the problematic of subjection and identification" 
(1994:50). That is, Bhabha's discussion here attempts to show the possible channels 
through which poststructuralism - and this is not an attempt to homogenise the 
differential projects variously identified as 'poststructuralist' - meaningfully thinks 
through the problematics of subjection and identification; 'meaningfully' then, because 
there is not here the caricature of an adherence to some sort of infinite dissemination of 
meaning through the play of the signifier that collapses into an impotent nihilism. 
For Bhabha, Fanon's (so often quoted) meditations in Black Skin, White Masks before the 
disorienting gaze of a white child - "Look, a Negro ... Mama, see the Negro!" - reveals 
precisely the enunciative space of the doubling of identity. It is important to remember 
here that the psychoanalytic procedure of identification is "only ever the problematic of 
access to an image of totality" and that this psychic image marks the site of an ambivalent 
identification: "The image is at once a metaphoric substitution, an illusion of presence, 
and by that same token a metonym, a sign of its absence or loss" (1994:51). Fanon's 
answer to the question of psychoanalytic demand and the desire of the black man 
emerges as a demand for the "objectifying confrontation with otherness" (51). Bhabha 
disputes Fanon's fixed inscription of an image of the Other as representative of a 
fundamentally opposed and "alien cultural consciousness" (52). For Bhabha, the Other 
should rather be seen as enabling the introduction of cultural difference "as a linguistic, 
symbolic and historic reality" (52). Following Lacan's extension of Freud's work on the 
primal Oedipal scene, Bhabha stresses that the place of the "Law of the father or the 
For Bhabha's fuller articulation of this 'space of doubling' as the moment of (post)colonial hybridity, see 
"Signs Taken for Wonders" (1985b:153-58;160-162). 
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paternal metaphor" in the language of psychoanalysis cannot be taken at face value. 
Rather, he proposes that the 'Law of the Father' be seen as the space of an ambivalent 
identification resulting in "a conflict of authority", given its inscription of "a normative, 
normalizing place for the subject" whose "metaphoric access to identity is exactly the 
place of prohibition and repression" (1994:52) 
There should be no surprise when Bhabha criticises Fanon for what he calls Fanon's 
"analytic" (as opposed to psychoanalytic?) mode. Although he acknowledges that the 
Algerian struggle for liberation from which Fanon writes requires "more immediate 
identifications", Bhabha complains about what he sees as Fanon's turn away "from the 
ambivalences of identification to the antagonistic identities of political alienation and 
cultural discrimination" (1994:60). Bhabha thus refuses Fanon's retention of the binary 
opposition coloniser/colonised, as he finds in this gesture the deplorable hasty naming of 
the Other. As 1 will soon more fully explore, this is precisely the aspect of Bhabha's 
reading of Fanon that Parry finds most objectionable. To be sure, Fanon's explicit 
naming of the white man's Other as the black man, and the converse, is seen by Bhabha 
as evidence of Fanon's adherence to the racist lexicon of the "political time and cultural 
space" (1994:60) from which Fanon was writing. The ambivalent identifications that 
characterise the psychic projections of fear, desire and demand do not entail a neat 
exchange and nor are they authorised in perpetuity. Bhabha blames this trend in Fanon -
his attempt to explain away his contributions to the thought of the complex psychic 
projections characterising colonial relations - on the exigencies of his "sociodiagnostic 
psychiatry": 
It is as if Fanon is fearful of his most radical insights: that the politics of race will 
not be entirely contained within the humanist myth of man or economic necessity 
or historical progress, for its psychic affects question such forms of determinism; 
that social sovereignty and human subjectivity are only realizable in the order of 
otherness. It is as if the question of desire that emerged from the traumatic 
tradition of the oppressed has to be modified, at the end of Black Skin, White 
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Masks, to make way for an existentialist humanism that is banal as it is beatific. 
(1994:61) 
What Bhabha repudiates here is the thrust of Fanon's humanism, which he argues is 
"overcompensation" for the 'Manichean psychology' that characterises colonial relations. 
This "deep hunger for humanism" (1994:61) arises from Fanon's reinsertion of the 
Hegelian master/slave dialectic in an attempt to affirm recognition of the colonised 
native's subjectivity. For Bhabha, this is despite Fanon's earlier understanding of colonial 
relations as founded on "narcissistic indifference" (61). Consequently, Bhabha argues, 
Fanon's insistence on humanism, his "Hegelian dream for a human reality in-itself-for-
itself (1994:61), is foreclosed by his own assertion of colonial relations as Manichean 
and illustrative of an interrupted dialectic. For Bhabha, this "non-dialectical moment of 
Manicheanism", as an instance of the threat of cultural difference that springs from 
paranoiac identification, provides "a strategy of political subversion": 
In occupying two places at once - or three in Fanon's case - the depersonalized, 
dislocated colonial subject can become an incalculable object, quite literally 
difficult to place ... At the edge, in-between the black body and the white body, 
there is a tension of meaning and being, or some would say demand and desire, 
which is the psychic counterpart to [the] muscular tension that inhabits the native 
body. (1994:62) 
This strategy of subversion is for Bhabha an attempt to follow the subaltern or 
metonymic instance in a "form of power that is exercised at the limits of identity and 
authority, in the mocking spirit of mask and image" (1994:62). He argues that this is the 
paradigmatic lesson taught by the revolutionary consciousness and combat of the veiled 
Algerian woman in the liberation struggle for Algerian decolonisation. By crossing 
psychic, political, patriarchal and geographical Manichean boundaries, she lays claim to 
her own liberty. Finally, Bhabha asserts that Fanon's signal achievement lies in his 
"shifting the focus of cultural racism from the politics of nationalism to the politics of 
narcissism" (1994:63). This shift in focus, as he hopes to have argued, "opens up a 
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margin of interrogation that causes the subversive slippage of identity and authority" 
(1994:63). 
If 1 interpret him correctly, the key issue in Bhabha's reading of Fanon is the 
(inordinate?) attention he pays to Fanon's articulation of the 'agonism' that informs the 
psychic and social identifications of the colonial world. Bhabha does indeed take 
seriously Fanon's schematisation of colonial relations as being (manifestly) constituted 
by Manichean psychology. Thus when Bhabha admonishes Fanon for his retention of the 
binary opposition coloniser/colonised, it is not so much that Bhabha refuses the 
antagonistic relations characterising the colonial world, nor that he undervalues the anti-
colonialist/liberationist tradition and its calls to armed insurrection against colonialist 
oppression and dominance. These calls to armed rebellion contributed to the statutory 
dismantling of colonial imperialism and to the realisation of the colonised's right to self-
govern which no serious commentary can of itself call into question. 
Bhabha too already acknowledges that the colonial world, during a program of 
decolonisation, is in a 'state of emergency' - the result of the colonised's revolutionary 
challenge to the apparatuses and functionaries of colonial authority. For Bhabha, what is 
ultimately untenable in Fanon's work is his reinscription - as mere reversal - of colonial 
identification in antagonistic terms, given his insights into the forestalling of 'mutual 
recognition' within colonial relations (in what Fanon himself calls "dual narcissism"). 
That is, although this reinscription is tendered as an attempt to reaffirm the colonised 
native's subjectivity in the face of the weight of the latter's elision in the racist discourse 
and reality of colonial authority and identity, it nonetheless abrogates the subversivity in 
the menace of the alterity of cultural difference. 
1 have already (in chapter two) touched on some of Parry's complaints against 
Bhabha's reading of Fanon, in her essay "Problems in Current Theories of Colonial 
Discourse". Parry strongly objects to what she sees as Bhabha's rejection of the 
fundamental enmity of colonial relations in favour of a psychoanalytical/deconstructive 
reading that rather foregrounds the fissures in colonial identity and authority as a result of 
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the process of ambivalent identification. For Parry, "Fanon's writings intercede to 
promote the construction of a politically conscious, unified revolutionary self, standing in 
unmitigated antagonism to the oppressor, occupying a combative subject position from 
which the wretched of the earth are enabled to mobilize an armed struggle against 
colonial power" (2004:15). She argues that Bhabha's emphasis on Fanon as opening the 
space for an interrogation of cultural difference through the "politics of narcissism", 
seeks to rescue Fanon as 'proto-poststructuralist' and is thus an attempt to "annex Fanon 
to Bhabha's own theory" (2004:16). Parry argues that by not following the trajectory of 
Fanon's thought, from his initial concern to analyse the 'psycho-existential complex' 
arising from "the juxtaposition of the white and black races", to his later articulation of 
the programme of decolonisation in The Wretched of the Earth, Bhabha "obscures 
Fanon's paradigm of the colonial condition as one of implacable enmity between native 
and invader, making armed opposition both a cathartic and a pragmatic necessity" 
(2004:17)9. 
Parry does however admit that Bhabha follows the anti-colonialist interpretation of the 
motive of colonial discourse as being the deployment of racial discrimination and the 
stereotyping of the colonised as a figure of degeneracy in order to facilitate the 
imperialist project of conquest, hegemony and pillage. However, in his psychoanalytical 
articulation of the ambivalence of colonial discourse, Parry argues that Bhabha limits 
native resistance to "returning the look of surveillance as the displacing gaze of the 
disciplined" (2004:24). Parry offers that Bhabha's theorising is particularly effective 
in making visible those moments when colonial discourse, already disturbed at its 
source by a doubleness of enunciation, is further subverted by the object of its 
address; when the scenario written by colonialism is given a performance by the 
native that estranges and undermines the colonialist script. (2004:25) 
For Parry, the value of anti-colonialist/liberationist discourse lies in the recognition by its 
proponents that the processes of subjection and oppression characterising colonial 
9 See Fanon's Introduction to BlackSkin, White Masks (1986:14). 
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relations necessarily produce resistance by the colonised, given the incommensurable 
demands made of the marginalised subject. Contrary to Bhabha, Parry argues that what 
remains enabling in Fanon is that the counter-discursive political demand of his analysis, 
although initially invoking a native past in seeking to dispel the disparaged history of the 
native's cultural difference, surpasses a simple search for lost origins or traditions. This 
counter-discourse, although derivative of colonial discourse, is forged in the cultural 
consciousness of resistance against colonial hegemony, and ultimately ruptures the 
colonial episteme. This is because such resistance by the colonised calls forth an 
uncertain future that promises the attainability of freedom through the rescinding of the 
'psycho-existential complexes' that result from the cultural denigration, the sexual, racial 
and economic exploitation and discrimination that characterise colonial relations. 
As 1 have already argued in my earlier discussion (in chapter two) of Parry's attack on 
Spivak's work, Parry's concern to retain the anti-colonialist articulation of the colonial 
scene as ordered by the Manichean binary opposition coloniser/colonised is indeed 
admirable. What motivates this retention of colonial Manicheanism, as Ania Loomba has 
pointed out in "Overworlding the Third World", is nothing less than the attempt to 
recover both the material socio-economic and historical reality of colonial relations and, 
the multivalent oppositional colonised subjectivities, whether individual or found in anti-
colonialist/liberationist/nationalist discourses. However, I also wish to reiterate that 
Parry's analysis of what she sees as the problematic disparagement of the counter-
discursive radicality of anti-colonialist/nationalist articulations in the work of Bhabha 
(and Spivak), undoubtedly (as I argued in chapter two) falls prey to an uncritical 
endorsement of nationalism. In this vein, 1 wish to recall Neil Lazarus's assessment that 
Parry's invocation of native agency and resistance, privileges a particular type and mode 
of native subjectivity and resistance. 
In the introduction to her Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique, Parry 
seems to acknowledge the latter shortcoming in her invocation of native agency when she 
says "some of the chapters advance arguments I would no longer present in their initial 
form or vocabulary, and contain concessions made out of politesse or diffidence to 
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theoretical positions 1 now consider unsustainable" (2004:3). Arguably, her reading of 
Fanon in "Resistance Theory/Theorizing Resistance or two Cheers for Nativism", 
published some seven years after her initial valorisation of a particular type of insurgent 
native subjectivity in "Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse", is a 
corrective of her prior uncritical endorsement of anti-colonialist nationalism and native 
resistance. "Resistance Theory/Theorizing Resistance" is paradigmatic for the 
apprehension of what it is critically at stake in both Bhabha and Parry's differential 
appropriations of the insights of Fanon's work. As such 1 will briefly explore Parry's 
rearticulation of her position on native resistance. 
That Parry has revised her position on how native resistance is to be theorised becomes 
apparent in her mild castigation - as seen in the first footnote to her essay - of what she 
sees as Fanon's view of the colonised as altogether passive before modern liberation 
movements. Parry now critically acknowledges the heterogeneous forms of native 
resistance beyond its narrow instances in the discourses of native elites: 
Traces of popular disobedience can also be recuperated from unwritten symbolic 
and symptomatic practices which register a rejection or violation of the subject 
positions assigned by colonialism. Such modes of refusal are not readily 
accommodated in the anti-colonialist discourses written by the elites of the 
nationalist and liberation movements. (2004:38) 
Parry is keenly aware of the possible danger of mythologizing aboriginality, and she 
affirms "Robert Young's caution that the search for a nativist alternative may simply 
represent 'the narcissistic desire to find an other that will reflect western assumptions of 
selfhood'"(2004:42). Nevertheless, she argues that the interest of postcolonial critique 
concerned to re-present the informal narrativisations of dissent and opposition to colonial 
authority and identity, "is to retain in the discussion that realm of freedom which these 
histories prefigured or configured, as well as to register decolonising struggles as an 
emancipatory project despite the egregious failure these brought in their wake" 
(2004:42). Parry could have acknowledged the similarity of this caution to Spivak's 
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concern (as I have already discussed in chapter two) that postcolonial intellectuals should 
be mindful of the 'persistent recognition of the Other by assimilation' as the reinscription 
of 'the subject of the West or the West as Subject'. 
As such, Parry also notes that a committed postcolonial critique, in retracing these 
counter-narratives of resistance, should be wary of countersigning the "erasures, 
suppressions and marginalizations, evident for example in the foregrounding of male 
figures of praxis and authority". Once again, to borrow her own phrase, Parry shows that 
she is now aware of the problems in current correctives of theorisations of colonial 
discourse: "Such attention to the retention of patriarchal positions in anti-colonialist 
discourses points up the inadvisability of using the sources to write an optimistic 
narrative of liberation struggles as 'ideologically correct'" (2004:43). And of course, this 
is the particular danger that threatens her own reading of native resistance as she 
concentrates on the articulations of anti-colonialist nationalism in the work of Fanon (but 
also Aime Cesaire). 
Before detailing the many objections to Negritude, Parry states her commitment 
to historicise the performance of resistance in her discussion of Fanon and Cesaire as 
liberation theorists who "affirm the invention of an insurgent, unified black self, 
acknowledge the revolutionary energies released by valorizing the cultures denigrated by 
colonialism" (2004:43). This is despite their visions of a post-ethnocentric future -
illustrated in their commitment to a post-European conception of Man as being a 
necessary goal of programmes of decolonisation. For Parry, Black Skin, White Masks can 
be read as Fanon's attempt to affect the depersonalisation of the Antilean black through 
learning or being weaned from the errors of both assimilation and Negritude, and 
hence charting the move from the reactional ... to the actional. But perhaps it 
traces the path of the author affecting his own cure within the space of its pages -
Negritude marking the transgressive moment of emergence from the colonized 
condition, and the transition from Negritude to universal solidarity signalling 
disalienation and the transcendence of ethnicity. (2004:51) 
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Parry goes on to trace the development of Fanon's position on Negritude - in what was at 
times a simultaneous rejection and affirmation. Finally, she argues that for the later 
Fanon of The Wretched of the Earth, the rehabilitation of a rediscovered native past is 
valuable only when forged as part of the shaping of national culture by the insurgent 
native subjectivities in the struggle for liberation. Parry reads Fanon's denigration of the 
notion of an essential continental African culture - or even a homogeneously defined 
notion of a 'Pan-Africanist' culture that includes diasporic Africans - as his affirmation 
of the heterogeneity of African cultural difference. For Parry, this position, in Fanon's 
"On National Culture", also illustrates his "disenchantment with the official cultural 
nationalism of the newly independent African states" (2004:52), and leads him to 
carefully distinguish between the notion of a transformative and liberatory national 
culture and narrow bourgeois-elite nationalism. Although Parry argues that Fanon is 
perhaps overly optimistic in his articulation of the dawn of what he calls 'true 
decolonisation', she takes the import of his arguments seriously, as articulating 
something other than a bankrupt 'derivative discourse': 
In turning away from Europe as a source and model of meanings and aspirations, 
Fanon's last writings look not to the fulfilment of the Enlightenment's ideals 
within the existing order but to decolonization as the agency of a transfigured 
social condition; hence holding in place that vision of the anti-colonial struggle as 
a global emancipatory project and projecting the radical hope of a realized 
humanism. (2004:54) 
As with Parry's quarrel with Spivak's work (already discussed in chapter two), the debate 
once again turns on the question of the most appropriate and enabling politics for 
recovering native resistance, agency and subjectivity. This question is one both of the 
political positionality of the postcolonial intellectual - in the service of theorising an 
oppositional practice within the contemporary geopolitical/social/economic terrain of 
Global Capitalism, and a question of how to read and to relate to the articulations of 
oppositionality in the counter-discourse of the anti-colonialist/liberationist/nationalist 
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tradition. At stake in the debate is something like the slippage between the aims and 
claims of the postcolonial intellectual's reading of Fanon: that is, what 
theoretical/political insight/strategy is offered by his work? As I have already argued 
some of the problems and potentialities of Parry's initial reading of native resistance, 1 
will here summarise her position on what can be garnered from a reading of Fanon. 
Parry herself is precisely aware of what is critically at stake in the debate when she 
asserts that "proposals on how resistance is to be theorized display faultlines within the 
discussion that rehearse questions about subjectivity, identity, agency and the status of 
the reverse-discourse as an oppositional practice, posing problems about the appropriate 
models for contemporary counter-hegemonic work" (2004:37). Admirably, she reaffirms 
Fanon's articulation of a 'new humanism' that would be something other than the 
customary European discourse of humanism - the latter being understood to have been 
part of the conditions of possibility of the colonialist/imperialist mission10. Parry's 
reading of Fanon notably focuses on his call for 'the wretched of the earth' to fashion an 
insurgent subjectivity, which she argues attempted and succeeded in challenging colonial 
authority and identity in the violent upheaval that was the Algerian movement for 
liberation11. As such, Parry argues against what she sees as the occlusion of Fanon's 
relationship to Negritude in readings of his work that seek to claim him as largely 
refusing (though at times accusing him of) a nativist or essentialist politics. 
However, Parry seems to affirm Bhabha's theorisation of the ambivalence of colonial 
discourse - albeit Fanon's anti-colonialist articulation of a counter-discourse - when she 
asserts that "Fanon's writings function at a point of tension between cultural nationalism 
and transnationality, without 'resolving' the contradiction and without yielding an 
Bhabha modifies his earlier negative stance on Fanon's humanism as "an existentialist humanism that is 
as banal as it is beatific" when, in a conversation with John Comaroff, he holds that "the anti-colonial 
movements in Asia and Africa were movements fired by a moral purpose, seeking a new ethico-political 
order- a new humanism, as Frantz Fanon put it" (2002:15-16). 
Laura Chrisman argues: "Dominant Foucauldian - and Fanonian - convictions of the all-engulfing nature 
of colonial power have another unfortunate corollary: the exclusion, or ideological dismissal, of early anti-
colonial theorists" (1995:207). Pace Chrisman, Fanon nowhere argues for an all-pervasive and engulfing 
notion of colonial discourse and authority. Nor are his patient critiques of the positions of Negritude and his 
predecessors a "structural exclusion" or mere "ideological dismissal". 
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attachment to the one or the aspiration to the other"(2004:49) . In the final analysis, 
although she states her task as being to refigure the place of nativism or Negritude within 
the body of Fanon's thought, in her unremitting analysis of the latter - even with her 
assertion that it occupies an ambiguous space within his thought - Parry seems to 
construct it as pre-eminent. Her reading of Fanon is tendered as both a corrective to what 
she sees as the disparagement of the counter-discourse of nationalism, and a refusal to 
allow the reclamation of a native past from which the colonised can construct an 
insurgent subjectivity in their struggles for liberation. 
This disparagement, she argues, issues from (Bhabha's) theorisations of colonial 
discourse that rely on a "language model in its 'strong' form" (1994:9). Such a model 
also refuses the Manichean ordering of colonial relations in the binary opposition 
coloniser/colonised, which Fanon affirmed, with the result of figuring the colonial 
encounter, not as a struggle between implacably and unevenly positioned participants, but 
rather as "a configuration of discursive transactions" (2004:26)13. As I have already 
argued, her complaint is precisely against Bhabha's reading of Fanon's major 
breakthrough as being Fanon's affecting a shift of the discussion of "cultural racism from 
the politics of nationalism to the politics of narcissism" (1994:63). One could easily note 
that in her hurry, Parry misreads Bhabha's latter assertion. That is, Bhabha's statement 
above only asserts that Fanon shifts the focus of the discussion of cultural racism to a 
politics of narcissism. This would not necessarily mean an absolute shift of focus in the 
discussion of colonial discourse from the politics of nationalism. 
I have already (in chapter two) mapped out some of the problems of Parry's distinction 
between the 'social' or 'material' political intervention, and the 'theoretical'. I wish to 
recall Parry's assertion that both Spivak and Bhabha's work is "marked by the 
exhorbitation of discourse and a related incuriosity about the enabling socio-economic 
12 Here is another instance of this tendency: "The retreat from a wavering empathy with Negritude becomes 
an ambiguous [or ambivalent?] critique in Fanon's address to the First Congress of Negro Writers and 
Artists in Paris in 1956" (Parry, 2004:51) 
See also Abdul JanMohamed's similar criticism in "The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function 
of Racial Difference in Colonialist literature": "Though he cites Frantz Fanon, Bhabha completely ignores 
Fanon's definition of the conqueror/native relation as a 'Manichean' struggle - a definition that is not a 
fanciful metaphoric caricature but an accurate representation of a profound conflict" (1985:60). 
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and political institutions and other forms of social praxis" (2004:26). In "Signs of Our 
Times" Parry goes even further: 
[In] subordinating, the cognition and explication of social forms, institutions and 
practices, and which are ultimately dependent on empirical enquiry, to 
deconstructions of the signifying process, and by reiterating that the structure of 
linguistic difference and the vicissitudes in the movement of the signifier alienates 
and overwhelms content, Bhabha registers his affiliation with the language model 
in its 'strong' form. (1994:9) 
In "Interrogating Identity" (1994:64) Bhabha already responds to this sort of criticism 
when he argues for his articulation of the moment of hybridity as a question that 
intercedes into the calculations and subsumptions of political thinking, for a 
demonstration of the as yet "unthought" contingency of the political. Contrary to Parry, 
in "The Commitment to Theory", Bhabha argues that "textuality is not simply a second-
order ideological expression" (1994:23) to be subsumed by the moment of political 
action. He thus asserts the "emphasis on the representation of the political, on the 
construction of discourse, is the radical contribution of theory. Its conceptual vigilance 
never allows a simple identity between the political objective and its means of 
representation" (1994:27). 
One could argue that Parry's quarrel with Bhabha is precisely a question of 
emphasis on particular aspects of Fanon's program of decolonisation: whether to recoup 
his work as an interrogation of identity and authority (primarily from a reading of Black 
Skin, White Masks) or a call for the colonised's liberation through an affirmation of the 
solidarity and exigencies offered by an anti-colonialist nationalism (primarily from a 
reading of The Wretched of the Earth)14. However, I am in no way suggesting that 
Fanon's articulations from his early to his final works are diametrically opposed - as is 
highlighted by my emphasis on 'primarily' in the above assertion. Of course, as my 
This is highlighted by even a cursory inspection of the respective emphases of Bhabha and Parry's 
quotations from their footnotes and bibliographies. 
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analysis of Bhabha's reading of Fanon has shown, Bhabha does indeed claim Fanon's 
most radical insights are his interrogation of the ambivalent space of colonial identity and 
authority. As Parry herself acknowledges, what remains enabling in Bhabha's reading of 
Fanon is his recognition of the elisions and marginalisations of particular subjectivities 
with the discourse of colonialism. To this, I would add Bhabha's similar attention to anti-
colonialist counter-discourses, as well as to the dynamics of postcolonial bourgeois-elite 
nationalism: 
The extent of his influence suggests the power of Bhabha's rethinking of culture 
'as an uneven, incomplete production of meaning and value', his insights into the 
hierarchy retained by the liberal ethic of multiculturalism, his attention to the 
differential histories of race, nations and peoples, his innovative work on the 
inflections of colonialism within western thought, and his contributions to 
opening up the categories of identity, culture and nation to their heterogeneity. 
(Parry, 1994:7) 
However, as Parry also criticises, Bhabha's reading of Fanon is not without its problems. 
The differences in Parry and Bhabha's reading of Fanon are then not merely a question of 
emphasis, but rather indicative of a particular politico-theoretical investment. One could 
argue that Bhabha's reading of Fanon in "Remembering Fanon", specifically written as 
the Foreword to the 1986 edition of Black Skin, White Masks, commits itself carefully 
and rigorously - in the attention it gives to what follows it - to the question of the 
preface. What would emerge here is an appraisal of something akin to my previous 
discussion (in chapter three) of the question of context as it relates to Bhabha's 
enunciations in his Foreword. It should be noted that upon close examination, Bhabha 
does illustrate his reading of Fanon from some of his later works. Take for example 
Bhabha's assertion of the Algerian woman's participation in the liberation movement (in 
"Algeria Unveiled") as a paradigmatic instance of hybridity that threatens colonial 
identity and authority15. Perhaps such a view should serve to countermand the 
5 Parry's reading of Bhabha's project as not attentive to the interconnections between the 'the social' and 
the theoretical would in this instance have to be modified. 
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exasperations and complaints expressed by some critics about the attention Bhabha gives 
to Black Skin, White Masks. 
Of course the view I assert above becomes untenable inasmuch as Bhabha's own stated 
claim in the Foreword, as seen from its title, is to remember (the main body of) Fanon's 
thought. Also, as I noted in the introduction to this chapter, Bhabha revises and reprints 
the Foreword as "Interrogating Identity: Frantz Fanon and the Postcolonial Prerogative" 
in another context, where the claims he makes emerge as a reading of the totality of 
Fanon's contribution. Neil Lazarus argues this much when he asserts, "although Bhabha 
predicates his theory of colonial discourse upon the work of Fanon, he contrives to read 
him 'back to front' - that is, from The Wretched of the Earth to Black Skin, White Masks 
- thereby falsifying the testimony of Fanon's own evolution as a theorist" (1993:87). 
However, 1 cannot as yet endorse Lazarus's next claim that Bhabha uses his reading of 
Black Skin, White Masks "to disavow Fanon's political commitments and his theorization 
of 'the African Revolution'"16. For as I have already illustrated, Bhabha acknowledges 
Fanon's political investments and articulations of the project of decolonisation together 
with what he sees as its shortcomings. Nonetheless, 1 would have to agree with Lazarus's 
argument that the movement of some of Bhabha's objections to Fanon do seem to 
appropriate Fanon to Bhabha's own project. For instance, when he identifies Fanon's 
reinscription of "the antagonistic identities of the political alienation and cultural 
discrimination" as an attempt "to restore the dream to its proper political time and 
cultural space" (Bhabha, 1994:60) - is Bhabha here complaining against Fanon's attempt 
to historicise the colonial encounter? Or is Bhabha rather attempting to illustrate the 
shortcomings of the oppositional political practice entailed in that reinscription? 
The following reading of Fanon's positions on politics, subjectivity and the 
programme of decolonisation does not constitute an attempt to critique his articulations. 
So too Moore-Gilbert's similar assertion: "Bhabha almost completely discounts those later works of 
Fanon which call for violent action against the colonizer. Indeed, in reading his mentor's development as a 
thinker backwards, and so persistently ignoring his later work, Bhabha might even be accused of not so 
much of 'remembering' as 'dismembering' Fanon" (1997:138); See also Cedric Robinson's belligerent 
assessment, (1993:85). 
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It is rather tendered as a necessarily compressed and selective reading of those sites in his 
work that are of critical importance to the debate. However, this is not to say that Fanon's 
work is without its own problems - as is highlighted by some five decades of critical 
assessment of his work. Although Fanon argues, in his introduction to Black Skin, White 
Masks, that "only a psychoanalytic interpretation of the black problem can lay bare the 
anomalies of affect that are responsible for the structure o f colonial narcissism, he is 
keenly aware that "the effective disalienation of the black man entails an immediate 
recognition of social and economic realities" (1986:12-13). Fanon already registers the 
need for "collective catharsis" (145) as necessary to affect the disalienation of the 
colonised: "In every society, exists - must exist - a channel, an outlet through which the 
forces accumulated in the form of aggression can be released" (145). Despite Fanon's 
claim for the efficacy of psychoanalytic interpretation, he asserts his disagreement with 
(and reformulation of) some of the terms and conclusions of European psychoanalysis: 
There has been much talk of psychoanalysis and the Negro. Distrusting the ways 
in which it might be applied, 1 have preferred to call this chapter "The Negro and 
Psychopathology", well aware that Freud and Adler and even the cosmic Jung did 
not think of the Negro in all their investigations. (1986:151) 
In The Wretched of the Earth Fanon foregrounds the implacable oppositionality of 
colonial relations, highlighted by his recognition of the violent upheaval in the Negro's 
struggle for liberation - his articulation of the Manichean ordering of colonial relation 
around the binary opposition coloniser/colonised. This is not to suggest that Fanon's 
interrogation of identity is obviated at the end of his first work. Such a psychoanalytic 
interrogation is not somehow foreclosed when Fanon resigns from his position as Chief 
psychiatrist at Blida-Joinville. Even here, as he leaves his post in the recognition of the 
non-viability of his psychiatric intervention at the hospital, Fanon is aware of the need to 
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interrogate the dynamics of colonial identity together with an articulation of an 
oppositional practice for the colonised in the movement for decolonisation . 
Consequently, Fanon's task in L 'An Cinq de la Revolution Algerienne - translated into 
English as Studies in a Dying Colonialism - is precisely both to catechise and historicise 
the colonised's construction of insurgent subjectivities in the fifth year of the Algerian 
Revolution. In some of the chapters of the latter work, Fanon variously explores how the 
Algerian woman's participation in the movement for liberation granted her channels 
through which to challenge both the functions and apparatuses of colonial authority and, 
the sometimes sexist and patriarchal discourses of her own society. So too Fanon's 
analysis of the colonised's subversive and politically expedient use of the technological 
devices of the coloniser and the decoupling of the coloniser's medical innovations from 
colonialist oppression and discrimination. No less important here is Fanon's thesis about 
the changes wrought by the movement for liberation on some of the conservative 
strictures of the colonised's familial relations. 
Fanon does indeed figure colonial relations as Manichean and hence his assertion that 
decolonisation is immanently violent. For Fanon, colonialism "is violence in its natural 
state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence" (2001:48). This 
violence is a response in equal measure to the violence of the colonial world that was 
responsible for the repudiation and destruction of the native's pre-colonial cultural, 
economic, social, and psychic difference. Thus, the violence of decolonisation is for 
Fanon crucial for the re-emergence of the native into history: 
Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a 
programme of complete disorder ... Decolonization is the meeting of two forces, 
opposed to each other by their very nature ... Decolonization is the veritable 
creation of new men. (2001:27-29) 
17 Fanon's resignation from Blida-Joinville was also informed (and the two are not unrelated) by the 
political necessity of avoiding imminent arrest by the Algerian authorities. It was at this point that the 
authorities had traced his connections to the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN). 
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However, it is important not to read Fanon's assertion about the "absolute violence" 
entailed by a programme of decolonisation - in the oft-cited essay, "Concerning 
Violence" - in isolation from Fanon's work as a whole. Although Fanon argues for the 
instrumentality of this violence of decolonisation for the native's construction of a 
revolutionary consciousness and the overthrowing of colonial authority - its 
discriminatory episteme and quotidian material oppression and exploitation - he admits 
that such violence should not become an uncritically endorsed prescription for 
revolutionary movements: "If need be the native can accept compromise with 
colonialism, but never a surrender of principle" (2001:114), and he warns against an 
"unmixed and total brutality, [which] if not immediately combated, invariably leads to 
the defeat of the movement within a few weeks" (117)18. Fanon is then not advocating the 
native's violent insurrection for itself, but rather sees it as necessary for a revolutionary 
consciousness through which a national culture is formed. As I have already highlighted 
in Parry's attack on Spivak and Bhabha (in both chapter two and the current chapter), 
Fanon is at pains to delineate his thought on the politics of national culture from those of 
bourgeois-elite nationalism: 
The nationalist militant who fled from the town in disgust at the demagogic and 
reformist manoeuvres of the leaders there, disappointed by political life, discovers 
in real action a new form of political activity which [in] no way resembles the old. 
These politics are national, revolutionary and social and these new facts which the 
native will now come to know exist only in action. They are the essence of the 
fight which explodes the old colonial truths and reveals unexpected facets, which 
brings out new meanings and pinpoints the contradictions camouflaged by these 
facts. (2001:117) 
18 Although Fanon has observed the Manichean ordering of colonial relations, he tempers this view 
somewhat in his essay, "Algeria's European Minority" in Studies of a Dying Colonialism, where he 
illustrates that this latter constituency is "far from being the monolithic block that one imagines" 
(1989:148). This point is evident even in The Wretched of the Earth, where Fanon notes a paradigm shift at 
a certain point in the violent struggle as a result of an inauguration of revolutionary consciousness: "As 
they look around them, [the natives] notice that certain settlers do not join in the general hysteria; there are 
differences in the same species. Such men, who before were included without distinction and 
indiscriminately in the monolithic mass of the foreigner's presence, actually go so far as to condemn the 
colonial war" (2001:116); For Hannah Arendt's discussion of Fanon's meditation on violence, see On 
Violence (1970:14; 20; 65). 
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A more patient deconstructive engagement with Fanon's work might pose the question of 
whether Fanon is locked in Manichean binaries, or whether his texts show colonialism 
already in deconstruction. Posing that question has however not been the aim of my own 
compressed reading of Fanon. Rather, I hope to have illustrated what Bhabha's particular 
deconstructive/postcolonial reading of Fanon, as well as Parry's alternate reading, 
contributes to the theorisation of postcoloniality. The following sketch should not, as I 
allude to in my remarks above, take the place of a more rigorous demonstration, but 
rather signals the conditions of possibility (and impossibility) of such a deconstructive 
demonstration. 
One can leverage a deconstructive reading of the discourse of colonialism in a reading 
that would demonstrate deconstruction as already in decolonisation. Perhaps the 
movement of such a reading would, among other things, trace in the discourse and reality 
of colonialism, and its counter-discourses - what Derrida in his text on apartheid calls 
"the totality of its text" (1986:165) - something like the call of decolonisation as a call to 
justice, and an appeal for an ethical relation with the Other in the dismantling of 
colonialism. This is precisely what Bhabha's reading of colonialism attempts. That is, 
Bhabha's enunciation of a "strategy of subversion" as the movement of the subaltern or 
"metonymic instance" of interruption/irruption is an attempt "to keep open the event of 
alterity which alone makes politics possible and inevitable, but which political 
philosophy of all colours has always tried to close" (Bennington, 2000:33). The latter 
recalls my discussion (in chapter three) of the deconstructive thought of the question of 
ethics. 
Here, decolonisation could be seen as a "paragon" for deconstruction. In what is more 
than a strained metaphor - given Derrida's sometime reminder of his Franco-Maghrebian 
status - decolonisation and deconstruction (or Fanon and Derrida) would, in this reading, 
meet somewhere on the scene of the Algerian movement for liberation. In proposing such 
a reading, I am of course relying heavily on Derrida's enunciation of the deconstructive 
engagement with/to the question of ethics and justice, in his essay "Force of Law: The 
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'Mystical Foundation of Authority'" (1992). This reading would entail the kind of rigour, 
nuance and patience that is somewhat absent in Azzedine Haddour's "Fanon through the 
Poststructuralist Speculum" (2005). 
In what is otherwise an informed reading of the texts of the debate and of deconstruction, 
Haddour falters when he represents deconstruction in the singular and as a set of 
procedures, a toolbox of strategies or method. (Once again, and not for the last time, this 
is similar to McClintock and Nixon's understanding of deconstruction, as discussed in 
chapter three.) Although Haddour correctly notes the importance of Derrida's 
articulations on 'supplementarity', 'mimesis' and 'the hymen' for Bhabha's theorisation 
of a "politics of subversion" - through Bhabha's own enunciation of the concepts of 
mimicry and hybridity - Haddour elides the differences (or differance) within not only 
the terms of Derrida's articulation, but also Bhabha's reading of them. Hence Haddour 
argues the following: "What holds for the supplement holds for mimesis and the hymen" 
(2005:55); "77ze deconstructive strategy is, in Derrida's terms, an operation that both 
sows (disseminates) confusion between the two opposites and stands between them at 
once" (2005:56, my emphasis). The conditions of possibility for the reading of 
decolonisation I have sketched would also have to be mindful of the following assertion, 
which also illustrates Bhabha's concern not to uncritically deploy some set of procedures 
labelled deconstructive: 
The difference of other cultures is other than the excess of signification, the 
differance of the trace or the trajectory of desire. These are theoretical strategies 
that may be necessary to combat 'ethnocentricism' but they cannot, of 
themselves, unreconstructed, represent that otherness. There can be no inevitable 
sliding from the semiotic or deconstructionist activity to the unproblematic 
reading of other cultural and discursive systems. There is in such readings a will 
to power and knowledge that, in failing to specify the limits of their own field of 
enunciation and effectivity, proceed to individualise otherness as the discovery of 
their own assumptions (1983:197) 
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In reading Bhabha's caution against the grain one could note that Robert Young's White 
Mythologies: Writing History and the West (1990), is precisely (although partially) such a 
reconstitutive analysis of the conditions of emergence of poststructuralist theories in 
general, and Derrida's work in particular. Here, Young already offers something like the 
possible reading I offered for apprehending deconstruction as already in decolonisation. 
Young himself acknowledges that it is not merely the aforementioned title - taken from a 
chapter of Derrida's Margins of Philosophy (1982) - that he gleans from Derrida's work. 
For Young, the point missed by criticism of Derrida's work that asserts Derrida merely 
reinscibes the hegemonic discursive authority of the West or that his work involves only 
the critique of "Western metaphysics" as such - and this, I recall, is precisely the 
criticism expressed by McClintock and Nixon (in chapter three) - is that his critique of 
logocentrism is at once also a critique of ethnocentrism: 
In its largest and perhaps most significant perspective, deconstruction involves 
not just a critique of the grounds of knowledge in general, but specifically of the 
grounds of Occidental knowledge. The equation of knowledge with 'what is 
called Western thought, the thought whose destiny is to extend its domains while 
the boundaries of the West are drawn back' involves the very kind of assumption 
that Derrida is interrogating - and this is the reason for his constant emphasis on 
its being the knowledge of the West. (Young, 2004:49) 
Thus, in "White Mythologies Revisited", Young reminds that his own political 
intervention was firstly an attempt to challenge the totalising discursive authority of 
European Marxism by arguing for "an epistemological critique of the West's greatest 
myth - History". Such a critique was leveraged, he claims, in order to examine "the ways 
in which the West's most radical dissident, critical perspectives shared the same 
assumptions" (2004:2). Secondly, his project aimed to explore how those considered 
peripheral and non-European articulated a differential understanding of history that 
highlighted the contradictions and fissures in the hegemonic Western conceptualisation of 
History. "This 'History' is contrasted with non-European accounts in which history is 
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conceived not as a single overarching narrative, but in terms of networks of discrete, 
multitudinous histories that are uncontainable within any single Western schema" 
(2004:3). Young thus has recourse, in the opening of White Mythologies, to highlight the 
colonial provenance of what came to be known under the rubric of "poststructuralism": 
If so-called 'so-called poststructuralism' is the product of a single historical 
moment, then that moment is probably not May 1968 but rather the Algerian War 
of Independence - no doubt itself both a symptom and a product. In this respect it 
is significant that Sartre, Althusser, Derrida and Lyotard, among others, were all 
either born in Algeria or personally involved with the events of the war. (2004:32) 
Young's essay, "Subjectivity and History: Derrida in Algeria", as the title undoubtedly 
suggests, is a singular engagement with the assertion he set out earlier, in White 
Mythologies. Here, Young is concerned to argue for Derrida to be seen as a postcolonial 
theorist and for poststructuralism to be apprehended as "Franco-Maghrebian theory" 
(2001:414). That is, Young's task is to illustrate the historical links between the 
philosophers and theorists who came to be known as poststructuralist and Algeria, or the 
war for Algerian independence. Derrida was there, Young argues, on the scene of the 
unthinkable violence that was the Algerian Revolution: "Others, such as Fanon and 
Lyotard, went to Algeria to work or on military service and became actively involved 
with the revolution ... and saw Derrida frequently when he had returned to Algeria to do 
his military service there" (2001:414). Young is at pains to assert that Derrida's 
marginality, as part of the "Jewish" population of colonial Algeria, further meant that his 
identity was cut through by ambivalent identification within colonial relations19: 
The Jews live in ... an in-between limbo world in which on the one hand they 
identify with the colonizer with whom they can never be fully assimilated, but 
"Yet yours were the ideas that... were taken up by many refugees and minorities, migrant and immigrant 
groups, because they felt that it was your ideas that expressed, embodied their own disembodied devalued 
cultural and political situations ... Because you were one of them and thus spoke with them from their 
subject positions on the margins, theirs was already the language with which and through which you 
reconceptualized the world from their perspective and asserted the power of the marginalized in the 
heartlands of western institutions" (Young, 2001:425-26). 
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whose life they try to live in abject mimicry, while on the other hand they remain 
always condemned to live the life of the colonized. (2001:422)20 
In this homiletic manner, Young hopes to demonstrate that Derrida's work - even in its 
earliest articulations - is distinctly postcolonial. "From the first, then, your target was, we 
would say these days, western globalization, conceptual in form but material in its 
effects, and the eurocentricism of western culture" (Young, 2001:412). In this vein, the 
poststructuralist interrogation of "the idea of totality was born out of the experience of, 
and forms of resistance to, the totalizing regimes of the late colonial state, particularly 
French Algeria" (415). This re-vision of the conditions of possibility of deconstruction is 
aimed particularly at postcolonial intellectuals who reject postcolonial theory as 
'Western', and therefore incapable of answering to the questions of the 'Third World' -
incapable of partaking, to paraphrase Quayson (from my discussion in chapter two), in 
the native's discursive modalities. 
I would suggest that although Young's essay is an important historical intervention into 
the debate about the eurocentricity of postcolonial theory, what remains disquieting is the 
possible slide towards conflation that occurs in Young's effort to reclaim deconstruction 
as postcolonial. Thus although Young acknowledges the differences between the anti-
colonialist discourses of liberation and poststructuralist deconstructions of the ideas and 
ideals of Western philosophy and culture, they are too easily enunciated together in the 
following: "Many of those who developed the theoretical positions subsequently 
characterized as poststructuralism came from Algeria or had been involved in the war of 
independence. Fanon, Memmi, Bourdieu, Althusser, Lyotard, Derrida, Cixous - they 
were all in or from Algeria" (2001:413). Not only is Derrida offered as theorising 
postcoloniality, it would seem that Fanon and Memmi are now also poststructuralist. 
It is of course imperative to attend to the historico-political conditions of possibility of 
work that has come to be called 'poststructuralist'. I cannot in the last instance dismiss 
~ Given Young's claim for Derrida's colonial Algeria connection, he could have included Fanon's analysis 
of Jewish Algerians in Studies in a Dying Colonialism, "Algeria's European Minority" (1989:153-157). 
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Young's historico-political re-visioning of deconstruction. In my reading, however, 
deconstructive practices, as theoretical demonstrations/interrogations of the questions of 
politics, ethics, culture, economics, literature or whatever, should stand or fall on the 
basis of the flexibility with which they facilitate the posing of the latter questions, rather 
than on their geographical provenance. As I hope to have demonstrated in my assessment 
of the present debate, those theoretical interrogations are not self-sufficiently or 
exclusively theoretical. Also, I hope to have illustrated the importance of question of 
context, in my discussion of the debate between Derrida and, McClintock and Nixon. 
What 1 remain uneasy with in Young's reading of Derrida in Algeria is the manner in 
which Young's argument strains towards an assertion of context as the final determinant 
of Derrida as a postcolonial theorist. 
To return to the question of Bhabha's reading of Fanon then, I hope to have demonstrated 
Bhabha's deconstructive practices are also ethico-political interventions that seek to keep 
open the space for the arrival of the other that refuses appropriation and identification as 
the Self s alienated image - to frustrate the economy of narcissistic identification. 
Doubtless, there are also problems with Bhabha's reading of Fanon, and no less so with 
Parry's attack and her own reading of Fanon. Perhaps it would be rather crass to assert 
that whereas Bhabha's reading attempts to pose the question of politics as politics-in-
question or the political as question, Parry's reading assumes the inherent radicality of 
politics. Both are joined in an attempt not only to read the contributions of the anti-
colonialist tradition, but also to fashion an enabling postcolonial critique as a counter-
hegemonic practice within the contemporary situation of a thoroughly hegemonic Global 
Capitalism. 
Perhaps, then, the differences in these readings of Fanon illustrate the problematic 
question of the positionality of the (post)colonial intellectual, and the function of the 
intellectual's theoretico-political intervention. That is, what can perhaps be salvaged from 
Fanon's work is a political insight or strategy as a theoretical insight into the problems of 
all political strategies - this would include Fanon's own articulations within the counter-
discourses of anti-colonialist/liberationist nationalism. It seems to me that such critical 
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vigilance might be important for the discourses of South Africa - a South Africa that has 
enjoyed exemplary status for postcolonial inquiry. What 1 intend to investigate in the 
following conclusion is precisely the modalities of postcolonial theory or postcoloniality 





In a number of important ways, the appropriation of postcolonial theory and 
postcoloniality within the South African academy rehearses some of the earlier concerns I 
identified in my analysis (in chapters two to four) of the Spivak/Parry, 
Derrida/McClintock and Nixon, and Bhabha/Parry debates. However, to say the South 
African debates on postcolonial theory are a rehearsal is not to assert that the latter 
debates are but a mere repetition of those within metropolitan academy. That is, the 
occasionality of the appropriation of postcolonial theory, and the consequent debate in 
South Africa, occurs within a particular and differentiated politico-historical and 
institutional environment. At the macro level this would be the transitory space of the 
negotiations to bring a formal end to the discriminatory and exploitative practices of 
apartheid South Africa between the state, lead by the National Party (NP), and the 
movement considered the spearhead of the 'National Democratic Revolution', the 
African National Congress (ANC). It is principally within this space that I wish to 
conclude by investigating the modalities of postcolonial theory and deconstruction that 
have gained currency within the literary-cultural discourses of the South African 
academy. 
Perhaps more than anybody else in the South African academy, David Attwell and Leon 
de Kock are acknowledged as seeking to install postcolonial theory onto the literary-
cultural discursive agenda. Although this attempt at a reorientation can be seen in much 
of their intellectual production in early 1990s, and after, the most exemplary instances are 
Attwell and de Kock's respective interviews with Bhabha and Spivak. So too are 
Attwell's "Introduction", as editor of a 1993 special issue on postcolonial theory in 
Current Writing: Text and Reception in Southern Africa, and de Kock's "Postcolonial 
Analysis and the Question of Critical Disablement", his contribution to the same issue of 
the journal. Also important here will be Annamaria Carusi's contributions to postcolonial 
analysis in South Africa - in "Post, Post and Post. Or, Where is South African Literature 
in All This" (1991) and "The Postcolonial Other as a Problem for Political Action" 
(1991). As a critique of the appropriation of postcolonial theory, Nicholas Visser's 
"Postcoloniality of a Special Type: Theory and its Appropriations in South Africa" 
(1997) will be especially important for my investigation. In this vein, I will also draw on 
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Kelwyn Sole's, "South Africa Passes the Posts" (1997), and his "Democratising Culture 
and Literature in a 'New South Africa': Organisation and Theory" (1994a)l. 
I will discuss what I believe to be the four major concerns in the South African debate 
through a critical analysis of the positions on postcolonial theory held by the above 
critics. As with the previous international debates, the first question is none other than theA 
question of the applicability of the term postcolonial or a notion of postcoloniality as an 
explanatory discourse for the South African case. It should be clear that this question is 
related to earlier suggestions (in chapters two to four) about the exemplary status South 
Africa has seemed to enjoy for postcolonial inquiry. To some measure this was 
highlighted in my discussion (in chapter two) of the exchange between Laura Chrisman 
and Robert Young. To recall, Chrisman, borrowing Spivak's phrase, complained about 
the possible danger of "sanctioned ignorance" on historical specificity posed by the 
metropolitan theorisation about South Africa, due to the country acquiring "the 
fetishistic status of racial allegory" (1997:41-42). 
This is similar to McClintock and Nixon's charge (in chapter three) against Derrida's 
intervention into the debate on apartheid. So too Rosemary Jolly and Paul Cilliers' 
respective assertions (also in chapter three) that there is, within metropolitan politico-
theoretical enunciations, the tendency to construct apartheid South Africa as the "atavistic 
other" (Jolly, 1995:19-20) or to (dis)place the text of apartheid as an exclusively South 
African phenomenon. I also examine here what emerges in the debate as the question of 
critical disablement of the investigating intellectual who deploys postcolonial theory 
informed by deconstructive practices. In its own manner, the latter concern reiterates my 
discussion (in chapter two) about both Parry's complaint against the closure she argues is 
constituted by Spivak's politics and Moore-Gilberts suggestion that Spivak's work is 
'politically pessimistic'. In a different register, it also rehearses my analysis (in chapter 
three) of McClintock and Nixon's assertion that Derrida's gesture in "Racism's Last 
Word" merely invokes a 'textual' politics that does not enable an activist politics. The 
1 In 1998 Sole was one of the recipients of the Thomas Pringle Award for his essay, "South Africa Passes 
the Posts", awarded by the English Academy of Southern Africa. 
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latter preoccupations are related to the last two questions I will examine here: namely, the 
question of the political implications of postcolonial theory as appropriated in the South 
African academy, and the question of the focus on race and cultural difference at the 
expense of an analysis of class. 
That South Africa has been seen as a "paragon" of postcoloniality is not to say there has 
been no debate of that very designation. Attwell and de Kock's positions on postcolonial 
theory are in this regard perhaps amongst the most filial. Although Attwell acknowledges 
that there exists the prevalent suspicion within the South African literary-cultural 
establishment that postcolonial theory is merely the latest hegemonic (though ephemeral) 
attempt to theorise the histories of (especially Euro-American) colonialism and 
imperialism, he argues, "South Africans are hardly in a position to decline the term" 
(1993a: 1). This assertion is informed by an understanding of "postcoloniality as to an 
historical and cultural condition, one in which the legacies of colonialism have yet to be 
transcended" (1993a:l). 
/
Attwell further argues that "we cannot avoid asking what relevance international 
discourses of postcoloniality have for South Africa" (1993a:4, my emphasis). 
Furthermore, the "broadest agenda" of the issue of Current Writing under his editorship 
"is to begin looking for the most useful points of entry for local scholarship in an 
international sphere of activity" (1993a:6). As 1 will argue, there is a particular tendency 
- something other than mere generosity - contained in both Attwell's contention about 
the impossibility for South Africans to refuse the term postcolonial and the "imagined 
community"2 constructed in his use of the unificatory "we". From the very first paragraph 
(the first line even) of his "Introduction" to the issue of aforementioned publication, 
Attwell claims discursive authority for his articulations, through the consensus implied by 
his use of "we". 
This is also evidenced in his assertion that "we have always known we are 'postcolonial 
in one sense or another" (1993a:2). Attwell recognises the "untheorised" status of such 
The phrase is Benedict Anderson's (1991). 
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knowledge - hence his appropriation of a postcolonial "critical-theoretical language" 
(1993a:2) - and its potential vulnerability "to self-contradiction or to sceptical 
questioning from international quarters" (1993a:3, my emphasis). 1 highlight 
"international" in Attwell argument in order to illustrate the focus of his appropriation of 
postcolonial theory. This also demonstrates the manner in which he construes the 
relationship between metropolitan discourses and peripheral reception. Thus Attwell «/. 
claims: "As real or at least aspirant participants in critical theory, we find ourselves 
already in a relationship with these discourses. South Africa continues to be seen as a 
crucible wherein many of the questions being addressed elsewhere burn with unusual 
intensity" (1993a:2). This latter assertion resonates with my discussion (recalled in my 
initial comments to this conclusion) of the claims for South Africa as an exemplary 
instance of postcoloniality. Attwell's concern is, in fact, to speculate "about the South 
African case as instance of the postcolonial" (1993a:5). That is, it seems his speculation 
occurs post the assumption of South Africa's postcoloniality: 
The South African case is marked (and it is not the only instance of this) in that 
both 'settler' and 'native' forms of consciousness ... are shaped to a considerable 
degree by the emergence of another form of articulation. That is to say, the poles 
are attracted not merely by their opposition to one another; rather, their 
construction is founded on a dialogic principle - sometimes imitative, sometimes 
hostile - so that any simple theoretical polarity becomes unworkable. (1993 a: 5) 
it becomes clear in their interview that Attwell's appropriation of the term postcolonial is 
informed by a reading of Bhabha - and also, as Attwell himself admits, Spivak's 
assertion about the non-essentiality of some-thing called postcolonialism. Attwell follows 
Bhabha in the modest understanding of postcolonialism as the discursive modality of "a 
certain kind of pedagogy" (1993b: 104) - that is, the conditions of possibility of the 
emergence of postcolonial studies. Moreover, when he asserts, "the term has a content", 
he accepts Bhabha's differential conception of postcoloniality in the following: 
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So my argument is not just that liberalism and humanism, the enlightenment, 
'meet their limit' in colonialism, that colonialism somehow reveals some 
repressed nature, reality or contradiction, but that it is a much more ongoing, 
problematic, displacing, disseminatory negotiation with the colonial, not just at 
the political level, but also at the conceptual and psychic level. It is this 
negotiation that marks the very emergence of modernity. (1993b: 105) 
Attwell suggests - although he insists that he is only "playing devil's advocate" 
(1993b: 107) - given the history of the segregationist, exclusionary and discriminatory 
discourses of apartheid, that the deconstructive thought of difference is unsuitable for the 
South African case. In a country sundered by a palpably violent history, Attwell 
speculates on the urgency for national solidarity in the transitory uncertain potentialities 
of the negotiated settlement of the early 1990s, which called for anything but a violent 
intransigence: "Historical pressures seem to be moving us towards [the] kind of reflection 
... where we are able to look beyond the fixed polarities of some metropolitan versions of 
postcolonial studies" (1993a:5). Once again, the tendency submerged in this can be seen 
in Attwell's suggestion for the appropriation of postcolonial theory in South Africa: 
In the case of white South Africa we might say that the emergence of ari historical 
consciousness might be measured not only in terms of differentiation from the 
metropolis ... but also by the extent to which the claim to authority by various 
streams of African, self-affirming consciousness is realised within white 
discourses. Similarly, the emergence of the different forms of black historical 
consciousness might be described in terms of how, or to what extent, the vision of 
reconstruction has reckoned with changes already wrought by the colonial 
presence, changes that have revised the very terms on which collective self-
realisation is possible. (1993a:5) 
Thus Attwell, in his interview with Bhabha, notes the particular difficulty felt by South 
African critics faced with the task of "applying a disjunctive reading of nationalism ... 
[when] reading the reconstitution of the nation in terms of the national democratic 
struggle as led by the ANC" (1993a: 108). 
1 would suggest that Attwell's previous suggestion for the appropriation of 
postcolonial theory in South Africa seems to rely on race and cultural difference, without 
an analysis of the tensions of discursive authority wrought by class identifications. That 
is, his suggestion for the appropriation of postcolonial theory homogenises the emergence 
of a historical consciousness for both "white South Africa" and "black" subjects. Firstly, 
there are important class differentiations in the racially identified emergent historical 
consciousness of "white South Africa" occluded in Attwell's discussion. For instance, 
this would mean attending to how such formations of historical consciousness would 
have differed between English and Afrikaans speaking white South Africans, given the 
imperially legislated economic privilege enjoyed by the former before the first republic of 
South Africa. Secondly, Attwell's assertions cannot hold that "the claim to authority by 
various streams of African, self-affirming consciousness is realised within white 
discourses" is, 1 would argue, precisely the limited discursive interaction between black 
elites and their white counterparts. 
The "claims to authority" glossed by Attwell could thus be seen, to borrow Spivak's 
phrase, to be the claims to authority by the "native informant". Attwell fails to realise that 
the seeds for such a "disjunctive" reading of nationalism are already within the counter-
discourses of the anti-colonialist nationalist tradition - as I have illustrated in my reading 
of Fanon's work in connection with Parry's attack on both Spivak and Bhabha (in chapter 
four). Indeed, Bhabha's response to Attwell acknowledges the political necessity of 
"nation-building" as "the notion of the nation as the liberatory horizon, which has a 
national, populist resonance, of a claim to justice ... the claim to a new history" 
(1993b: 108). For Bhabha, what remains important is to also highlight the necessary 
ambivalence in that (re)construction of a national culture - to remain aware of the 
contingency, the fissures and occlusions that occur in any articulation of "unified 
^ sovereignty" (1993b:108): . ^ ' 
112 
I have no doubt that in certain documents, at the level of political rallying, 
political pamphleteering, visionary speeches, this image of a unified nation has to 
exist. But in actual practice ... in the more practice-bound inscriptions, in the 
actual working out, or through, or with these ideas, in the contexts in which these 
ideas are constructed, surely those are contexts where that very notion of the 
nation is being both propagated and, at the same time, erased and displaced? 
(Bhabha, 1993b: 109) 
Attwell's prompting of the statement, "class is one agency among others" (1993b: 107) 
from Bhabha possibly serves to highlight his political positionality. It also foregrounds a 
particular (mis)take in his exchange with Bhabha. For Bhabha, to question the 
"sufficiency and priority of class" is not a "refusal of the importance of class as 
generating a certain structure of the social formation which produces its own agency" 
(1993b: 107). This does not mean, as Attwell seems to understand it, that the postcolonial 
intellectual should merely elide the analysis of class as an interpretive category, choosing 
exclusively (if not primarily, in what is a simple reversal of priority) to focus on race and 
cultural difference. I will later return to the question of this reversal of priority as possibly 
indicative of the politico-institutional dynamics operating within the South African 
academy. Contrary to Attwell, Bhabha's affirmation of the statement "class is one agency 
among others" emerges out of the search for a "deconstructive reading of class, class 
against the grain": 
Class read against the sociological coordinates of European capitalism; a notion 
of class in which the periodising teleologies of capitalist development were in 
question, where there was uneven development ... class read in tension with its 
non-emphasis on questions of gender and race relations, domestic economies, 
domestic slavery. (1993b: 107) 
Attwell's hasty appropriation of the "critical-theoretical language" of postcolonial theory 
clearly (mis)takes the reading of class as an analytic category. A similar tendency is 
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demonstrated in what I would argue is de Kock's more sophisticated articulation on the 
reading of class within postcolonial analysis. 
De Kock's attempt, in "Sitting for the Civilisation Test", to reorient his appropriation of 
postcolonial theory to the South African case - through a historical and historiographical 
investigation - is to be commended . The problem arises in the consistent lack of 
attention to the category of class in his essay, or rather the manner in which de Kock 
reads the relevance of class in his analysis. This is illustrated in both his analyses of the 
unanimous resolution made at the African Authors Conference of 1936, by some of the 
most pre-eminent black South African authors of the time, that a "national" literature - as 
opposed to an aboriginal "tribal" literature - should and can only be expressed in English 
(2001:393), and the calls for a "civilisation test" "at the All African Convention (AAC) in 
1935" (2001:397-98). Here, de Kock affirms the discursive authority and authentic 
representivity of the resolutions of what is a clearly a black-elite: 
On the surface we have an emergent African nationalist discourse framing its 
ideals in what postcolonial theory would normally regard as the language of 
complicity. Here is a genuinely representative postcolonizing ethos, not driven by 
self-serving elitist or bourgeois sellouts, that seemingly asks to be measured by 
the standards of imperial 'civilization'. (2001:399-400) 
The rather neat box de Kock constructs for postcolonial theory - which is not the same as 
asserting such a construction is a mere fiction - suggests that postcolonial theory has 
become a type of orthodoxy whose analytic focus privileges a genealogy that includes the 
liberation movement in South Africa. I would suggest that such a construction requires 
rigorous unpacking as it is a consequence of a particular appropriation of postcolonial 
theory. It is for this reason that 1 turn to de Kock's earlier postcolonial analytical 
articulations. 
De Kock's reorientation in this essay is largely focused on thinking forms of native agency and resistance 
that would be other than Bhabha's theorisation of 'mimicry' and his notion of'sly civility'. 
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In his earlier assertions, at the time of his interview with Spivak, de Kock is concerned to 
assuage the hostility towards postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis within 
the South African academy given their efficacy for "a country as deeply postcolonial and 
as discursively-stratified as South Africa" (1992:32). As de Kock affirms in his 
"Postcolonial Analysis and the Question of Critical Disablement", for him, 
"'Postcolonial' ... denotes both a temporal relation (modern South Africa, no longer a 
colony, was constituted within a colonial past), and a causal nexus" (1993:65). In his 
opening remarks to the interview, de Kock argues that the machinations of reforming 
apartheid - demonstrated in the unbanning of most of the liberation movements, the 
increasingly apologetic statements of NP officials, and F. W. de Klerk's commitment to 
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the idea of a representative government - unsettled the grounds of oppositional 
discourses: 
The governing party (and its slavish television service) had begun freely to 
appropriate liberal language ... so that even the discourse of liberal humanism, 
which for so long was the front line of cultural resistance and the preserve of the 
arts, looked to be in danger of being swallowed up by the former apartheid 
demons. (1992:30) 
It is true that de Kock does not specify his own placement within the counter-discourses 
"of those who had been banned, proscribed, suppressed, and maimed by apartheid, and 
[exiles] who were now back home without ever having repented" (1992:29-30) or within 
the "cultural resistance" of "the discourse of liberal humanism". However, given his 
place within the South African literary-cultural establishment, perhaps his political 
positionality is highlighted by both his endorsement of the oppositional practices of the 
'liberal humanists' as "the preserve of the arts", and his claim that the New Nation 
Writers Conference in South Africa "served as a healing ground"4. All of South Africa 
was symbolically reconstituted under the single nationhood formerly denied" (1992:31). 
4 The New Nation Writers Conference took place in 1991, as a result of reforms undertaken by the Pretoria 
regime in the early 1990s. As both de Kock and Attwell also note, the return to South Africa by some of the 
previously banned political exiles and political parties who opposed apartheid, and the end of the academic 
boycott of the country by international writers, critics, theorists and commentators, opened up the space for 
re-visioning "the cultural identity of South African people" (De Kock, 1992:30). 
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He seems to be aware that class identifications have a bearing on the enunciation of 
discursive authority when he notes that the conference was "fairly middle-class affair, 
while black South Africans continued to die in large numbers in the political violence all 
around us" (1992:29). And, although he criticises the conference for being "like a post-
revolution conference before the [material political] revolution that would now never 
really occur" (29), here is de Kock's approval of the opening preoccupations of the 
conference: 
So, many of the conference themes were perforce conceived in opposition to the 
perceived dominant tropes of the old apartheid ... The first day was devoted to 
discussing alternatives to race-talk. The sessions were entitled 'Race & Ethnicity: 
Towards Cultural Diversity & Unity'; 'Race & Ethnicity: Images & Stereotypes 
in Literature'; 'Race & Ethnicity: The Problems & Challenges of Racism in 
Writing; and 'Race & Ethnicity: Beyond the Legacy of Victims; South African 
Writers Speak'. (1992:30-31) 
If the session titles of the first day of the conference are taken at their word, then the 
discussion in the sessions are not so much "an alternative to race-talk", as de Kock 
argues, but the reinsertion of race-talk at precisely the moment where it is supposedly 
transcended. However, such a reading would remain unfair inasmuch as it figures the 
discussion in the sessions from the preoccupations highlighted by the titles. 
The particularity of de Kock's positionality is once again illustrated in his conception of 
the task of reconstituting a representative South African national culture as merely 
achieved through a release of "the stranglehold of ... pompous, Wasp, middle-class 
control of scholarly discourse" (1992:31). As laudable as that opening up of scholarly 
discourse is, it should be clear that it is a particular type of opening up - with its own 
constraints and exclusions. In a country that today has eleven official languages, one such 
constraint would be the linguistic hegemony of the English language (and Afrikaans) 
within the South African literary-cultural establishment, and the insufficiency of 
translation work being done in the country. 
( 
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The difficulty of reading the place of class analysis in de Kock's work - and this is why 
his articulation is more sophisticated than AttwelPs - is that de Kock shows an awareness 
of, and even uses, class as an analytic category. In the final analysis however, like the 
tendency 1 noted in Attwell, the manner of de Kock's attention to class analysis within his 
appropriation of postcolonial theory does not complicate the promise of what Derrida 
called "South Africa in memory of apartheid" (discussed in chapter three). This latter 
assertion necessarily hesitates to say that Attwell and de Kock's appropriation does not 
complicate the promise of the 'postcolonial', inasmuch as this would pre-empt my J-a^ (,•*! 
discussion of the debate on the applicability of the term for the South African case. 
Another preoccupation of the South African debate about postcolonial theory is a concern 
for the possibilities of political action that are opened up or closed off by Spivak's notion 
i of subalternity and Bhabha's conceptualisation of cultural difference. De Kock 
approaches this problematic of critical disablement that is said to cohere to postcolonial 
theory - the supposed retention of binary oppositionality or "strong othering" - by 
arguing it is only the result of misrepresenting the postcolonial theoretical thought on 
otherness in what he says is "a misrepresentation bordering on caricature" (1993:51). 
Thus his argument attempts to keep open a space for "what a critic of colonialism in 
South Africa is enabled to say" (1993:48). Instead of a "hard version" of 
"poststructuralist-based" theory, which as he has said is a crude misrepresentation, de 
Kock argues for a version that would allow "for an ethical subject who can recognise the 
tyrannies of identity, but who nevertheless must work from a basis of identity which is 
politically defined" (1993:60). De Kock clearly expresses his interest in the following: 
[If] poststructuralist logic were to teach that, regardless of relative agency or 
historical, political and ethical considerations, any assertion of subjectivity in 
identitarian terms was 'logocentric', 'essentialist' and unacceptable because it 
merely reversed Western binary procedure, then black political mobilisation, or 
any group mobilisation for that matter, would have to be regarded as inadmissible. 
(1993:53) 
t f i , ^ IL 
117 
My discussion in this thesis has shown that deconstructive practices - what de Kock calls 
"poststructuralist logic" - are always plural, heterogeneous, and never easily 
accommodated within the rubric of a "logic". What remains interesting in de Kock's 
reading of deconstruction in the above assertion is his attempt to refuse precisely the 
deconstructive demonstration of the textuality of "agency or the historical, political and 
ethical considerations". I have already illustrated (in chapter three) the misreading 
involved in such a view, in my discussion of McClintock and Nixon's assertion that 
Derrida's appeal in "Racism's Last Word" is incapable of interrogating historicity of the 
text of apartheid. De Kock here seems to suggest that the deconstructive thought on 
alterity finally closes off access to materiality, historiography, quotidian politics and 
ethics. 
Carusi is also anxious that the conceptual problematic of heterogeneity within 
postcolonial theory "results in a dilemma for the theorising of reconstitutive political 
action" (1991b:228). What Carusi (and others) take umbrage at is precisely the 
deployment of deconstructive practices within postcolonial theory. Their reading is thus 
exemplary for my investigation of the efficacy of deconstruction when brought to 
postcolonial contexts. Her engagement with the prior question of South Africa's 
postcolonial status is in this regard entirely admirable. Carusi, who seeks to examine the 
relations that South African literary production has to "post-structuralism and post-
modernism" and the deployment of the latter in "post-colonialism", acknowledges that 
the debates within the country's literary-cultural establishment have meant that "South 
Africa's 'post-colonial status' ... is in itself questionable": "At the crux of this is the 
question of the applicability or non-applicability of the post-colonial label ... Attitudes 
towards the label are differentiated according to linguistic and racial position, and more 
directly, in terms of political standpoint (1991a:95)5. 
To illustrate this point Carusi offers the following reading: "If one thinks along the lines of the importance 
of the consolidation of national language ... and through this of a national culture, including racial, social 
and religious practices, there is a large part of the (white) population, for whom the label 'postcolonialism' 
is not an issue at all. Post-colonialism, as a desirable state of affairs, has been accomplished, de facto, and 
in a most successful manner. The South African nation exists because of the success of the construction of 
Afrikanerdom." (1991a:95-96). 
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Consequently, she asserts, "to speak of post-colonialism is pre-emptive" (1991a:96) in a 
South Africa where the literary-cultural production of blacks is marginalised. She argues 
for the political usefulness and practicality of the term "post-apartheid". Thus her critical 
awareness of the historicity of the idea of South African "colonialism" means that she 
acknowledges, "[if] colonialism may not be an appropriately descriptive term for the way 
in which subjugation is carried out in this country, neo-imperialism certainly is" 
(1991a:96)6. However, despite the apparent torsions and tensions in the applicability of 
the term postcolonial to the South African case, Carusi still asserts the efficacy "of post-
colonial discourse for liberation and resistance literature": 
[The] recognition [in postcolonial theory] of the desire of a colonized or 
subjugated people for an identity and for self-determination ... focuses on the 
central position of cultural production in the attainment of those goals ... the 
discourse of colonialism has placed itself in a position to counter, with varying 
degrees of success, imperialistic strategies be they in the political, economic or 
cultural sphere. (1991a:96). 
For Carusi, "Otherness is a ... problem for theories of postcoloniaHsm; it is also one of 
the major obstacles to their fulfilling their claim to contributing to emancipatory political 
intervention" (1991b:229). She acknowledges the contribution made by Spivak and 
Bhabha's examination of the power/knowledge dynamics of colonial authority and 
identification, and the ways in which it constructs the colonised as the colonising Self s 
shadow. However, in a manner not unlike Parry's attack on Spivak and Bhabha's work 
(discussed in chapters two and four), Carusi argues that the latter's interrogations of the 
elisions of imperialist subject constitution foreclose the colonised's ability to fashion 
counter-hegemonic practices. So too does Carusi follow Parry's trajectory in her 
assessment that such interrogations are nothing less than a denial of all agency and 
6 In a different register, David Johnson articulates a similar concern: "To read Said and Young outside the 
metropole without taking into careful account what they might mean in new contexts is therefore to risk 
imposing their calendar and their politics on a diversity of quite distinct neo-colonial contexts" (1994:81). 
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resistance to the colonised. For Carusi, the radical difference theorised by Spivak's notion 
of subalternity implies that the 
other is in a structurally identical position as the beyond of transgression, that is, it 
has only a negative status ... Since there is effectively no place from which the 
other can signify itself as other, the idea of an other to the West reinforces the 
position of nonfunctionality and powerlessness of the other with respect to the 
West. Working within such a framework ... it is no wonder that 'the subaltern 
cannot speak' (1991b:230-231) 
I have already illustrated (in chapter two) that such a reading of Spivak's notion of 
subalternity does not attend to the strictures of the definition Spivak deploys. Carusi's 
pronouncement also fails to contextualise Spivak's interrogation of subalternity. As such, 
Carusi's failure approximates my earlier discussion (in chapter three) of McClintock and 
Nixon's misapprehension of the context of Derrida's text on apartheid. Spivak reiterates 
this much in her interview with de Kock when she notes how criticism of "Can the 
Subaltern Speak?" has tended to ignore the occasionality or circumstances that inform her 
essay. That is, the incident and situation informing her contention that "the subaltern 
cannot speak" is the message Bhuvaneswari attempts to speak through her suicide. 
1 agree with Carusi's reading that Bhabha's enunciation of identification in colonial 
discourse, in "The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of 
Colonialism", operates through the processes of fetishism - that is, through an ambivalent 
fixation/disavowal of the difference of subjectivity. However, despite her assertion that 
her essay will not be an assessment of Spivak and Bhabha's "work as a whole", her 
discussion of "The Other Question" as "exemplary [standpoint] in the theorising of 
postcolonial otherness, within a poststructuralist framework" (1991b:229) ends up 
ignoring the intellectual trajectory of Bhabha's work - his later extension of the concepts 
of "mimicry" and "hybridity" or "the metonymic instance". 
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Of course Carusi is precisely correct when she notes that the deconstmctive thought of 
heterogeneous difference does not prescribe or found a political programme that is 
recognisable under the terms of conventional political philosophies: "Purposeful action 
requires a basis in a positive foundation in that it requires a basis on which decisions and 
predictions are made" (1991b:236). Purposeful action requires purposeful action seems to 
be the neat tautology Carusi here asserts - a post-haste misapprehension of the 
undecidability that cuts through all moments of decision. As I have already illustrated in 
my discussion (in chapters three) of McClintock and Nixon's reproach of Derrida's text 
on apartheid, and in my discussion (in chapter four) of Bhabha's response to his 
detractors in "The Commitment to Theory", Carusi's assertion seems to hold an 
unexamined assumption on the radicality of merely invoking political practice. That is, as 
Bhabha argues, 
Political positions are not simply identifiable as progressive or reactionary, 
bourgeois or radical, prior to the act of critique engagee, or outside the terms and 
conditions of their discursive address. It is in this sense that the historical moment 
of political action must be thought of as part of the history of its writing ... [This] 
is to suggest that the dynamics of writing and textuality require us to rethink the 
logics of causality and determinacy through which we recognize the 'political' as 
a form of calculation and strategic action dedicated to social transformation. 
(Bhabha, 1994:22-23) 
Once again, as I have already shown in my discussion of Spivak and Bhabha respectively 
(in chapters two and four), subalternity is a not moment of negativity in some conception 
of a dialectical progression. For Spivak, subalternity is the catachrestic (or, for Bhabha, 
the metonymic is the interstitial) occasion for the subversive interruption/irruption of the 
other that refuses subsumption - so as to refuse a valorisation of the "oppressed as 
subject". As Spivak argues, this is does not mean that political action or representation 
(both Darstellung and Vertretung) becomes an impossibility or mere contradiction. On 
the contrary, to highlight the conditions of undecidability of the moment of decision is 
precisely to demonstrate the necessary urgency of the political decision that would 
121 
remain ethical. Nonetheless, 1 would argue that Carusi's enunciations are recuperable 
inasmuch as they initiate a critique of the appropriation of metropolitan theory. 
At this point I would like to return to Attwell's appropriation of postcolonial theory, 
where there is a disquieting sense of deference to the arguments of the metropolitan 
postcolonial intellectual. As I have already shown, this is particularly marked in his 
interview with Bhabha. I would suggest that such deference is related to both the 
interpersonal relations entailed by the text of the interview and the dynamics of 
metropolitan theorisation and peripheral reception. To recall, one of the primary 
motivations for Attwell's appropriation of postcolonial theory was that an "untheorised" 
apprehension of postcoloniality by South African critics was "potentially vulnerable ... to 
sceptical questioning from international quarters" (1993a:3, my emphasis). On the 
whole, Attwell does not pose a significant challenge to Bhabha's project, as is illustrated 
by the lack of discord in the questions, answers and interjectory remarks in the interview. 
David Johnson, in "Importing Metropolitan Post-colonials", argues a similar point when 
he asserts such "cosy interviews" (1994:83) - referring to Attwell and de Kock's 
respective interviews - entail a "sanguine reading of ... theory and [whose] potential 
value runs certain risks" (74). 1 have already shown (particularly in chapter two) how this 
is related to the question of metropolitan theory - Ato Quayson particularly censuring the 
use of psychoanalysis (2000:74) - as a 'derivative discourse' without sufficient 
explanatory potential for the experiences of the colonised. 
I have highlighted the particular modalities of postcolonial theory that Carusi, de 
Kock and Attwell seek to appropriate for the South African academy. Their different 
views are bound by a preoccupation with the political positionality of the postcolonial 
intellectual. I would suggest that what emerges from this particular appropriation is a 
domestication of the politico-theoretical insight that, as argued earlier (in chapter four), 
was to be gleaned from the debate on Fanon between Bhabha and Parry. The 
appropriation of postcolonial theory by the critics under discussion - primarily Attwell 
and de Kock - seeks to install a "particularist version of postcolonial theory" (Sole, 
1994a:23) that seeks to foreclose the deconstructive interrogation of alterity. For Sole, 
122 
Attwell and de Kock's formulations of postcoloniality largely bypass an examination of 
"how to periodise South Africa within a 'colonial/post-coloniaP framework" (1997:119). 
However, there are problems with Sole's critique as well. 
1 would argue that Visser's exposition in "Postcoloniality of a Special Type: Theory and 
Its Appropriations in South Africa" condenses a rigorous and incisive critique of the 
problems in the appropriation of postcolonial theory by the critics I have here discussed. 
It is for this reason that my following discussion will concentrate on Visser's critique. 
Besides rehearsing the orientation of many of Visser's arguments7, Sole's critique in 
"South Africa Passes the Posts" is too expansive in its attacks for the purposes of my 
investigation of the critiques of postcolonial theory. I will however have recourse to an 
analysis of some of Sole's arguments in the latter essay, as well as the debate initiated by 
his essay, "Democratising Culture". This is because Sole's case illuminates the reasons 
for what I will argue is a deadlock in the debate in South Africa. 
Visser's critique takes as its point of departure the occluded discussion of the 
applicability of the term postcolonial within South African postcolonial criticism. He 
hopes to identify in the assertion of South Africa's postcolonial status by South African 
critics an uncritical endorsement of the assumptions of a theory popularised (though not 
without debate) by the South African Communist Party in the early 1960s: namely, the 
theory of South Africa as an instance of "Colonialism of a Special Type" or CST, as it 
later became known: "Assumptions about shared experience, about the supposed 
convergence of interests among all who are not white, and about shared racial 
subjectivity ... have been central features of CST. They are also key features of 
postcolonial theory in South Africa, and within that theory they carry the same 
questionable entailments" (1997:81)8. As I have illustrated, and as Visser argues, Attwell 
7 Here is Visser's comment in a tributary note to his essay: "Kelwyn Sole was originally to have co-
authored this essay but had to withdraw owing to illness. I have benefited greatly from discussions with 
him. His views on current theory in South Africa are set out in 'Democratising Culture'" (1997:79). Thus 
Sole's recourse to some of the arguments in Visser's essay are not so much a rehearsal - given that Visser 
acknowledges the trace of Sole's non-present signature to the essay. This would also strengthen my case for 
concentrating on Visser's critique. 
8 That Attwell endorses and prescribes to CST's model of 'internal colonialism' becomes clear in Spivak's 
following acknowledgement: "David Attwell ... has pointed out to me the existence of the notion of a 
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and de Kock's appropriation of postcolonial theory, together with their endorsement of 
CST's model of 'internal colonialism', privileges an analysis of race over an analysis of 
class. I have already demonstrated that even when De Kock invokes class as an analytic 
category, it is finally submerged under an inordinate focus on race or cultural difference. 
I will return to the questionability and effect of this privileging of race in the South 
African appropriation of postcolonial theory. 
Like Carusi, Visser notes the overshadowing of the term 'post-apartheid' by 
'postcolonial'. His specific conclusions on this apparent occlusion are however at 
variance with hers. Visser argues there is a self-congratulatory tendency in the 
appropriation of postcoloniality in the South African academy. For him, this results from 
the misapprehension of "The transition that occurred in South Africa between 1990 and 
1994 ... [as] the most convincing occasion for dating the end of colonial rule over South 
Africa" (1997:83). Such a critique of the temporalising tendencies within the term 
postcolonial of course repeats the metropolitan debate I have already signalled in my 
introduction. For both Visser and Sole, this has particular theoretico-political 
consequences for postcolonial theory in South Africa. 
Visser's argument that the term 'postcolonial' overshadows any conception of the term 
'post-apartheid' is perhaps more interesting. This is because it would seem to be directly 
related to my earlier discussion (in chapter three) of Derrida's intervention in "Racism's 
Last Word". As 1 have already demonstrated, Derrida asserts the need for a responsibility 
towards the memory of apartheid, so that, among other things, it might not be forgotten. 
On the one hand, if postcolonial theory in South Africa does not thoroughly engage with 
the "totality of the text of apartheid''' (1986:165), then the foreshadowing of the term 
'post-apartheid' by 'postcolonial' would constitute irresponsibility towards the memory 
of apartheid that would risk a misunderstanding of its complex aftermath. 
'colonialism of a special type' in South Africa, a colonialism that did not, by and large, export surplus 
value ... I keep to my much less finetuned point of territorial presence - though even there, the difference 
between settler colonies ... and territorial imperialisms ... must be kept in mind" (1999:190-91). 
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On the other hand, one could also read its non-presence within the appropriations of 
postcolonial theory, as not so much an occlusion, but rather - following Derrida - a 
demonstration of its "apartitionality" (1985:292). In this regard, 1 wish to recall Niall 
Lucy's assertion (in chapter three) that "the word 'apartheid' is so saturated with history, 
like the word 'Auschwitz', that it seems to stand apart from history and to stand in for the 
ultimate form of its type" (1995:16). However, in analysing the particular absence of the 
term 'post-apartheid' within the appropriation of postcolonial theory in South Africa, 
such a reading would seem to me not so much germane as it would be potentially 
nebulous. Indeed, Visser's observations can be read as seeking to clarify this issue. 
In conceding the problematic question of the term postcolonial in South Africa, Visser 
might also have noted the equivocality of the term 'post-apartheid'. To consider the 
'totality of the text of apartheid' would then perhaps mean to attend to both its 
continuities and discontinuities within contemporary South Africa - not always 
necessarily of practice, but also of affect, within the multitudinous discursive spaces of 
the country. It should be clear then that these sites of enunciation are not limited to 
academic discourse but would include, among other things, all manner of political 
speeches, state policy and the particularities of social relations - whether cultural, 
economic, racial or sexual difference. There is, of course, the danger that such attention 
could be seen as counterproductive to attempts to foster a national culture after the 
violently Manichean and discriminatory practices of the apartheid state. As I have already 
illustrated, this is also Attwell's concern when he argues about the difficulties of 
"applying a disjunctive reading of nationalism ... [when] reading the reconstitution of the 
nation in terms of the national democratic struggle as led by the ANC" (1993b: 108).i 
Minimally, one of the responsibilities of the (postcolonial) intellectual in South Africa, 
should be an attempt to demystify those difficulties by thinking through them in the most 
consistent fashion possible. 
Although I agree with some of Visser's specific critiques about the status of postcolonial 
theory in South Africa, I do not always agree with the manner in which he derives his 
critique. To be sure, de Kock does acknowledge the debt of his understanding of colonial 
125 
relations and the South African debate on CST, in an expansive footnote that shows his 
critical awareness of the historicity of the idea of colonialism in South Africa, prior to 
Visser's criticism: "The South African Communist Party, on the one hand, has proposed 
a theory of 'internal colonialism' or 'colonialism of a special type' which combines 'the 
worst features of both imperialism and colonialism' ... in which 'Non-white South 
Africa' is a colony of 'White South Africa'" (1997:65). However, to bury the discussion 
of the applicability of term postcolonial to the South African case within a footnote could 
also be seen as a strategic critical silencing of the debate about the term. 
As such, 1 cannot but agree with Visser and Sole's critique that the appropriation of 
postcolonial theory in the South African literary-cultural establishment seems to be a 
"liberal-pluralist" (Visser, 1997:90) position or falls back onto the terms of "liberal 
humanism" (Sole, 1997:124). This is minimally illustrated by the tendency I have argued 
is submerged in de Kock and Attwell's respective claims for the task of postcolonial 
criticism in South Africa. For Sole, there is a tendency for Attwell to slip "back into 
notions of authenticity when dealing with issues of black agency" (1997:116), a move 
that Sole offers is typical of postcolonial criticism in South Africa. For Visser, the 
workings of this "entrenched liberal-pluralist orientation" (1997:90) are illustrated "in the 
relation between current theory and syllabus construction", given the problematic 
retention of literary works within syllabi that have been critiqued as complicit with the 
task of "forming students into good liberal pluralists" (1997:90). Consequently, Visser 
correctly argues against this distinguishing characteristic of the South African 
appropriation of postcolonial theory, "which domesticates the theory, stripping it of its 
more interesting and provocative assertions in order to reinstate it as the latest expression 
of liberal pluralism" (1997:92)9. 
9 "In each case, however, the 'hard' version appears to be that which contains the most provocative, not to 
say most centrally distinguishing, assumptions and conclusions. De Kock seeks a deconstruction without 
most of Derrida or de Man, a poststructuralism without most of Foucault or Lacan, a postmodernism 
without most of Lyotard or Baudrillard; just as he appears to seek a postcolonial theory without most of 
Spivak or Bhabha. What is unclear is just what remains after such abstractions, and why anyone would 
want to advocate the remainder" (Visser, 1997:85). 
126 
I have shown that there is an overbearing focus on race and cultural difference within the 
latter appropriation of postcolonial theory. To this extent, I agree with Visser's 
assessment that "Postcolonial theorists may insist that racial identity is always 
constructed, but the identity constructed is always somehow racial" (1997:86). Of course 
the analysis of race and cultural difference in South Africa should not be at the expense 
of a phenomenal occlusion of class - nor should it occlude other forms of difference: to 
name but a few, regional (South Africa has nine provinces, differing in degrees of the 
rural, (sub)urban and informal settlement) gender, embodied physiological and 
psychological difference. AttwelPs striking elision of class analysis and his assertion that 
postcolonial theory is "post-marxist" (1993a:4) can be understood as deference to the 
politico-institutional dynamics of the South African literary-cultural establishment. For 
Visser, AttwelPs uncritical pronouncement that postcolonial theory is necessarily "post-
marxist" 
would appear to suggest some sort of development out of Marxism, an advanced 
revision of the traditions of Marxist thought or a higher synthesis of its 
conceptions. What Attwell is actually spelling out, and here he is fully 
representative of virtually all South African academics who have embraced 
postcolonial theory, is not post-Marxism but the far more familiar anti-Marxism. 
(1997:94)10 
The analysis of class identification, alienation or whatever, is not (how could it be?) the 
exclusive purview or sole proprietary of Marxist analysis. One could remember Derrida's 
(belated?) enunciations, in Spectres of Marx, on the importance of an awareness of the 
efficacious spectrality of Marxist critique within his thought, especially regarding the 
contemporary international division of labour, the juridico-economic discourses and 
consequences of state policies, decisions and actions and, the corporate governance of the 
modern transnational conglomerate - nothing other than an (for him, now deconstructive) 
analysis of the contemporary scene of Global Capitalism: 
10 See also, Johnson's praise for Aijaz Ahmad (1992): "Ahmad's work is important because it builds on a 
long tradition of anti-imperialist Marxist thought... and further, because it engages in depth with a range of 
anti-Marxist arguments that have become too-easy critical orthodoxies" (1994:80) 
• 
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Now, if there is a spirit of Marxism which I will never be ready to renounce, it is 
not the critical idea or the questioning stance ... It is rather a certain emancipatory 
and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of the promise that one can try to 
liberate from any dogmatics and even from any metaphysico-religious 
determination, from any messianism. And a promise must promise to be kept, that 
is, not to remain 'spiritual' or 'abstract', but to produce events, new effective 
forms of action, practice, organization, and so forth. To break with the 'party 
form' or with some form of State or the International does not mean to give up 
every form of practical or effective organization. It is exactly the contrary that 
matters to us here. (2006:111-112) 
On the one hand, perhaps this should temper anything like the view that Derrida's work 
or deconstruction in general should be inherently either anti-Mdxxist or anti-humanist11. 
On the other, it renders questionable any unexamined assumptions of those who would 
claim to be post-Marxist. Thus Parry correctly notes that what necessarily haunts 
Derrida's grammar, in the above articulation, is an understanding that (to a degree 1 have 
argued is always already demonstrated in his earliest work) the questions of the politics 
and ethics are animated by a call for a differential future, for an ethical relation with the 
other that would be something other than mere subsumption to some prior rule or mere 
calculation. I have already illustrated that Derrida's reading of apartheid, in his debate 
with McClintock and Nixon, is precisely such a text of appeal. Such a reading of race and 
cultural difference together with an analysis of class in the South African case is 
incisively demonstrated by John Comaroff s comments in his conversation with Bhabha. 
11 As I have already illustrated in my discussion (in chapter two) of Derrida's text on apartheid, Derrida 
argues that the discourses of human rights meet their as yet 'unthought limit' when faced with the text of 
apartheid. However, for Derrida on the danger involved in summary dismissals (or even unsparing radical 
interrogations) of the latter discourses, see "Force of Law: The 'Mystic Foundation of Authority'" 
(1992:28). For Derrida, the danger lies in the possibility of misconstruing and forgetting the (partial) 
commonalities these discourses have with the deconstructive thought on politics. I would argue that this is 
minimally located in the common appeal for a change in the social, political, institutional, juridal order of 
the contemporary world, that would be other than the systematic exploitation, marginalisation, 
discrimination and deprivation. 
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In "Speaking of Postcoloniality, in the Continuous Present: A Conversation", Comaroff 
argues, "Constitutively and constitutionally, race [in South Africa] has given way to 
class. But, demographically speaking, emergent class lines still bear a very tight 
correlation with old patterns of racial division ... [The] vast majority of unemployed, 
unwaged, and homeless people remain people of color" (2002:33). My own concluding 
remarks about the contradictions of the South African transition to a government elected 
by universal suffrage, are partially informed by the development of Comaroff s analysis. 
Although articulated from an alternate interpretive mode, Michael MacDonald's 
argument, in Why Race Matters in South Africa, is also particularly astute in this regard. 
MacDonald asserts, "The transition to democracy [with the election of the ANC to 
government] disentangled citizenship from race, opening citizenship to all South Africans 
irrespective of race, but it did not disentangle class from race" (2006:126)12. The stark 
reality in contemporary South Africa is that class distinctions have become intensified 
across race lines. 
Sole's critique of the appropriations of postcolonial theory in South Africa is valuable for 
its analysis of the problematics that were largely not thought through in that 
appropriation. However, as I suggested earlier, his own call for a Marxist analysis of 
South Africa is not without its problems. Problematically, Sole still argues for an 
irreducible distinction between the social and the discursive. As I have already argued in 
my discussion of Parry's attack on Spivak, and my examination of McClintock and 
Nixon's reading of Derrida's text on apartheid, such a distinction insists on the 
essentiality of the social and elides a whole history of critique of the social as an 
interpretive horizon. 
Consequently, Sole repeats the misreading of Derrida's reformulation of the notion of 
text and context when he argues that deconstructive practices are confined only to the 
"printed page" and are thus merely "a new type of textual radicalism: with a 'subversive' 
12 See the development of this argument in "The Birth of a Nation" section of Comaroff s conversation 
with Bhabha (Comaroff, 2002:32-38); see especially the final two chapters and "Conclusion" to 
MacDonald's study (2006:124-186), although it is sometimes difficult to agree with the extent to which his 
analysis seems to inscribe an essential intentionality to the circumstances in South Africa. 
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political agenda which remains pertinent only within the confines of the academy" 
(1994a: 17). Here Sole seems to hold, once again as illustrated in the previous debates, a 
too rigid a distinction between the theoretical and the political or between theory and 
practice. Also, although Sole argues that an analysis of class identification should not 
mean that all social relations are constructed as economically determined, the singular 
weight of the prescriptions and descriptions in his argument finally result in this. Such a 
tendency is arguably also noticeable in Visser's assertion that "class relations remain 
entirely unaltered in the 'new' South Africa" (1997:93, my emphasis). This is particularly 
highlighted in Sole's essay, "Democratising Culture", where he argues that postcolonial 
theorists - Spivak being particularly censured for eschewing her "Marxist sympathies" -
remain "wilfully blind" to the social domain when they "lose sight of, render obsolete, 
the powerful socialising and differentiating force of class struggle and formation" 
(1994a:21). However, as I have already demonstrated (in chapter two), Sole here not only 
(mis)takes the place of class and the social within Spivak's thought, 1 would argue that 
his reiterated insistence on class as a pre-eminent category for analysing social relations 
finally essentialises the social within what Spivak called 'capitalist sociality'. Also, 
Spivak's insistence that the postcolonial intellectual should mark her positionality, and 
assertions that the intellectual must attempt to 'unlearn privilege' are already a critique of 
the intellectual as class-privileged. 
As 1 already mentioned, although Sole's, "Democratising Culture" is not specifically 
concerned with postcolonial theory it usefully highlights the context of the debate. That 
the debate on the appropriation of postcolonial theory within the discourses of the South 
African literary-cultural establishment has stalled should be clear from my discussion 
here. This is also illustrated by some of the belligerent responses to Sole's essay. 
Although Guy Willoughby, one of the respondents to Sole's essay, decries the prevalence 
of "ritualised mutual debunking in local scholarly journals" (1994:39), this is precisely 
what the debate becomes when most of the responses engage in what are at times 
critically unnecessary ad hominem attacks on Sole's position13. One could also argue that 
13 Some of the responses to Sole's "Democratising Culture", are thoroughly vitriolic. Except Isabel 
Hofmeyr's response, as Sole acknowledges in his rejoinder, the respondents seek to attack his gesture by 
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Sole's critique of postcolonial theory in South Africa has been largely ignored. It should 
be clear then, as I have already argued here, (and in chapter three), that the texture of 
such debate does not open onto any further discussion of the terms of the debate and 
rather signals the adherence to rigid disciplinary and institutional politics. 
Sole asserts this much in his rejoinder when he argues that the belligerence of the 
responses signals the will to power "of official or academic 'consensus'" (1994b:62) that 
admonishes the views of marginal and discordant critique. This critical divide and 
(unnecessary) antagonism is illustrated by the genesis of the critiques of the appropriation 
of postcolonial theory in South Africa. As I have already illustrated, the major critiques 
of this appropriation - by Sole, Visser and Johnson - emerge from a self-acknowledged 
(although not homogenous) Marxist criticism. This is also highlighted by Attwell's 
concession on the displacement of the previously ascendant Marxist criticism within the 
South African academy, "progressive scholarship in South Africa has been 
predominantly Marxist" (1993b: 105, my emphasis). As I have demonstrated, what 
displaced the latter scholarship is an apparently "liberal-pluralist" literary-cultural 
criticism that was amenable to the atmosphere of negotiated settlement. 
That the critique of postcolonial theory in South Africa has been ignored also becomes 
clear in Attwell's Rewriting Modernity: Studies in black South African Literary History 
(2005). Attwell nowhere (not once) explicitly registers Visser and Sole's critiques. 
Without any particular citation, Attwell remarks, in the "Preface" to the aforementioned 
work, that "By the early 1990s the debate over the place of postcolonial studies in South 
Africa was firmly under way: should we reject this foreign, homogenising, ahistoricising, 
'poststructuralist' import, or should we reinvent it on our own terms" (2005 :ix). 1 would 
argue that what is rather "homogenising" and "ahistoricising" is precisely Attwell's 
occlusion of what is an important debate within South African intellectual discussion. Of 
course Attwell has registered the terms of the debate. This can be seen in the 
preoccupations and changed order of priorities in his following assertion: 
asserting "that [he is] close to nervous breakdown; that [he is]; [and that he is] a neurotic" (Sole, 1994b:61-
62); see Willoughby, Lewis Nkosi and Gareth Cornwell's responses, all in the same issue as Sole's essay 
and rejoinder. 
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1 could speak of the ways in which the country's celebrated pluralism masks the 
racist legacies of the past; of a deepening or a 'normalisation' of class division as 
the middle class becomes more black than white ... The question for South 
Africa, then, is how to translate the terms of [a dominant 'liberal capitalism'] in 
ways that are appropriate to our history and the country's political, social and 
cultural priorities ... the challenge is whether the country will repeat liberal 
capitalism's manifest failures or whether it will translate its underlying promises 
appropriately. Such is the game that the post-apartheid settlement is playing. 
(2005:6, my emphasis) 
Arguably, Attwell can now be seen to acknowledge Visser and Sole's critiques of a 
submerged "liberal-pluralist" tendency, as well as their assertion of the need for more 
attention to class analysis within South African postcolonial criticism. Also, note the 
affirmation of term 'post-apartheid', together with the implied order of priorities in 
Attwell's comments. 
Finally, I would like to clarify how the title of my project relates to my central 
thesis: how efficacious are deconstructive practices when brought to the interrogation of 
postcolonial contexts? This question is necessarily, as I hope I have illustrated, also a 
question of the particular appropriation of postcoloniality and deconstruction. Thus my 
bracketing of "post" together with the pluralizing of the term "colonial" in 
(post)colonialities, is an attempt to highlight some of the protean contexts, histories and 
articulations of colonial discourse and postcolonial theory. In the debates that I have 
critically analysed, this has meant minimally to understand the different enunciative 
contexts that inform (post)colonial theory. So too my pluralizing of "deconstruction". 
The second part of my title, as illustrated in my discussion of all the previous debates, 
was an attempt to place the terms of the debate under a type of probative erasure. This 
was done in order to highlight the text of what I argue has been taken, mistaken or 
(mis)taken in postcolonial theory, and what has at times placed the intellectual practices 
of these latter appropriations into double-binds. I have tried to conceive of the trace of 
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such an erasure as both the undecidability or futurity of the ethico-political promise 
always already in the enunciations of the debates. 
It would be much too easy to end there. It would also be too easy - without easing - to 
enter into some specie of moralistic diatribe about present material conditions in South 
Africa. Surely a deconstructive postcolonial criticism (no less than the response) has a 
responsibility towards that too? Such a question, as I have already demonstrated in my 
discussion of the "political demand" made of Derrida's work (in chapter three), is 
interesting in its interest to read deconstruction in a particularly pejorative manner. To 
ask the question of the question means to question its priority. The responsibility is 
already t/here. However, the question still - in a kind of stasis that should not annul the 
movement of a deconstruction - needs an answer: South Africa is assuredly a country 
that is in need of urgency. Some perhaps would cry out (and they already do, everyday) a 
state of emergency. It is, in fact, a country where the National Democratic Revolution -
that principle, alliance, and movement for liberation - took place, some might say, 
without revolution. That is, how quickly it became (necessarily?) married to (others say 
marred by) democratic-capitalism. Here, we have the socio-economic state policies of 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) and Affirmative Action (AA) 'to 
address the imbalances of the past' or 'level the playing fields'. On the one hand, to the 
rural and poor these policies mean, among other things, improving sanitation through the 
elimination of the 'bucket-system' - a euphemism that should never elide the quotidian 
humiliation - within a timeframe that continues to be officially revised as the state strains 
under the demands for service delivery. Hence the rise of grassroots civic or social 
movements. 
On the other hand, the rise of a black elite, the embourgeoisement, the creation of a 
black-capitalist class - somehow the term Black Diamond is coined to identify it. (There 
is a history that inhabits that term, no less than the coining - who is coining it in South 
Africa, and why? That history calls for reading.) Here, the current practice of AA has led 
the Black Management Forum to call for the exclusion of white women from the category 
of "previously disadvantaged". Here too, on the one hand a chronic lack of human capital 
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- a "skills shortage" in the official idiom - lived by half the working-age population as an 
unemployment rate of around 42 percent under the broad definition (or the no less 
salutary figure of around 31 percent in the official calculation)14. On the other hand, the 
exclusivity, the barriers to entry, of tertiary education, whether these are seen as 
economic, linguistic, institutional culture or whatever, together with skills mobility or a 
flight of skills from the country, a "brain drain" - some say, among other things, the 
consequences of the international division of labour or the high incidence of (violent) 
crime in South Africa. Here too, a grave HIV-AIDS pandemic, where the state president 
enters an ideological debate about the efficacy (and dangers of international 
(pharmaceutical) prescriptions. 
The economy of the text of contemporary South Africa highlighted in the above 
ruminations is at best, rudimentary. It also deliberately foregrounds the text of the 
political economy of contemporary South Africa. Perhaps, no less than anywhere else in 
the world today, South Africa is a country where, to paraphrase Spivak out of context, 
one cannot not read the material. Although now, the textuality of the material would be 
posed as question and thus no longer be (and never really was) self-sufficient in a stasis 
that would merely appeal to its massively present reality. This would also render 
insufficient the mere appropriation of a postcolonial theoretical lexicon. To follow 
Spivak's insistence that intellectuals mark their political positionality is necessitated in 
South Africa, given the disparate class (and race) inequality that characterises the 
country. The postcolonial intellectual as an elite member of South African society is 
implicated within those social relations. The South African case necessitates that 
postcolonial critics realise, following Bhabha, that the urgency called forth in/by the 
country is also a question of emergence into an otherwise. 
It is for these reasons that I hope to have shown that it is necessary to reread the debates 
that I have discussed in this thesis. To revisit these debates would require something 
14 See Patrick Bond's discussion, in Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa 
(2005), of what he calls the South African "governments semantic dance", in its calculation of the 'narrow' 
definition and refusal of the 'broad' definition of unemployment in 2003 (2005:263; 363). For similar 
figures and assertions about South Africa's economic indicators, see also MacDonald (2006:150-152). 
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other than the deadlocked institutional politics that have informed the South African 
appropriation of (and response to) postcolonial theory. I hold that the task of the South 
African postcolonial critic is precisely to think through the difficulties that are manifested 
in contemporary South Africa. I hope to have illustrated that it is precisely a 
deconstructive postcolonial reading that would be germane to the reading of those 
difficulties. The slogan of the state's media campaign to foster something like an African-
national consciousness, uttered by none other than the current state president, assures us . 
that South Africa is "alive with possibility". To follow Derrida's apprehension of the 
complexity of the question of apartheid is perhaps to begin to read the heterogeneity of 
that possibility, the striking complexity of the text of contemporary South Africa and the 
difficulties facing a deconstructive postcolonial analysis to come. 
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